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There is a sizeable lacuna in the literature on civil society activism in authoritarian 
contexts. My research aims to address this gap by offering a conceptual framework 
that covers two contrasting forms of activism, i.e. NGO- and citizen-led activism. In 
particular, the thesis provides a detailed ethnographic account of both NGO- and 
citizen-led activism in Vietnam and reflects upon the politics of evolving state-
society relations in the same country. Analytically, drawing on the relational 
approach to civil society and mainstream social movement theories, the research 
focuses on legitimacy, autonomy, as well as formality and informality as the 
defining characteristics of civil society activism. This framework is applied in the 
context of Vietnam but arguably can be applied in other authoritarian contexts. This 
is because these concepts are not only grounded in theories, for they are validated 
and triangulated through my data collection and analysis.  
In relation to the NGO-led activism, the thesis showcases a detailed process through 
which a local NGO orchestrates mobilisation to help local ethnic minorities claim 
forest land from the state institutions. In relation to the citizen-led activism, the 
thesis examines a recent broad-based citizen-led movement (the Trees Movement) 
established to oppose the government’s decision to cut down thousands of large 
old trees lining the streets of Hanoi and to demand government accountability. 
Whilst the latter displays a transient, time-bound, issue-based and more 
antagonistic form of activism, the former illustrates a more sustainable, 
collaborative, embedded form. Both case studies seek to generate regulatory 
legitimacy for their activism by appealing to the official state agenda and discourse. 
Yet, critical differences exist between their legitimation strategies. Whilst the NGO 
focused on generating pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy, the Trees Movement was 
more concerned with generating normative legitimacy. 
In seeking to understand civil society activism in Vietnam, this thesis challenges 
mainstream civil society theories (liberal tradition) that portray an autonomous and 
conflictual state-society relationship. It also challenges dominant social movement 
theories (political process theory) that focus exclusively on the dynamics of overt 
confrontation with the state. By embracing and problematising different forms of 
civil society activism, the thesis argues that civil society groups under authoritarian 
regimes like Vietnam, regardless of whether they are formal and registered or 
informal and unregistered, have to orchestrate their activism within the state 
agenda and discourse. Since state authority under authoritarianism remains strong 
and resilient in the face of a strengthening civil society, being embedded in the state 
is critical because it offers some guarded room for manoeuvre for civil society 




Existing scholarship on civil society activism in Vietnam has focused on either state 
or society-led change. This has led to two different narratives: one around the 
notion of a strong state and the other around the notion of a vibrant civil society. 
The thesis contests these polarities and argues that a strong state is not 
synonymous with state effectiveness and accountability, and that a vibrant civil 
society does not necessarily lead to positive social outcomes such as political reform 
or democratisation. Crucially as civil society activism grows and takes on innovative 
forms, the strength of the state seems also to be growing.  
This thesis rejects the tendency that exists in much of the current literature to 
downplay NGO-led engagement at the expense of more antagonistic forms of 
activism, such as public protests and social movements. Existing accounts also tend 
to treat each form of activism separately. My research looks at the two forms 
comparatively and recognises their differences as well as their similarities, their 
opportunities and their challenges. The central argument is that the growth and 
expansion of civil society activism are intricately intertwined with political authority 
and power. The thesis shows that civil society in Vietnam is a vibrant, diverse and 
evolving space. Its future development and evolution will depend on its ability to 
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“Long live the glorious Communist Party of Vietnam”, an official banner designed in 
red and yellow, can easily catch one’s eyes when setting foot into any government 
building in Vietnam. Like citizens living under other single-party regimes, many 
Vietnamese nowadays have become immune to this ruling communist slogan. 
Waking up at dawn, buzzing through the streets thick with traffic and noise on their 
motorbikes in search of daily subsistence, fortune, opportunity, or greater wealth, 
most Vietnamese have other things to be concerned about rather than the glory of 
the party or the fate of unelected leaders. Since the downturn of the national 
economy in 2008, a year that marked the end of an extended period of rapid 
economic growth (Beauge, 2010), the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has been 
beset by a host of socio-economic, political and environmental problems. These 
include, for example, rampant corruption in state-owned industries, industrial 
strikes over shrinking wages, and farmers’ protests about destitution and eviction 
from their property. In particular, the recent rise of the so-called anti-China 
nationalist movement in Vietnam, led by intellectuals and supported mostly by 
urban youth, albeit fragmented and fragile, has openly challenged the close 
relationship that the CPV has established with Beijing (Vu, 2014). All of these issues 
constitute a huge challenge for the ruling party. 
 
In retrospect, the doi moi (reform) policies of 1986, a response to the economic 
crisis of the time, have helped the country to reduce poverty (e.g. from 60 percent 
to 20 percent in the past twenty years) and achieve a high economic growth rate of 
6-7 percent per year (World Bank, 2012). The CPV, however, has still held firmly 
onto its commitments to uphold the Marxist doctrinism and one-party rule. Despite 
the economic progress, the reality of market-oriented development, compounded 
with socialist commitment, has unleashed political tensions which make state-
society relations highly complex. Since its establishment in 1930, the CPV has 
dominated state politics and social affairs. In a famous dictum, Lord Acton (1887, 
n.p.) once said, “Absolute power demoralises. Power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely”. In Vietnam, the entrenched one-party rule (with no 
tolerance towards the emergence of an opposition party) has become a fertile 




After doi moi, international donors and International Non Govermental 
Oraganisations (INGOs) arrived in the country with money to experiment with a 
myriad of development models. The advent of these external actors, coupled with 
the internal economic dynamism, brought many apparent benefits including the 
emergence of new societal actors, including local NGOs and other forms of civil 
society organisation, claiming to represent new interests in society (Sidel, 1995; 
Kerkvliet, 2001). In particular, a wide range of new associational groups have been 
seeking space from the state, constituting one of the most exciting, dynamic sectors 
in the changing political landscape of Vietnam (PPWG, 2016). This phenomenon has 
enabled a major restructuring of state-society relations in Vietnam. 
 
Figure 1. “Promote success and eagerly move forward” (Workers and farmers, two 
vanguard forces on a propaganda poster during the American war) 
 
(Source: Invent the Future, 2015) 
 
During my fieldwork in Vietnam in 2014-2015, there were several critical 
associational events, both online and offline, that I, as a researcher, felt fortunate to 
observe. These included demonstrations against the lack of government 




the visit of Xi Jinping, the Chinese President. Observing these events allowed me to 
gain greater insights into the changing civic space, which, albeit still limited, 
continues to expand. As one of my respondents, an experienced independent 
activist, put it:  
“2015 is an eventful year of civil society activism in Vietnam. We can see it 
as a year of fierce fighting between the ruling power and burgeoning civil 
society groups, including, both registered NGOs and independent 
organisations. They are working towards a more accountable government, a 
more liberal society with democratic practice to be exercised and human 
rights to be upheld.” (Interview, 15 June 2015, Hanoi). 
Generally, Vietnamese from diverse backgrounds are becoming more vocal about 
socio-economic and political issues (Wells-Dang, 2014). This is explained partly by 
the widespread use of digital tools and social media platforms where civilians and 
civil society groups can mobilise and act. A foreign scholar of Vietnamese politics 
expressed the view that a state-led civil society or state corporatism no longer 
reflects the changing political landscape of contemporary Vietnam, for it fails to 
explain the dynamics and complexity of civil society activism (Interview, 06 
December 2014, Saigon).  
Vietnam’s politics are changing at a faster pace than its ruling party is prepared to 
admit and predict (London, 2016), which can be witnessed in the opening up of 
contested space, both in the virtual sphere and real life. Civil society is moving 
dynamically towards pluralism, with the expansion of urban intellectuals, educated 
youths, rights activists, bloggers and the growth of grassroots movements, in 
parallel with traditional forms of engagement carried out by registered NGOs. In 
particular, the increasing grassroots activism is accentuating the ‘contested’ nature 
of civil society activism that has been long obscured by the rhetoric that civil society 
in authoritarian regimes like Vietnam is either co-opted or suppressed. These forms 
of civil society activism showcase different dimensions of associationalism and also 
different types of political pressures, each of which has an important role to play in 
effecting change and (re)structuring state-society relations in Vietnam.  
 
Social change is a ubiquitous narrative across the country, but the nature and 
politics of this change remains far from conclusive and this topic is much 
understudied. Despite the positive economic effects of doi moi, there is a question 




from the economics of change, there are certainly significant factors concerning the 
politics of change that need to be captured. It is therefore incumbent on the 
scholarly community to understand analytically the evolving state-society relations 
under the single-party rule of Vietnam. 
 
In order to understand the dynamics of change pertinent to state-society relations, 
it is important and useful to look carefully at the institutions associated with 
promoting that change. This thesis aims to contribute to this understanding by 
looking at the phenomenon of civil society activism carried out by both local NGOs 
and civilian actors. My research explores contemporary civil society activism in 
Vietnam and reflects on the politics of the evolving state-society relations in that 
country. This is achieved through an analysis of two different forms of activism, i.e. 
NGO-led and citizen-led activism, with an examination that locates them in a wider 
historical context. I examine in detail both forms of activism and then analyse 
comparatively their characteristics, limitations and opportunities. This comparison, 
rooted in my analytical framework, facilitates a wider consideration of civil society 
activism in authoritarian contexts.  
 
In particular, the primary focus of the study involves tracing and exploring the 
processes through which civil society groups with different organisational 
structures, degrees of autonomy and positions of legitimacy orchestrate collective 
action. Given these differentiated elements, I examine how these groups organise 
and situate themselves in the relationships that they respond to and become 
enmeshed within. In the same vein, I explore the strategies and tactics they deploy 
to legitimate their actions, how they establish different kinds of coalitions and 
networks, and how they appeal to the interplay of both formal and informal 
channels to exercise their activism.  
 
Regarding the NGO-led activism case study, I place emphasis on its processes of 
legitimation, its coalition building and its strategic recourse to structural links at 
different levels in order to achieve its mobilising objectives, rather than focusing on 
the normative qualities and characteristics pertinent to the NGO. Meanwhile, with 
regard to the citizen-led activism case study, I shed light onto a recent organic 
grassroots movement staged by Hanoians, who organised themselves into informal 




government’s arbitrary decision to cut down thousands of large old trees lining the 
city streets.        
 
Conceptually, I argue that it is not appropriate to apply dominant civil society 
theories that are rooted in Western contexts to examine the dynamics of change 
pertinent to state-society relations in authoritarian regimes, such as Vietnam. It is 
already well documented that state-society relations under any political system are 
never static and established; instead they are continually negotiated over time as 
the actors involved respond to and pursue different causes and motives (Devine, 
1999). State-society relations in Vietnam are evolving and run counter to many 
assumptions underpinning the dominant theories. In seeking to understand civil 
society activism in Vietnam, this thesis challenges mainstream civil society theories 
that position civil society autonomously from the state. It also challenges dominant 
social movement theories that focus exclusively on overt forms of political 
contention. By embracing and problematising different forms of civil society 
activism that are rooted in local realities and practice, I argue that civil society 
groups in authoritarian contexts like Vietnam, irrespective of their institutional 
characteristics, have to couch their activities within the state agenda and discourse 
in order to exercise their activism. When state authority under authoritarianism 
remains strong and resilient in the face of a strengthening civil society, being 
embedded in the state remains crucial, because it offers a relatively guarded space 
for civil society groups to accomplish collective goals.   
 
There is a sizeable lacuna in the literature on civil society activism in authoritarian 
contexts. The existing scholarship is fragmentary and lacks a strong theoretical 
paradigm. Hence, my research aims to address this gap by offering a conceptual 
framework that covers both NGO- and citizen-led activism. The relevant concepts 
developed in the thesis (legitimacy, autonomy, as well as formality and informality 
of activism) capture the dynamics and intricacies of these different forms of 
activism. They are not only grounded in theories, for they also represent the most 
distinctive features growing out of local realities of associationalism in Vietnam. This 
analytical framework is also resonant to varying degrees with civil society activism 
in other authoritarian regimes. In addition to its conceptual contribution to the 




contributes to existing literature on legitimacy, autonomy and (in)formality in 
particular. 
 
The major finding of my research is that under authoritarian contexts the distinction 
made between NGO-led and citizen-led activism may not be that strong since there 
are significant similarities in the way these different activisms are articulated and 
operationalised. This is considered a significant contribution to the existing 
literature on civil society activism in non-democratic or less liberal regimes.  
 
The thesis rejects the tendency that exists in much of the current literature that has 
paid more attention to contentious forms of activism such as public protests and 
social movements at the expense of traditional form of NGO-led activism. The 
existing accounts also tend to treat each form of activism separately, but my study 
examines both of them with equal focus. The thesis argues that a more nuanced 
understanding of evolving state-society relations can emerge from an approach that 
lays equal emphasis on these different forms. In addition, through a rigorous 
empirical study of the Trees Movement, the research provides novel in-depth 
understanding of how civilians exercise public contestation under the one-party rule 
of Vietnam. It offers a timely bottom-up account of a citizen-led movement and 
points to the potential significance of critical green activism in restructuring state-
society relations in Vietnam, with the role of social media being discernible. 
The following research questions were formulated to assist me in attaining my 
research objectives.  
First, what organisational forms do civil society groups adopt and how are 
these positioned in relation to the state?  
Second, what strategies of engagement do civil society groups adopt in 
order to achieve their goals?  
Third, how do the contrasting forms of civil society activism illuminate the 
evolving state-society relations in Vietnam?   
 
These questions opened much space for me to discover and triangulate different 
empirical perspectives. They helped me explore the most distinctive dimensions of 
civil society activism in Vietnam, which I formulated under the key themes I 




informality of activism. Taken concurrently, they also allowed me to reflect upon 
the evolving state-society relations in Vietnam. 
 
To address these research questions, I followed ethnographic research 
complemented by observation, marginal participation, numerous qualitative 
interviews, verbal and non-verbal communications and sometimes simply being in 
the right place at the right time to capture critical moments. My two in-depth case 
studies focused on two locations far away from one another, one in Hanoi, which is 
home to the national government offices and the largest hub of local NGOs, whilst 
the other is in a rural area of a poor province in the central region, Quang Binh. 
Hence, I had to move physically not only between these two places, but also across 
many parts of the country, both rural and urban including Saigon, Danang, Hue, Ha 
Tinh, and Nghe An to meet the right people at the right time so as to gain important 
insights for my research.  
 
The thesis has been divided into six chapters, a conclusion and this introduction. In 
Chapter one, I provide a historical overview of the dynamics of contemporary civil 
society in Vietnam, as well as an analysis of the dominant conceptual approaches 
used to understand state-society relations in Vietnam. In relation to the latter, I 
focus specifically on the ‘strong state versus vibrant civil society’ debates.  
 
Chapter 2 covers theoretical discussions and subsequently, the construction of the 
analytical framework of the thesis. In this chapter, I first critically review the major 
theoretical debates about civil society activism in authoritarian contexts. Then, I 
highlight a number of key analytical concepts drawn from the literature that had 
particular relevance for my empirical research namely (i) legitimacy, (ii) autonomy 
of activism, and (iii) formality and informality of activism. The selection of these 
themes was theoretically informed and subsequently validated and triangulated 
through my data collection and analysis.  
 
Chapter 3 details methodologically how my research process evolved and 
progressed. It traces how I negotiated case studies, collected data, refined research 
questions and addressed research challenges as well as how I dealt with ethical 




certain critical moments when I, as a researcher, had to believe in my vantage point 
or my ‘insider knowledge’ to decide to embark on a different path, in order to 
enhance the novelty and significance of my research.    
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 discuss my empirical findings. Specifically, Chapter 4 showcases 
the Trees Movement (TM), a recent broad-based citizen-led movement established 
to oppose the government’s decision to cut down thousands of large old trees lining 
the streets of Hanoi. This case study represents an autonomous, antagonistic form 
of civil society activism, which stands in stark contrast to the NGO-led activism, the 
second in-depth case study presented in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the complex processes, whereby different 
civil society groups orchestrated collective actions to request the government to 
stop cutting down the trees and also to demand it to be deliberative and 
accountable. Drawing on the TM, I argue that citizen-led activism, an emerging form 
of civic engagement, is likely to play a critical role in effecting change and 
(re)structuring state-society relations in Vietnam. This is because it signals to the 
political elites that ordinary civilians are able to orchestrate rightful civic actions to 
oppose unpopular and unaccountable state decisions and policies. The chapter also 
signals the rise of a critical green public sphere, in which the use of digital tools and 
social media is undoubtedly of importance in organising collective action. The 
chapter ends by discussing how the government responded to the movement 
groups through the analytical lens of three dimensions of power provided by Lukes 
(1974).  
 
Chapter 5 analyses another form of activism that is embedded in the state and led 
by a registered NGO. It focuses on the case study of a local NGO, named Centre for 
Community Empowerment and Rural Development (CCERD). It details how CCERD 
orchestrated mobilisation to help local ethnic minorities claim land. This case study 
is an embodiment of NGO-led activism that seeks to engage in critical activism 
through collaborative approach. Its mobilisation finally put the local government in 
position where the latter was compelled to deliver progressive policy outputs to the 
local landless poor. This case study also informs us about the local politics in 
Vietnam, where the state apparatus is not homogeneous and the violation of the 




by taking advantage of their embedded connections to the state, working within 
and through bureaucratic structures, manipulating structural links, as well as 
strategising the interplay of formality and informality of activism, VNGOs are 
carving out more room for themselves to manoeuvre in critical actions.   
 
Chapter 6 directly engages in the comparative analysis of two different forms of civil 
society activism embodied in the two in-depth case studies. In order to do this, the 
chapter uses the domains developed in the analytical framework (i.e. legitimacy, 
autonomy of activism along with formality and informality of activism) as the basis 
for these comparisons. In so doing, the intersections and contrasts of both forms of 
civil society activism are discerned and analysed in depth. Intermingled with this 
analysis is an endeavour to locate these forms of activism in a wider historical 
context in order to understand how these forms can potentially restructure state-
society relations in Vietnam. The chapter argues that civil society groups in 
authoritarian contexts like Vietnam, regardless of their organisational structures, 
positions of legitimacy or degrees of autonomy, have to couch their activities within 
the state agenda and discourse to orchestrate collective action. 
 
Whilst the Trees Movement portrays a case study where discrete informal civilian 
groups organised themselves and stood up to the state and displays a transient, 
time-bound and more antagonistic form of activism, the NGO case study illustrates 
a more sustainable, collaborative, embedded form. As such, the two case studies 
represent two relatively contrasting forms of civil society activism and also different 
episodes of contentious politics in Vietnam, ranging from dialogue to advocacy 
through to contention. 
 
The conclusion of the thesis summarises the major findings of my research and 
addresses the research questions. It also reflects on the broader implications of the 
thesis findings and locates its contribution within the existing literature on civil 












“[…] no… no… they (i.e. the Communist Party of Vietnam) claim to the world 
they are committed to upholding the Marxist ideology, but how they are 
treating civil society in reality is totally opposite to what they claim. If they 
truly followed Marx, they would never see civil society as an instrument of 
peaceful revolution, because Marx believes in civil society and doesn’t talk 
about civil society like that. […] They want to combine communism and 
capitalism… how?... it sounds like they want to combine water and fire… 
how? It’s impossible. […] and it’s absurd to think that economic liberalisation 
can be successful in the absence of political liberalisation. […] political 
reform or this country is going nowhere? (Interview, 20th May 2015, Hanoi).  
In the late 1980s, the collapse of the central-planned economy imposed by the 
Communist party of Vietnam (CPV) led to a serious economic crisis and 
hyperinflation (775% in 1986) (Vuong, 2014). The daunting unbearable reality 
caused the CPV to put in place reform policies. It has been almost thirty years since 
Vietnam embarked on a so-called ‘socialist–oriented market economy’, also known 
as doi moi (Renovation). The reform has transformed the country economically and 
socially, bringing millions of people out of poverty and raising people’s living 
standards (UNDP, 2016). It has also resulted in a major restructuring of society 
evidenced in the emergence and rise to prominence of new societal actors such as 
local NGOs (Sidel, 1995). This has opened up new spaces of engagement for non-
state actors seeking social change and policy impact (Kerkvliet, 2001). Yet, Vietnam 
has still held firmly onto its commitment to a socialist path and one-party rule. The 
state’s open-door policies, viewed by many as an anchor for a more liberal society 
to cling on to, are considered as synonymous with the retreat of the authoritarian 
state. This may be the case, but to date there has been no systematic research on 
this.  
Taking a closer look at the political context of Vietnam, local realities reveal that 
beneath the exterior of a so-called political transformation lies the destiny of a 
whole nation that is believed to have the potentials and capacities to become a 




social values and standards, and escalating inequality. Often, this state of affairs is 
associated with allegations of epidemic corruption, powerful vested interests, state-
sponsored crony capitalism and overall, a flawed political system. The unusual 
marriage of socialist commitments with capitalist aspirations has unleashed a 
myriad of paradoxes that make the issue of state-society relations highly complex. It 
places theorists and thinkers in a quandary about where exactly the CPV is leading 
the country and how it can reconcile such a combination. Some sceptics even go so 
far as to say that for the past thirty years the social transformation in Vietnam has 
been incarcerated owing to the fact that the country has gone straight from 
collectivisation to crony capitalism with not much in between, and they doubt that 
those who have benefited so much from the system have any incentive to 
dismantle it (Pilling, 2017).  
 
This chapter examines the empirical context and critically assesses existing 
academic accounts of social and political change in Vietnam. State-society relations 
in Vietnam are in flux, which can be evidenced in the new emerging forms of civil 
society actions ranging from engagement by registered NGOs to critical activism by 
independent activists and dissidents through to grassroots movements. These 
forms of activism constitute different slants of the associationalism in contemporary 
Vietnam, nevertheless since doi moi generally only NGO actions have been more 
focused upon and grassroots movements have been understudied for various 
reasons with political sensitivity being the most discernible one. My research fills 
this gap by offering two contrasting case studies representing different forms of civil 
society activism in Vietnam that serve to assist me in examining the changing 
dynamics of state-society relations in the country.   
 
The chapter starts by providing a historical overview of Vietnamese civil society, 
with a particular focus on how and why Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) emerged. Then, 
it describes critical periods of Vietnamese civil society development along with 
insights into the activism initiated by independent groups. 
 
The second part of the chapter sheds light on two main perspectives growing out of 
the existing literature on state-society relations in Vietnam namely, a strong state 
vs. vibrant civil society, in other words, state- or society-led change will be the 




historically in the evolving political landscape of Vietnam. While regarding the 
former, the role of the state is advocated, whereby a more tolerant state-society 
relation is ascribed to decisions taken by the state, under the latter, it is believed 
that society is an incubator/driver of change. There has, however, been relatively 
little rigorous analysis into the relative merits and weaknesses of the state- or 
society-led change perspectives, especially in relation to the dynamics of evolving 
state-society relations. Mapping out these perspectives with substantial historical 
cases is foundational for exploring contemporary civil society activism in Vietnam as 
well as locating it in a wider historical context. 
 
As the millennium came and went, scholars and commentators long struggled to 
understand evolving state-society relations in contemporary Vietnam. Whilst recent 
studies, albeit peripheral, have endeavoured to unravel the complexity of 
restructuring state-society relations, there is no academic or policy consensus on 
the shape and meaning of these relations. There are a number of key questions 
unanswered. Is the party state or civil society strengthening? Does civil society 
genuinely have room to manoeuvre in a country that is conventionally considered 
an authoritarian state? Is the emergent space for civil society action contingent on 
the incremental relaxing of the party state? What are prospects of change arising 
from different forms of civil society activism? What are the potential risks and 
opportunities that each form entails? Through explicating the different forms of civil 
society activism found in Vietnam, my thesis contributes new insights to the existing 
literature regarding these concerns in authoritarian contexts. 
 
 
2. Vietnamese civil society 
 
Before presenting an historical account of civil society (xã hội dân sự) in Vietnam, it 
is worth mentioning how the term is defined in the Vietnamese context. 
Conceptually, attempts to define civil society have persisted throughout history 
with little consensus, which is due to the high complexity pertaining to its 
relationships with the state (Chandhoke, 1995). When the term of Western 
traditions was imported to Vietnam through the international development 
discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the period coincident with historic 




Tiananmen Square in China, it was shunned by the CPV. That is, the term ‘civil 
society’ is almost never used in state official documents and in the mainstream 
media in Vietnam. No official legal or policy documents refer to this term in its 
entirety. State officials are fearful of or averse to using the term in formal forums, 
except in some informal conversations with researchers such as myself. However, 
they are more willing to discuss specific issues, such as ‘how associations have to 
follow registration procedures’, ‘mass organisations are helping their represented 
groups’, or ‘how donors should work with local governments’. The pressure to use 
this term, Hannah (2007) indicates, was placed on the Vietnamese state by the 
donor community, since the international development discourse in the 1990s was 
advocating the strengthening of civil society and there was a need to translate into 
Vietnamese donor documents that use the English term extensively.  
 
Whilst the term civil society remains unrecognised in the official state discourse, 
this is not to say that the dynamics of associationalism pertinent to Vietnamese 
society is to be downplayed. The section that follows, provides a historical overview 
of civil society development in Vietnam, whereby the evolving dynamics of 
associationalism is illuminated. I present the historical development of civil society 
in Vietnam before and after doi moi, followed by an explanation of the reasons 
underlying the emergence and development of VNGOs.  
 
  
2.1. Civil society in the pre-doi moi period (before 1986) 
 
A large body of English-written scholarship on the Vietnamese civil society 
demonstrates that only after doi moi did civil society emerge to the fore in Vietnam 
(Nguyen Hung Quoc, 2013). Tracing history, a few local studies, however, indicate 
the early emergence of Vietnamese associationalism, which perhaps dates back to 
after the dismantling of primitive communism and has evolved since that time 
(Thang van Phuc et al., 2002). A frequently quoted Vietnamese proverb, “Healthy 
leaves cover torn leaves” (lá lành đùm lá rách), is indicative of the traditional 




During the feudal era (i.e. before 18581), some signs of civil society were observed, 
whereby some forms of association were existent namely, family clans, fraternities 
(e.g. carpentry, bamboo hat makers), associations of mutual conscience, religious- 
or spiritual-based groups, gender-based or art-based groups. Despite the feudal 
state of most dynasties not being much interested in managing these groups, they 
somehow recognised the potential contributions of these groups towards a better 
and stable society.  
 
A good example of civil society practice during the feudal and colonial periods could 
be found in the organisation and structure of a village, which was by nature a self-
governing and self-controlling institution. This structure is highlighted by local 
historians as an early form of the Vietnamese civil society. The ‘village’ 
associationalism constitutes a typical feature of the Vietnamese culture prevalent 
not only in the traditional society, but also in Vietnam today. What is this village 
culture and why is it considered an early form of Vietnamese civil society?  
 
The prolonged foreign occupations (French colonialism 1858 – 1945) in the country 
through centuries induced a practice in which the local leadership and local people 
were to coalesce together to oppose foreign rulers. Local rulers, especially those at 
the lowest level, were basically among the oppressed subjects and hence, they 
wanted to promote rather than hinder democratic village traditions (Pham Binh 
Son, 1997; Pham Van Bich, 1999). Traditionally, a village was regulated by customs, 
customary rules, or commune charters, and managed by a committee of 
representatives nominated by its communities (i.e. a form of direct democracy). 
Self-control meant that each village was responsible for its own affairs independent 
from the control of the state administration apparatus and state laws, whilst self-
governing referred to rights to participation in decision making exercised by each 
community in the village. Notable regarding the course of national construction and 
defence, was the existence of two systems operating in parallel, i.e. village rule and 
state law (Le Van Quang and Van Duc Thanh, 2003). The latter was a 
conglomeration of universal institutions regulating society at a nation-wide scale, 
and compulsory for all to exercise, whereas the former exposed its effects within 
the village boundary. During feudal times, village rules were regarded sub-law 
                                                          





institutions, albeit informal and downplayed by the feudal state. Evidence, however, 
shows that in many instances, where both the state laws and the village rules were 
involved to address village-related issues, triumph, more often than not, went to 
the institutions at the lower level. This traditional practice still resonates with 
present-day society and offers a good reference for explaining why various central-
level policies fail to be enforced at local levels. That is, in many instances local 
governments bypass superiors’ rules to realise what they wish to attain. Koh (2001) 
relates this phenomenon to Parkinson’s disease, whereby the central government 
considered as the brain located in Hanoi cannot always control the movements of 
its body parts throughout the whole country.   
 
Historical evidence has also revealed that Vietnam had a rich associational life in the 
early 20th century during the French colonisation (Bach Tan Sinh, 2011). This period 
witnessed a proliferation of individually established associations and social 
movements conducive to social activities and revolutionary cause (ibid). The period 
between 1858 and 1945, saw a series of national liberation and class struggles. 
Voluntary associations were formed to fight against the oppression by the ruling 
power. These groups extended their operation beyond their fraternities, hamlets or 
villages, with some even reaching out the provincial and national level. Critical to 
this era was the birth of a number of political associations aimed at mobilising and 
educating people to rise up to fight for national liberation. Remarkable were the 
associations led by reformist intellectuals in early 1900s such as Đông Kinh Nghĩa 
Thục (aka Tonkin Free School) founded by Phan Chu Trinh in 1907; Duy Tân hội (aka 
Vietnam Modernisation Association) – a revolutionary organisation (1904-1912), 
Việt Nam Quang Phục Hội (aka Vietnamese Restoration League) in 1912, and the 
Dong Du Movement (Visit the East) in 1906, all created by Phan Boi Chau. Notably, 
Việt Nam Quang Phục Hội was established with the agenda of overturning French 
colonial rule and putting in its place a democratic republic, but it was repressed 
soon after it was created. However, it had a strong impact upon subsequent 
anticolonial organisations (Marr, 1971). Most associations established in this period 
were urban-based and worked actively until 1945.  
 
According to Nguyen Lenh (2013), prior to the first Constitution of the Vietnamese 
State in 1946, there existed almost thirty organisations, with political purposes and 




These political organisations (not socio-economic oriented organisations) tended to 
call themselves associations, parties, fronts, leagues, unions, or alliances. To name 
some, Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội (League for the Independence of Vietnam), 
An Nam Cộng sản Đảng (An Nam Communist Party), Hội Việt Nam Cách mạng 
Thanh niên (The Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League), Đảng Dân chủ Việt Nam 
(Democratic Party of Vietnam), Đảng xã hội Việt Nam (Social Party of Vietnam), Đại 
Việt Quốc gia Liên minh (Dai Viet National Alliance) and Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam 
(Communist Party of Vietnam). Except for the Social Party of Vietnam, the 
Democratic Party of Vietnam and the Communist Party of Vietnam, all were 
dismantled by 1945 (the year Vietnam declared its independence).  
 
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) was established in 1930 and since then it 
has been committed to upholding the Marxim-Leninism and Hochiminh’s ideology. 
Accompanying its establishment, the CPV established the mass organisations (MOs) 
that functioned as its extended arms stretching to the grassroots level to undertake 
party propagation and mobilise mass support for class liberation and national 
liberation. The MOs during this period included the Vietnam Women’s Union, 
Farmers’ Union, Youth’s Union, and Children’s Union. In rural areas, home to nearly 
90 percent of the population at that time, farmers organised themselves into 
informal groups to develop agricultural, business and cultural activities, such as 
cultivating, harvesting groups, family business groups, folk-dance groups, or groups 
for mass education purposes. Likewise, associational activities in urban areas were 
no less active in comparison. Student-led groups emerged with various purposes, 
including entertainment, sports, or academic. Additionally, there were also religious 
associations that focused on humanitarian and charitable activities (Thang Van Phuc 
et al., 2002).  
 
In 1945, Vietnam declared its independence and was named the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam. The Article 10 of the first Constitution 1946 stipulates that 
“citizens have the right to freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom of 
organisation and assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of residence, as well as 
commuting domestically and abroad” (Nguyen Si Dung, 2013). This constitution, for 
the first time, officially recognised fundamental human rights and the pivotal role of 




this constitution referring to the leading role of any political organisations, including 
the CPV.  
 
The Geneva Accords of 1954 officially recognised Vietnam as an independent 
nation, officially putting an end to almost one hundred years of French occupation 
of the country. It also temporarily divided Vietnam into two parts with different 
regimes, i.e. the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North (i.e. under the control 
of the CPV) and the National Republic of Vietnam in the South (i.e. non-communist 
and aided by the United States and its allies). In the southern part, the National 
Republic of Vietnam (1954 – 1975) continued to apply a multi-party system with 
eight political organisations in total working both legally and illegally during the 
period 1954-1975.  
 
Regarding international NGOs (INGOs), some local sources reported that there were 
roughly 60 INGOs actively working in Vietnam until late 1974, half of which were 
American organisations mainly based in the South and focusing on humanitarian 
projects, whilst there were only four humanitarian organisations in the North (Dang, 
2009). Some path-breaking INGOs of that period were CARE, Catholic Relief 
Services, and the International Rescue Committee. These NGOs mainly delivered 
assistance for people who emigrated from the North to the South in the 1950s 
(ibid).  
 
After the South government collapsed and the American War (or Vietnam War) 
ended on 30 April 1975, the CPV declared its monopoly of power over the whole 
country. From the reunification to doi moi (1975-1986), most civil society activities 
were then terminated, with the existing organisations either being shut down or 
incorporated into a number of MOs and INGOs gradually reduced their work and 
withdrew from the country for the safety of their expatriate staff (Dang, 2009). 
During this period, associational activities were limited to party-owned MOs. 
Unfortunately, whilst many of the activities of the southern NGOs contributed to a 
vibrant civil society before 1975, understanding regarding these is problematic 
because their activities were almost undocumented and a large part of the material 




In brief, Vietnam historically used to have a relatively dynamic associational life 
before the reunification (1975). It can be seen that civil society activities of this 
period could fit into the dominant civil society theory, for their activism was inclined 
to challenging the feudalist and imperialist state, rather than accommodating it.   
 
 
2.2. Civil society after 1986 
 
The milestone of doi moi policies initiated in 1986 brought about socio-economic 
change for the country. Development aid and FDI quickly arrived, enabling the 
emergence of new societal actors who sought to take on new roles. Noticeable 
among these new societal actors, was the proliferation of local registered non-
governmental organisations (VNGOs) in the mid-1990s, a term that many 
Vietnamese had never heard of at that time. Additionally, recently there has been a 
growing number of independent activists, rights activists, bloggers, informal civil 
society groups and networks, exercising contestation both online and offline.  
 
It is argued that it will be misleading to continue to label Vietnam’s state-society 
relations as a mono-organisational model in the aftermath of doi moi (Vinh, 2006). 
Specifically, Will (2006) argues that civil society actors in Vietnam have become 
more adept at organising themselves into building new relationships with the 
government of different levels conducive to addressing governance deficits and 
development challenges. 
 
What are the components of civil society in Vietnam? Substantial scholarship on the 
topic indicates that using the liberal view that regards ‘state’ and ‘society’ as distinct 
spheres to examine civil society in Vietnam would miss out several important 
actors, activities and events inhering in civil society (Kerkvliet, 1995). Associations in 
Vietnam are structured in a way that they are made to entangle with the state, if 
they wish to seek organisational legitimacy. So, in order to overcome the limitations 
of the liberal perspective, the existing scholarship on Vietnamese civil society tends 
to place emphasis on processes, functions and activities that those organisations 




Since the term ‘civil society’ is not used in the official discourse, nor is it easy to 
distinguish associations in Vietnam, development agencies operating there tend to 
define it in a way that is adaptive to a particular project or development approach 
(Hannah, 2007). For example, CIVICUS, in its initial assessment of civil society in 
Vietnam, adopts a broad definition that includes various types of organisations that 
are not necessarily seen as integral parts of civil society in Vietnam, i.e. “the arena 
outside the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance 
common interests” (see Figure 2) (CIVICUS, 2006, p.31). With this definition, civil 
society includes all kinds of activities through which people come to organise, 
associate and seek to influence the wider community. It also indicates fuzzy 
boundaries between civil society and other sectors, shifting the focus from 
organisational structures to functions and actions of civil society members and 
organisations.  
Figure 2. The fuzzy boundaries of the civil society arena in Vietnam 
 
(Source: CIVICUS, 2006, p.32) 
 
Amid a high density and a wide variety of associations in Vietnam, it is necessary to 
provide a typology of these associations. According to CIVICUS (2006) there are 
seven main categories: (1) Mass organisations (MOs); (2) Umbrella organisation; (3) 
Professional associations; (4) VNGOs; (5) informal groups, (6) faith-based 
organisations; and (7) INGOs (see Table 1). Nevertheless, within the scope of the 
research I only focus on VNGOs and MOs for their most relevance to the in-depth 






Table 1. Main categories of associations in Vietnam 
Categories Type  Relation to the state  
 
A. Mass organisations (MOs) 
 
1. Vietnamese Fatherland Front 
(VFF): umbrella mass organisation 
of all umbrella organisations 
 
2. Women’s Union  
 
3. Farmers’ Association 
 

























B. Umbrella organisations  
1. Red Cross  
 
2. Vietnam Union of Science and 
Technology Associations (VUSTA) 
 
 
3. Business Associations 
 
4. Union of Arts and Literature 
(VUALL)  
 
5. Old Age Association 
 
6. VUFO – Vietnam Union of 
Friendship Organisations 
 




































Health NGOs, etc. 
E. Informal Groups 
 
Micro-credits, credit 




informal groupings, etc. 
some belong to 
Women’s and 
Farmers’ Unions;  
some unregistered 
but known to the 
administration 
F. Faith-based organisations  
  
Buddhist (approx. 9 
million) 
Catholic (6-8 million) 
Hoa Hao: 1.5 million 
Cao Dai: 1.1 million 
Protestant: 600,000 
Under VFF 
And some not 
registered 
G. International NGOs 
 
 
Funded from abroad, 
providing support to 
government and CSOs; 
530 INGOs operating in 





PACCOM is under 
the VUFO indicated 
above 
 (Source: CIVICUS, 2006, p.34) 
 
The Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF) and other MOs 
After doi moi, Vietnam’s society embraced more new actors such as NGOs, CBOs, 
and informal groups. Despite the associational life being no longer solely dominated 
by party-owned MOs, it is not the intention that their presence will diminish. Under 
the one-party rule of Vietnam, all MOs (i.e. socio-political organisations in 
Vietnamese definition) and all socio-professional associations and umbrella 
organisations (e.g. Lawyers Association, Writers Association, Historians Association, 




















(Source: VEPR, 2015, p.18) 
 
The VFF:  
“[…] is an integral part of the political system of Vietnam and under the 
direct leadership of the Communist Party. It is a political platform for people 
to express their wills and aspirations, for gathering and intensifying the 
national unity, […] a venue for consultation, co-ordination and unity of 
action of its member organisations, making contributions to safeguarding 
national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”. (Article 1, Law 
of the Vietnam Fatherland Front 1999).   
 
The position of the VFF in the political system as well as in society is clearly 
safeguarded in the Article 9 of the Constitution. It is an umbrella of MOs and a 
number of officially sanctioned religious groups (e.g. the Buddhist Sangha of 
Vietnam is the unique Buddhist association recognised by the Vietnamese 
government and put under the VFF). Its main functions since established heavily 
focus on propagation of party state policies at all levels. Recently, along with its 
member organisations, it has been involved in state poverty reduction programmes 
and humanitarian initiatives, for example, in propagandising and mobilising funds to 
support the local poor and those affected by natural calamities, in programmes 
such as ‘Day for the poor’ and ‘Fund for the poor’. Notably, it has recently been 
tasked with organising public participation, consultation and providing critique of 
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established MOs and not social organisations outside its auspices. The newly 
assigned roles by the VFF pose a question mark concerning how it is able to critique 
the party directives when it is one of its affiliates. In terms of religion, the VFF has 
the right to determine which religious groups will be given official recognition (Law 
of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, 1999).  
 
Currently, the VFF has 44 members including MOs, umbrella organisations, and 
other professional, political and social organisations. The CPV is also a member of 
the VFF and directs comprehensively its work. All MOs have head offices in Hanoi 
and branch offices in every province, even extending to the commune level (the 
lowest government level) (VFF, 2016). MOs are established by the Party and are 
heavily dependent on state funding. Their cadres of all levels from central to 
communes have public servant status and they receive a salary from the state 
budget. Funding to MOs comes from different sources, including the state budget 
(that accounts for the biggest share of total), charges and membership fees along 
with other external sources (VEPR, 2015). The total annual expenditure of MOs 
takes up 1.7% of the national GDP, which is twice the budget estimate for the 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health (ibid). With an oversized apparatus as 
such, the expenditure on infrastructure and the personnel of the VFF and MOs have 
sparked public criticism in the midst of alarming public debt and economic 
downturn.  
 
MOs operate nationwide with their dense networks extending to the grassroots 
level (see Table 2 for their membership). During times of war, they were an 
effective instrument for state propagation and mass mobilisation. After doi moi, 
they were given favourable conditions to reform themselves, e.g. taking on new 
roles in delivering social services to improve their members’ welfare (Sakata, 2006). 
Their new roles in service delivery and their nationwide coverage opened up 
opportunities for them to attract donor funding and in fact, many INGOs have 
sought to work with MOs rather than VNGOs to take advantage of their large 
networks. For example, the Women’s Union receives several funding resources 
from donors and INGOs to conduct micro credit programmes for poor women in 
both urban and rural areas. This practice consequently crowds out VNGOs and puts 











Farmers’ Association CPV 10.4 (2013) 
Women’s Union CPV 15.3 (2012) 
War Veterans’ 
Association 
CPV 2.7 (2014) 
Youth Union CPV 7.0 (2012) 
General Confederation 
of Labour (Trade Union) 
CPV 7.1 (2011) 
(Source: VEPR, 2015, p.23) 
 
Vietnamese NGOs: legal status, emergence and development 
VNGOs’ legal status 
 
Legitimacy is a common concern among Vietnamese CSOs, because the term ‘civil 
society’, as previously indicated, remains absent in the official legal documents in 
Vietnam. This means that the state has yet to admit it officially. Likewise, the term 
‘non-governmental organisation’ (NGO), was (at least until recently) difficult to use 
in Vietnam. There is no existing law that stipulates Vietnamese NGOs under the 
term ‘non-government’, which sounds similar to ‘anarchy’ (vô chính phủ) in the 
Vietnamese language. Because of this, activities outside of the state’s auspices were 
viewed as being anti-state or anarchy, rather than as something sound or good. The 
existing institutional arrangements do not allow them to enjoy a clearly-stated legal 
status as a non-governmental organisation. Hence, these organisations tend to seek 
refuge in the forms to which they do not actually belong, such as scientific and 
technological organisations, institutes, research centres or foundations to overcome 
the registration threshold (Taylor et al., 2012). In order to be able to survive, a 
religious institution, for example, has to register as a scientific, technological 




VNGOs are currently controlled under a grid of confusing administrative decrees. 
Most regulations regarding them were created in ad-hoc ways, meaning that they 
were issued simply as a temporary measure to cope with an increasing number of 
associations. Several decrees have been put in place with an aim to tighten 
associational activities further (e.g. Decree 88). There is a notable gap between 
what is stipulated in the Constitution and the presence of legal documents that 
aims to realise such constitutional rights. For instance, the 2013 Constitution’s 
Article No 25 clearly stipulates that citizens have the right to freedom of speech, 
association, access to information, and to demonstrate, but there is no law in place 
enabling people to exercise these rights.  
 
It is required that associations (e.g. local NGOs) are registered with the state-
affiliated bodies such as government departments, people’s committees, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA), or 
the Southeast Asia Research Associations of Vietnam, so as to obtain legal status. 
No registration means no legal status and no legal status means organisational 
legitimacy is precarious. Whilst there is no existing official document stating that 
unregistered organisations or organisations without legal status are officially 
considered illegitimate, widespread evidence shows that they face multiple 
difficulties, for example, in working with the government or in receiving and raising 
official funds. As a common practice, the state will not work with these 
organisations. However, registration is often accompanied with uneasy 
requirements needing to be met by VNGOs. There are numerous instances where 
associations have failed to procure registration. A self-help group of deaf and dumb 
people, for example, could not procure a registration after three years of persistent 
efforts, and a social welfare establishment providing support for abandoned 
children in Ho Chi Minh City managed to obtain registration after almost twenty 
years of being rejected (PPWG, 2016). Registration becomes even harder for the 
associations with large membership, especially for those in the southern provinces, 
where the central government tends to keep a tighter grip on the associational 
activities (e.g. the Scout Association currently has a couple of thousands of 
members, but has not been granted the license to operate officially). This is because 
southern people used to enjoy a more democratic regime during the American war, 





Looking at the Table 1, one might argue that VNGOs register with VUSTA and VUSTA 
is under the umbrella Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), so VNGOs belong to VFF. 
Hence, one might assume that belonging to VFF should be enough to secure NGO 
legitimacy, because the former is a powerful actor. However, it needs to be clarified 
that this kind of ‘belonging’ is normative and in fact does not safeguard VNGOs 
from being questioned or intimidated by the police. VNGOs seek registration with 
VUSTA or other state-affiliated agencies for organisational legitimacy, but it does 
not entail state funding. Local NGOs in Vietnam are not funded by the state. Unlike 
China or Russia, where the state does provide funding for some types of local NGOs, 
the Vietnamese state lacks capacities and resources to do so. Registration is simply 
a tool exercised by the state to control local NGOs.  
 
Nevertheless, despite barriers to registration prevailing and the term ‘civil society’ 
not being recognised officially, CSOs continue to emerge, either registered or 
unregistered. In fact, a huge number of community-based organisations (CBOs) and 
informal networks exist and operate without seeking registration. Regular citizens, 
with increasing civic awareness realise that they have the right to do what is not 
prohibited by law and there is no existing law stipulating that they are not allowed 
to associate.  
 
So, the concern whether civil society has to be admitted by the state becomes 
irrelevant, because with or without legal registration, civil society still exists 
alongside the state and market (iSEE, 2016). The existence and development of civil 
society is not reliant on the recognition (by law) of the state, but rather, it depends 
on the recognition of a pluralistic society that is open to criticism and opposition 
(ibid).  
 
There is no consensus in the current data regarding the number of VNGOs. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that there are variations in understanding and 
categorising VNGOs, most salient is the debate between donor communities, local 
academics and scholars over whether to include party-owned MOs in the civil 
society sector. According to different sources of data, the number of registered 
VNGOs (excluding MOs) has been estimated, to date, as ranging between 1,300 and 
2,000 (Thang Van Phuc, 2011). Meanwhile, Wells Dang (2011) observes an increase 




organisations work in various areas, such as reducing poverty, improving people’s 
access to quality education, providing healthcare and clean water, HIV prevention, 
gender equality, natural resources, capacities building and governance.  
 
There is also no official statistics which provides an exact number of existing CBOs in 
Vietnam, but some studies reveal that they vary from 100,000 to 200,000 (KEPA, 
2011) in different forms, such as interest groups, credit co-operatives, credit and 
saving groups, informal farmers groups (e.g. water-user groups, livestock farming 
groups) or mutual assistance groups. Meanwhile in urban areas, there are a variety 
of groups (neighbourhood, cultural, recreational, and others). Most of these CBOs 
are small-scale, voluntary, self-sufficient and self-governed (KEPA, 2011; Sinh et al, 
2011).  
 
Whilst some CBOs seek their legal registration through the articles under the Civil 
Code, a large number are not registered. Farmer groups, for instance, can be 
established by the MO, the Farmers’ Association, or by farmers themselves, who 
associate together to provide mutual assistance with no need to be officially 
recognised and formally structured. Members of urban-based informal groups are 
much younger and many of them have grown up in the times of internet and social 
media. Having more access to new digital technological tools and different sources 
of information, their awareness and knowledge has improved and as a result, they 




VNGOs are, by and large, argued to be the product of doi moi policies (Gray, 1999), 
but this argument needs to be examined in more detail. Drawing on the existing 
literature I bring to the fore four main reasons underlying the emergence of VNGOs. 
 
First, socio-economic changes resulting from the doi moi policies prompted the CPV 
to realise that in order to avoid the risk of the political crisis observed in Eastern 
Europe and to maintain its legitimacy, it was essential to put in place some 
measures aimed at so-called political reform to some certain level, albeit only as a 




decentralisation under the comprehensive public administration reform (PAR) 
programme (Gray, 1999). This was officially put forward at the Eighth Plenum of the 
Seventh Party Congress in 1995, which concertedly addressed four key reform areas 
(institutional reform, organisational structures, civil service reform and public 
finance) (Painter, 2005). One of the objectives of the PAR programme was to 
downsize the huge ineffective administrative apparatus (Turley, 1993), which 
resulted in cutting funding for certain party-owned socio-political associations 
including some MOs. The cut in funding was based on the role and importance of 
organisations. For example, MOs such as the Youth’s Union, the Women’s Union 
along with religious and cultural organisations, such as Writers’ and Artists’ 
Associations and the Buddhist Sangha were all put on the list of ‘maintained 
funding’. Those less important in the view of the party state (although they did not 
state this explicitly), e.g. scientific and technical institutes and professional 
organisations inclusive of architects as well as doctors, saw their budgets cut. The 
budget cuts that were encountered by these organisations were because in the new 
context of a more liberal economy the party believed that these organisations could 
sustain themselves through self-financing. After the budget cuts these organisations 
were relabelled ‘NGOs’, so that they could enter into the competition with the ‘real’ 
NGOs for international donors’ funding. Under the new form as NGOs, there was, 
however, little or no change in their objectives, methods or personnel (Gray, 1999).  
As a result, the ‘relabelled NGOs’ became one of the reasons for the increase in 
number of VNGOs.   
 
Second, the arrival of international donors and international NGOs was 
accompanied by the experiment of a myriad of new development 
models/programmes. These actors sought to work with local partners, especially 
non-state institutions such as local NGOs. VNGOs, therefore, proliferated following 
this trend. During the early 2000s, given the characteristics of donors’ funding 
programmes, most VNGOs engaged in direct intervention activities (i.e. mainly 
livelihood development). Apart from being considered local partners, VNGOs were 
targeted also because donors expected that providing support for them and 
grassroots organisations would result in an enhanced civil society that could be 
conducive to building a more accountable democratic government (Harper, 1996). 
VNGOs, Hannah (2007, p.124) contends, “must perform a complex dance between 
domestic and international ideas of development and civil society”, since they have 




and the Marxist-Leninist state’s suspicion towards the presence of organisations 
outside its auspices.    
 
Third, accompanying the positive socio-economic changes were negative effects, 
e.g. emerging development issues, widening inequality, and environmental 
deterioration. Since doi moi these issues have become more severe, which the state 
could not address by itself owing to a lack of capacities and resources. As a result, 
CSOs, including VNGOs, quickly filled this space and worked in conjunction with the 
state towards fulfilling state development policies (Hannah, 2007). 
 
Finally, the controlling Vietnamese state cannot neglect global political pressures, 
which constitute the last reason. It is worth mentioning that unlike many 
developing countries elsewhere, Vietnam is acknowledged to have high country 
ownership over its development programmes (World Bank, 2012). Yet, under the 
increasing pressure of global institutions, a requirement in their aid programs 
directed to the partner government indicates that local CSOs must be involved as 
co-implementers to deliver the programme. This trend also gave an impetus for the 
emergence of VNGOs. Tolerating the growth of registered NGOs also allows the 
authoritarian state to convey to the wider society that they are complying with the 





VNGOs emerged in the advent of doi moi, and there are some trends observed in 
their operation throughout different periods of development. 
VNGOs’ direct intervention projects were common up until 1995. Activities of this 
period were heavily donor-driven and organisations were mainly headed by retired 
public officers, who knew how to take advantage of their personal connections with 
the bureaucratic structures and quickly appeal to the high influx of donor aid. 
Between 1995 and 2005, there was, however, a shift from direct intervention to 




Since 2005, a rights-based approach has largely been applied by VNGOs, whereby 
they have become more concerned about effecting policy impact and social change. 
Many VNGOs’ leaders during this period used to work for INGOs, being well-
educated, and many have overseas degrees. After acquiring a great deal of 
experience from working with INGOs, they decided to move out to establish their 
own organisations. These organisations have gradually evolved from the image of 
passive, donor-driven organisations to asserting their position in negotiations with 
donors and INGOs. Some good examples of this trajectory include Institute for 
Studies of Society, Economy and Environment (iSEE) or Centre for Social Initiatives 
Promotion (CSIP). They also have paid greater attention to engaging with the media 
to enhance their image and reach out wider society. A good example in effecting 
social change by VNGOs can be seen in LGBT rights protection area (iSEE, 2015). 
From being prejudiced and ridiculed on TV, in movies, and in the media, the LGBT 
community has become socially recognised and respected, with same sex marriage 
no longer being prohibited in Vietnam.  
 
Moreover, very recently VNGOs have started encroaching into areas that used to be 
considered taboo ten years ago, such as human rights and anti-corruption. These 
‘sensitive’ topics are today no longer distant from the perception and activities of 
VNGOs. Through international development organisations (e.g. UNDP, the World 
Bank), VNGOs have begun to participate in monitoring national-level macro 
indicators (e.g. the Public Administration Performance Index – PAPI). Notably, they 
have engaged in monitoring the implementation of human rights commitments by 
the government, such as the compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (United Nations Vietnam, 
2015) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), (NGO Group for the CRC, 
2012). Through informal networks, VNGOs set up alliances to advocate for 
legislation to be in line with the principles of human rights.  
 
Drawing on Hannah’s (2007) continuum model (Figure 4), all civil society roles 
presented in this spectrum can be found in present-day Vietnam ranging from 
implementing state policies, to monitoring state performance to civil disobedience 
to regime opposition. VNGOs’ engagement in relation to this continuum nearly all 





Figure 4. Civil society roles 
 
(Source: Hannah, 2007, p.209) 
 
On the left end of the spectrum, Thayer (2009) is among the few scholars who focus 
on independent CSOs that overtly challenge the state. He overlooks civil society 
groups that are set up by or register with the state and casts doubt on their ability 
to challenge the state. He emphasises more on highly-politicised CSOs (i.e. regime-
adversary civil society), which are committed to fighting for democracy and human 
rights.  
 
The rising number of independent rights groups and activists in recent years is more 
critical of the leadership of the CPV. In particular, the use of digital and 
technological tools (e.g. Facebook) has yielded a large number of bloggers who use 
social media as an alternative platform to express their criticism. Wells-Dang (2014) 
observes that the proliferation of critical bloggers has sparked the political interest 
of young intellectuals and contributed to the increased youth awareness of socio-
political issues in urban cities. He particularly points out that when one blog is shut 
down, tens of others arise to fill its space. Noticeably, their activism does not only 
prevail on social media, for it also extends to real life practice through street 
protests on various issues, such as the anti-China invasion into the disputed waters 





In present-day Vietnam, public protests are more witnessed than before, yet 
London (2009) warns that the scale and frequency of these oppositional activities 
should not be equated with the advent of liberal democratic civil society in Vietnam, 
since the fundamental conditions for democratisation are still absent. He adds that 
on the part of the state, its repression is either harsh or half-hearted, based on the 
nature of each specific case. Nevertheless, he notifies that “the very fact public 
protests are allowed to occur indicates the nature of authoritarianism in Vietnam 
has its nuance” (London, 2009, p.394).  
 
In a nutshell, the first half of the chapter has presented a historical overview of civil 
society development, VNGOs along with the other main categories of associations 
in Vietnam. In the next part, I contextualise state-society relations in Vietnam given 
the existing scholarship of the topic, whereby two main perspectives: vibrant civil 
society and a strong state are discussed, whilst locating them historically in the 
changing political landscape of Vietnam. My research is tasked with exploring 
contemporary civil society activism in Vietnam and reflecting on the politics of the 
evolving state-society relations in that country. An illustration of the two 
perspectives, with substantial historical cases, is aimed at providing a background 
for my arguments pertaining to the changing dynamics and complexity of state-
society relations in Vietnam, which I set out in this thesis. 
 
 
3. State-society relations in Vietnam  
3.1. A vibrant civil society? 
 
“Groups and forces in society beyond the reach of the state not only exist 
but their activities from time to time influence what authorities decide” 
(Kerkvliet, 2001, p.269) 
Much of the existing scholarship on state-society relations in Vietnam contends that 
narratives of change are determined by societal actors, i.e. social change is initiated 
from below and from social pressures crystallized in civil society (Kerkvliet, 2005; 
Koh, 2001a, 2001b; Vasavakul, 2003; Wells-Dang, 2010, 2011; Thomas, 2011). 
Drawing on the literature, I bring to light four main pathways that societal actors 




continuum’, including everyday politics of resistance, fence breaking, public 
protests, and civil society networks (see Figure 5). 












 (Source: synthesised by the researcher) 
 
Everyday politics of resistance 
 
Drawing on the most influential study by James Scott (1985) on everyday forms of 
resistance, Kerkvliet (1995b, 2005, 2009) offers a unique account of how powerless 
peasants in the one party-dominated state of Vietnam can reverse national policy. 
Central to his argument is ‘everyday politics’ matters. By everyday politics, he refers 
to the way in which people live, work, and go about doing – or not doing – the 
things they are supposed to do. Everyday resistance involves little or no 
organisation. The collapse of the large-scale collective farming programme imposed 
by the CPV prior to doi moi with no presence of violent uprising or any type of 
organised opposition is a vivid manifestation of the cumulative effects of everyday 
politics.  













By the 1950s, the CPV officially initiated the collectivisation, whereby the means of 
production (e.g. land, livestock, and irrigation facilities) were collectivised and put 
under the management of cooperative leaders; peasants from different families and 
neighbourhoods were enticed, cajoled, and sometimes forced to work together in 
teams and production brigades in cooperatives, which ran counter to their habitual 
family-based production (Kerkvliet, 1995b). Villagers were reluctant to collectivise 
their land and other means of production. Immense efforts were made on the part 
of the party to accelerate large-scale collective farming and cooperatives. At the 
same time, the state took absolute control of the market for agricultural inputs and 
products. The central authorities insisted that the peasantry needed to keep faith in 
collectivisation, since it was a unique proper path to socialism. However, the state-
led collective production totally collapsed in the early 1980s and eventually the CPV 
was pressurised into abandoning collective farming and permitting family farming 
(Kerkvliet, 2009).  
 
The collectivised agricultural production broke down, because it encountered 
prolonged hesitation, objection, and surreptitious resistance by villagers. Everyday 
resistance became weapons of the voiceless, powerless peasants in rural Vietnam 
aimed at reversing the national collectivisation policies. The policy reversal occurred 
without social upheaval, or violence, or even organised opposition. ‘No one mourns 
for the father of everyone’ (Cha chung không ai khóc). As this Vietnamese proverb 
implies, villagers showed their everyday resistance through lackadaisical work 
(because whether they did the job diligently or not, they received the same number 
of workpoints) and other transgressions, such as circumventing the system to 
continue their family production covertly, or secretly encroaching upon collective 
fields to do their own farming, or stealthily harvesting rice from collective fields to 
quietly oppose abusive officials (Kerkvliet, 2009).  
 
Kerkvliet ironically pictures this resistance of powerless peasants as a stealthy slap 
in the face of the collectivisation policy and the authorities who imposed it (ibid). 
“By what they did and did not do and how they used their labour and other 
resources over which they retained some control, peasants in collective 
cooperatives were essentially manipulating collectivization policy” (Kerkvliet, 2005, 
p.30).  Villagers’ everyday resistance resulted in the policy change, thus showing 




How can such small acts make differences? It is due to the very nature of those acts, 
Kerkvliet explains. Specifically, they are non-confrontational, leaderless and 





Adam Fforde is the protagonist bringing attention to the fence breaking (phá rào) 
practice observed in Vietnamese society. This term became widely used by local 
people after doi moi, which refers to violations of orthodox socialist norms or 
regulations and rules set up by the party state, in order to expand space for 
autonomous activities (Fforde, 2005). Fforde is also one of the prominent sceptics 
of the idea that Vietnam is a strong state. He contends that “the essential problem 
in Vietnam is a weak state, rather than a state that is too strong” (Fforde, 2005, 
p.174). The weakness stems mainly from the unreformed communist political 
institutions in face of changing contexts globally and locally. As a result, the party is 
unable to control society like before (Fforde, 2013).  
 
Scholars such as Vasavakul (2003), Koh (2001), and Thomas (2001) offer detailed 
accounts of fence-breaking practice, whereby they focus on understanding why this 
phenomenon prevails in Vietnam. A number of explanatory factors they point out 
include, inter alia, the politics of a divided party, factionalism and malfunctioning 
policies merely aimed at protecting the political interests of the ruling power.  
 
In his analysis of illegal housing construction2 in Hanoi, for example, Koh (2001) 
showcases widespread offences by local people against the construction rules of 
the housing regime in the post-1975 period. Under the socialist housing regime, 
private construction was discouraged through limitless administrative procedures 
and requirements concerning licences and permits. It took local residents several 
months, even years to obtain the necessary construction documents. At the same 
time, the state also wanted to provide housing for residents but their efforts were 
so poorly exercised. In order to overcome the bureaucratic obstacles, local people 
                                                          
2 Illegal housing construction means: any activity that involves building a house or making any 
extension or renovation to either the interior or exterior of the house or the flat without official 
licences or permits. It is estimated that if strictly following this protocol, 90 percent of all housing 





in Hanoi boldly built or renovated their flats and houses without permission or 
certificates (Koh, 2001). The breakdown of the housing regulations in several 
quarters of Hanoi was due to the fact that residents united to circumvent the 
impracticable housing rules, which unexpectedly induced more illegal construction, 
rather than resolving the problem. Local residents resorted to pleading, lobbying, 
using personal connections or bribing officials at the relevant authority levels, in an 
attempt to accomplish their construction.  
 
The fence breaking in housing construction in Hanoi eventually effectuated the 
negotiation space for both local residents and local officials when the central rules 
were overlooked, and both sides colluded with one another to achieve what they 
wished. This practice is resonant with what Hayton illustrates, “Whenever local 
officials have to choose between national instructions and local demands, it’s 
usually the local that wins” (Hayton, 2010, p.74). This means that local officials tend 
to overlook central rules if their personal needs are met by ignoring such rules and 
colluding with local people. Koh (2001) concludes aptly that the final state policies 
in Vietnam are shaped in a way that the state makes policies with probably little 
political challenge from below, but the local officials and local people reshape those 
policies through interactions. The party state could inflict its will upon local officials, 
but evidence shows that the latter is also the channel for society to negotiate state 
policies and even influence the party state to alter the rules so as to legitimise their 
alleged acts.  
 
Tilly and Tarrow (2006) contend that ordinary people in authoritarian states tend to 
be obedient, compliant and only when political opportunities are open to them, do 
they rise up. This somehow does not ring very true in the case of Vietnam, where 
generations of people who throughout wartime were familiarised with guerrilla 
warfare to fight against the foreign invasions, are now employing these tactics again 
to deal with impractical state policies. This practice is nicely reflected in a common 





In authoritarian one-party states like Vietnam, where free expression and political 
dissent is restricted, public protests are seen as highly unusual because they easily 




when the anti-China nationalist movement burst out. In recent times, people have 
been taking to the streets over various issues such as workers’ well-being, farmers’ 
land loss, or the environmental crisis. 
 
Land protests of varying scales are perhaps among the most prevalent public 
contestation in Vietnam nowadays. The nation has undergone a double transition 
from central planning to a market economy and from low-income to middle-income 
status (Mishra, 2011). Along this development path, however, greater numbers of 
farmers and workers – two pillars of the revolutionary cause - have become 
increasingly excluded and impoverished. Land conflicts have broken out across Asia, 
in China for example, but in Vietnam they have a particular resonance. Recalling the 
past, it is not difficult to realise that all the national liberation struggles in Vietnam 
were fought mostly in the name of the peasantry, those who were the central force 
of mass revolutions. Yet, in the aftermath of the reunification (1975), they have 
become the most vulnerable group under the rhetoric of modernisation and 
industrialisation. Land grabs as the results of the collusion between political elites 
and corporates, are pervasive across the country, whereby using force by the local 
authorities to seize farmers’ land, ironically, has become commonplace (RFA, 2016). 
Land confiscation has sparked small-scale protests on an almost weekly basis and 
large-scale ones from time to time.  
 
The peasant upheaval in Thai Binh in 1997 and the unrest in the Central Highlands 
in 2001-2004 were both sparked by unbearable violations of land rights and 
officials’ corruption. In 1997, thousands of peasants in Thai Binh province took to 
the streets to protest against corrupt local government officials, who were 
unresponsive to peasants’ economic grievances (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This 
rural unrest shook the Hanoi leadership and caused them to review the provincial 
bureaucracy. As a result, 600 party officials were sacked (including the top two, 
these being the provincial secretary of the Communist Party and the chairperson of 
the provincial people’s council) and a total of 1,900 party members were disciplined 
(Luong, 2005). In early February 2001, another unrest also burst out in the 
provinces of Daklak and Gia Lai in the Central Highlands, where tens of thousands of 
ethnic minority people converged and demonstrated in the provincial capitals as 
well as in some district towns and communes over land and religious issues (Luong, 
2003). Concerning the latter, it was widely covered in the international media, for it 
tapped into the religious and ethnic issues in a strict sense and human rights abuses 




occurred in Thai Binh, a highly accredited revolutionary cradle of the CPV during the 
wartime (Wells-Dang, 2010; Luong, 2003).  
 
These rural unrests were indicative of the fact that political contestation in Vietnam 
was no longer limited to the officially approved channels or state-established 
associations (Kerkvliet, 2001). The state could not rein in society as they had before 
and the latter was able to find ways of circumventing its diktats. These incidents 
eventually caused the party to issue Directive 30-CT/TW, which was aimed at 
promoting the democratic participation of communities at the commune and 
district levels as well as at state-owned enterprises (Thayer, 2008). In 2007, this 
document was upgraded to an Ordinance aimed at enhancing transparency and 
accountability of local governments so as to be in line with the long-standing state-
propagandised rhetoric: “people know, people discuss, people execute, and people 
supervise” (Sinh, 2003, p.4). Nevertheless, there is no existing research on how 
these documents are being implemented in reality. Land protests at local levels, 
Wells-Dang (2010) states, have become a common feature of contemporary 
Vietnamese politics. Arbitrary land grabs, evictions, forced relocations and unjust 
compensation, all in all, have been triggering public anger, social distrust and 
undermining the CPV’s legitimacy.  
There is recently a rising phenomenon that seems more threatening for the ruling 
communists, i.e. unexpected alliances between landless farmers and urban 
independent activists (many of whom are bloggers). With the activists’ support, the 
information regarding confrontations between evicted farmers and security forces, 
which is not covered by the mainstream media, is quickly and widely disseminated 
on social media (e.g. Facebook, twitter). The rural landless farmer-urban activist 
alliance signals a significant episode of public contestation in Vietnam, which 
constitutes an emerging challenge to the political hegemony.  
 
Workers’ protests against shrunken wages and deteriorating working conditions are 
exhibiting increasingly larger numbers in contemporary Vietnam. Miserable workers 
and landless farmers are now subject to a downward spiral of deprivation. Industrial 
zones, private housing, entertainment complexes or golf courses have been erected 
directly on the farming land of farmers. After being evicted from their land, many 
children of these farmers have to choose to work in these factories under degrading 
conditions and many workers who go on strike come from landless farmer 




It is necessary to note that independent trade unions are not allowed in Vietnam 
and the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (national trade union centre) 
normatively represent the interests of workers, being under the direct leadership of 
the CPV. They are simply an integral part of the party state apparatus and receive 
substantial income as a levy on state employers, regardless of trade union 
membership, and have substantial property and commercial interests. It is just a 
wishful thinking that the trade union in Vietnam is willing to be involved with or 
encourage greater labour activism. In many labour disputes, they tend to contain 
workers rather than defending their rights (Clarke and Pringle, 2007). It is equally 
notable that scholarship on labour activism in Vietnam is extremely rare. The 
existing account contends that pressure for change in the trade unions is unlikely to 
come from within their own apparatus and thus, it is necessary to shift focus to 
pressures from outside, specifically to the pressures of worker activism from below 
(Clarke and Pringle, 2007; Kerkvliet, 2010).    
  
Kerkvliet, so far, is among the very few scholars who provide a detailed account of 
labour activism in Vietnam. Worker pressures, Kerkvliet (2010) demonstrates, has 
brought some positive results for workers in the short run and sometimes in the 
long run. In some instances, the government has had to make amendments to the 
legislation; for example, the Social Insurance Law in 2015 was finally amended after 
large-scale workers protests across many parts of the country. Kerkvliet also 
observes that repression against workers on strike seems inconsequential, because 
as he explains, they simply confine their concerns to their working conditions and 
the CPV somehow still perceives workers as well as farmers as the classes whose 
interests it is committed to represent since it was established (Kerkvliet, 2010). 
 
 
Civil society networks 
 
Fence-breaking is simply a social response, where people take advantage of policy 
impracticalities or loopholes to make them work towards fostering their own 
benefits. Wells-Dang introduces a more organised form of civil society action, i.e. 
“civil society network”, which he defines as “the joining together of organisations 
and individuals to influence power around a shared conception of the common 
good” (Wells-Dang, 2010, p.98). He, however, explains that not all networks are civil 




Dang, 2011). Drawing on network theory, he seeks to re-theorise civil society, 
arguing that it should be viewed “not as a sector or an arena but as a political 
process of collective action and alliance-building” (Wells-Dang, 2011, p.45).  
 
Advocating this view, Wells-Dang brings onto the scene the mobilisation process 
waged by civil society networks that involved actors from civil society and some 
parts of the state in the campaign to counter the Hanoi People’s Committee’s (i.e. 
Hanoi government) conversion plan for Reunification Park into Disneyland in 2007. 
The fifty-hectare park is the largest public one, considered as the lung of the city, 
and holds so much meaning for Hanoians in terms of green space as well as in terms 
of culture and history. Defenders of Reunification Park formed a network consisting 
of architects, current or retired government officials, academics, journalists, 
environmentalists and bloggers. They had recourse to various channels to realise 
their objectives, including spreading numerous well-written articles in mainstream 
newspapers and on websites, organising conferences as well as creating alliances 
with different key stakeholders involving the state, media, NGOs and international 
organisations. However, they did not publicly criticise or confront government 
officials. Being aware of the division within the city elites regarding access to 
benefits from the park project, the advocates strategically took advantage of this by 
using their professional connections to approach those who had no way of receiving 
penny from the project, or those who stood aside, or those who were critical. The 
mobilisation by civil society networks was eventually successful, i.e. the city 
government put on hold the private developer’s proposal. Notably, the advocates 
did not rely on one stand-alone approach, for a variety of tactics and strategies that 
complemented one another were engaged with to pressure on the city authority’s 
decision. Wells-Dang is among the main scholars that believe in change being 
initiated by societal actors, he states that “political changes are taking place within 
the complex and actually existing political system and society […]. As Vietnam edges 
toward a more open polity, change will come first from the rice roots3” (Wells-Dang, 
2010, p. 109). 
 
From everyday politics of resistance, fence-breaking, public protests to civil society 
networks, they are illustrative of different types of civil society expressions in 
contemporary Vietnam in order to deal with policy impracticalities and 
unaccountable decisions to bring about change. Societal actors of these expressions 
                                                          




eventually attained success for what they fought for. Influenced by this society-led 
change approach, my thesis attempts to understand evolving state-society relations 
in Vietnam by looking at different forms of civil society activism initiated by both 
formal (registered) and informal (unregistered) groups. However, my research tries 
to examine the dynamics and intricacies of state-society interactions and 
interconnectedness between the two rather than focusing only on either society or 
state alone. In particular, I will examine how different civil society groups organise 
and situate themselves in the relationships that they respond to and become 
enmeshed within.   
 
 
3.2. A strong state? 
 
“When political change occurs in Vietnam, […] a broadening of the political 
space is likely to come from change within state institutions, rather than 
from the rise of an assertive civil society as imagined in the West” 
(Gainsborough, 2002, p.707) 
 
“Vietnam, however, is a unique case because the impetus for political 
reform has not come from groups such as the urban middle class, students, 
or the military, but from within the elite ranks of the Vietnam Communist 
Party itself, frustrated at the pace and scope of development.” (Abuza, 2000, 
p. 1) 
The above quotations are illustrative of the state-led change perspective, whereby 
the narratives of change in Vietnam are considered to be shaped by the state. 
Thayer (1992) points out that the CPV leaders understand that they have to make 
some needed change given the evolving context after doi moi, and they are 
negotiating among themselves the pace and scope of that change (Thayer, 2010).  
 
A large body of scholarship on state-society relations in Vietnam argues that the 
impetus for change derives from within the state rather than from society 
(Gainsborough, 2010; Abuza, 2000; Landau, 2008; Vuving, 2010). The logic of this 
argument lies in that under the one-party rule of Vietnam, the state-society divide is 
conceptually ill-defined, therefore, in searching for the impetus of change, it is 




contestations often occur (Landau, 2008, p.254). Casting light on the different 
sections within the state structure, Vuving (2010) argues that whilst reformers 
occupy a small minority in the system, they are influential enough to initiate 
change, albeit to a limited degree, if they come to ally with selective civil society 
groups outside the state apparatus. Similarly, Wischermann (2011) indicates that 
the impulse for change primarily derives from reformist minds within the state, but 
cautions that these processes of change happen at an incremental pace and regime 
subversion is not an expected or attempted outcome.  
 
Marston (2012) also champions the important role played by the reformist minds in 
the state structure by providing insight into the highly controversial case of Bauxite 
Mining in Vietnam’s central highlands. In April 2006, the government’s approval of 
the Chinese companies’ large-scale bauxite reserves mining plans in the Central 
Highlands sparked public criticism. The most vocal critiques were scientists, 
intellectuals, senior communist party officials, the National Assembly deputies, a 
national figure who was a war hero and some registered NGOs. These actors came 
together in an informal network to counter this mining project. Most salient in the 
advocacy campaign was the role of the elites who were the reformers in the party, 
Marston notices. Whilst he acknowledges the initiatives of these civil society 
networks in expressing discontent, he raises his concern over their dependency on 
certain parts of the state apparatus for their advocacy campaign.   
 
Most discernible in the ‘strong state’ perspective is perhaps Gainsborough, one of 
the leading representatives of the rising post-Vietnam War generation of scholars. 
He brings in-depth insight into the contemporary politics of Vietnam through his 
intensive account of the Vietnamese state. In problematising the state, he seeks to 
examine the nature of the reform that the CPV has undertaken since the early 
1990s. He highlights that whatever change the 1986 reform has entailed needs to 
be mirrored within the state itself. He vividly argues: 
“Instead of looking for the emergence of a robust civil society standing as a 
bulwark against state power, as much of the literature does, one should 
rather look at what is occurring within the state” (Gainsborough, 2002, 
p.705).  
 
Gainsborough explicitly contends that “the idea that one should look for a 
broadening of political space within the state rings very true for Vietnam” (2002, 




varying from registered NGOs to religious dissent, dissident intellectuals, youth 
disillusionment, to workers’ protests and rural unrest, can be a real phenomenon of 
a dynamic society up to a point. However, he places his stronger emphasis on the 
state institutions, which he believes are the main arena of struggle, shaping the 
extent of change and the widening of political space. He brings to light some of the 
major political debates of the reform era, such as centralisation and 
decentralisation, equitisation of state-owned enterprises, the relationship between 
the party and the government, and the more influential role of the National 
Assembly, to justify his thought-provoking argument.  
 
Putting the equitisation of state-owned enterprises under scrutiny, he explains the 
real logics behind the façade of the so-called economic liberalisation put forward by 
the ruling Communists. In particular, equitisation – the sale of state assets - should 
not be seen as a retreat of the state from the economic front, but rather, it is an 
interventionism by which the political elites continue to control new owners, enrich 
themselves and maintain power in the face of external pressures to introduce 
reforms (Gainsborough, 2009). They employ the rule of uncertainty to exercise their 
power. ‘Uncertainty’ should not be simply referred to as the weakness in state 
management, instead it is what it should be and it is the rule of the game that the 
party state manipulates to make it justifiable for its discretionary decisions. In his in-
depth study of Vietnam’s local state in two provinces Lao Cai and Tay Ninh, he 
points out how the state institutions after equitisation have not only continued to 
play a central role in regulating economic activities, for they have also become 
active participants in economic activities through the running of state and private 
firms (Gainsborough, 2007).   
Equally interesting, in terms of dealing with high-profile corruption cases (e.g. the 
Tamexco case4 and  the Thai Binh  farmer uprising discussed above) by the political 
centre, Gainsborough unravels the reason why the state devotes so much energy to 
prosecuting such cases. On the face of it, prosecuting corrupted state officials can 
earn the political centre a higher legitimacy in the public’s eyes and thus, help sooth 
down public anger. However, instead of perceiving this action as an appraisable 
endeavour by the state in anti-corruption efforts for the public good, he considers it 
as the best evidence for an angry central state that wants to “discipline the lower 
levels in a climate of increased decentralisation” (Gainsborough, 2010, p.54). Under 
                                                          
4 The Tamexco case was a high-profile corruption case that took place in southern Vietnam in 1997 in 





pressures from neoliberal institutions, the party state has reluctantly put 
decentralisation in place. Nevertheless, amid the increasing fear of losing control 
over the lower levels, they have resorted to using decentralisation as a governing 
tool, whereby it is manifested as taking back control. Decentralisation is in fact 
recentralisation.  
Gainsborough is sceptical of the emergence of a robust middle class in Vietnam. 
This class has not emerged to challenge the state because, he contends, they are 
embedded within close relations with the state. The outcome that Vietnam will 
move towards Western-style liberal democracy is least likely to happen, for the 
authoritarian state of Vietnam remains dissociated from society and relatively 
impervious in relation to external ideas and influences (Gainsborough, 2010).  
The suspicion of the Marxist Leninist state towards civil society in Vietnam still 
prevails nowadays, although it has diminished to some degree. Nevertheless, its 
response has become more uncertain, unpredictable and non-uniform, and its 
openness is not consistent across government levels (i.e. more open at the central 
level and less so at the lower levels), nor is it between government agencies at the 
same level (i.e. more openness observed regarding those agencies interacting 
frequently with NGOs and CSOs). The phrase ‘civil society as a tool of peaceful 
evolution or a conspiracy of regime subversion’ is often used by the state 
propaganda brigade when referring to challenging groups in circumstances where 





This chapter has provided the background understanding of the empirical context of 
my research. Social change is a ubiquitous narrative in Vietnam, but the nature and 
politics of this change remain far from conclusive and generalisations of state-
society relations in Vietnam very often rely on thin evidence.  
 
The chapter has mapped out the historical development of Vietnamese civil society 
from the pre-doi moi period to the aftermath of doi moi, as well as the two 
dominant perspectives on state-society relations in Vietnam with substantial 
historical cases. The existing scholarship advocates either state- or society-centred 




approaches, narratives of change are considered to be shaped either by the state or 
society. These polarities seem to lack appreciation of the dynamics underlying the 
state-society nexus and will be contested in this thesis. My research offers an 
ethnographic detailed account of different forms of civil society activism that seeks 
to contribute towards a deeper appreciation of the dynamics, intricacies, and 
intermingling pertinent to state-society relations in the changing political landscape 
of Vietnam. In realising this, I develop three distinctive notions: legitimacy, 
autonomy and (in)formality in order to examine how civil society groups 
characterised by different institutional characteristics and different embedded 
connections to the state, express, organise and orchestrate activism while 
negotiating with the state. At the same time I also examine how the state behaves 
and responds to civil society actions.  
 
Through my empirical analysis, I argue that in Vietnam a strong state is not 
synonymous with state effectiveness and accountability, and that a vibrant civil 
society does not necessarily lead to positive social outcomes such as political 
change or democratisation. Crucially as civil society activism grows and takes on 
innovative forms, the strength of the state seems also to be growing. The central 
argument is that the growth and expansion of civil society activism are intricately 
intertwined with political authority and power. The thesis shows that civil society in 
Vietnam is a vibrant, diverse and evolving space. Its future development and 
evolution will depend on its ability to successfully navigate the political and social 




















The ultimate aim of my research is to explore contemporary civil society activism in 
Vietnam and to reflect upon the politics of evolving state-society relations. This is 
achieved through a comparative analysis of two contrasting forms of civil society 
activism deeply rooted in local realities, and an examination that locates these 
forms of activism in a wider historical context. In order to do this, I have focused my 
analytical lens on different civil society actions and strategies from below, played 
out by both local NGOs and informal civilian groups, rather than searching for how 
dominant civil society theories associated with normative values are applied in 
Vietnam. Through in-depth ethnographic research, I was in a strong position to 
write about the meaning and outcomes of one of the most significant episodes of 
public contestation in Vietnam in recent years: the movement to save Hanoi’s trees 
in 2015. This case study embodies autonomous citizen-led activism, which stands in 
stark contrast to my second in-depth case study, centred on activism led by a local 
NGO. The two case studies have illustrated different types of civil society activism 
emerging from the authoritarian one-party context of Vietnam.     
 
In this endeavour, drawing on major theoretical debates of civil society activism 
under authoritarian regimes, this chapter sets out the analytical framework I have 
applied in this thesis. Globally, it is well documented that authoritarian states are 
reconfiguring the way they rule, which can be evidenced in their selective strategies 
for dealing with associationalism, whereby they perform varying degrees of 
tolerance to different forms of civil society activism (Lewis, 2013; Cavatorta, 2012). 
Associationalism under the authoritarian rule is no longer limited to classic forms of 
activism led by formally organised groups (i.e. NGOs) (Cavatorta, 2012). The 
resilience of authoritarianism, coupled with emerging forms of civil society activism, 
has informed a new trend of scholarly research on civil society activism in 
authoritarian contexts. Nevertheless, the existing literature remains fragmentary 




I conducted a review of civil society literature, in general and civil society activism in 
authoritarian contexts, in particular, from the early days of my PhD. My research 
was driven by the eclectic approach, meaning that I opened my theoretical 
exploration to different trajectories and selectively incorporated what proved to 
have the most explanatory power in relation to my empirical findings. More 
specifically, initially my research was intentionally focused on domains of action led 
by local registered NGOs. However, while engaging directly with the empirical work 
in Vietnam (for further details of my research’s evolution please see Chapter 3), I 
came across a compelling phenomenon emerging from the local context, i.e. a form 
of collective action arising from the grassroots level, which I considered as a social 
movement and which I could not afford to ignore. To understand this phenomenon, 
I needed to draw on the social movement literature. During the course of my 
fieldwork I persisted in tracing back and forth between these two bodies of 
literature in the hope that there would be some key analytical themes emerging 
from these theories, which would help me formulate my analytical framework 
sufficient to capture my empirical findings.     
 
In what follows, I first review critically the main theoretical debates on civil society 
activism under authoritarianism. I then elucidate a number of key analytical 
concepts emerging from this theoretical review, which had particular relevance for 
my empirical findings: (i) legitimacy, (ii) autonomy, and (iii) formality and informality 
of activism. These elements proved most analytically relevant and broad enough to 
account for the dynamics and intricacies of civil society activism, thus facilitating 
reflection on changing state-society relations in Vietnam.  
 
 
2. Civil society activism in authoritarian contexts  
 
Whilst the notion of civil society has regained currency in recent decades, what it 
means and how it is defined in varied institutional settings continues to be an 
unresolved debate. In parallel with the resurrection of ‘civil society’ concept, since 
the late 1980s, there has been an increasing phenomenon of the so-called resilience 
of authoritarian regimes (Merkel, 2010). Across many parts of the world (e.g. 




evolved and new variants have emerged, even though it is still largely grounded in 
the root of its authoritarian rule, such as ‘electoral’ or ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’, ‘semi-authoritarianism’, or ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Bogaards, 
2009). The rise of new forms implies that the ruling power under authoritarian 
regimes skilfully puts in place some degree of institutional pluralism, albeit at the 
abstract level (e.g. participatory decision making, public consultation, open 
parliamentary hearings, tolerance to some forms of associationalism), whilst in fact 
concurrently holding firmly to authoritarian principles (Brooker, 2009). Non-
democratic regimes, as Cavatorta (2012) points out, have introduced a handful of 
institutional reforms propagandised as the promotion of democracy over the last 
two decades, however such reforms seem not to have led to any significant 
structural change in the nature of authoritarianism. Despite some form of rule of 
law and human rights legislation being introduced into such systems, they are 
simply a disguised reality of authoritarian consolidation (Ekman, 2009). This practice 
further complicates state-society relations under these regimes.        
 
Whilst civil society activism in authoritarian contexts has triggered academic 
attention and paved the way for the development of a new wave of research, the 
existing literature on this topic remains limited in terms of ideas. A large amount of 
scholarship focuses on the circumstances of stand-alone singular country contexts 
and little attempt has been directed towards approaching the topic from a 
comparative politics perspective. Cavatorta (2012, p.2) introduces the concept 
“activated citizenship” in order to highlight the fact that classic civil society activism 
with its emphasis on formal organisations and structures is unable to capture the 
complexity of how society expresses itself in authoritarian states where other forms 
of engagement emerge and rise to more pre-eminence, ranging from individual 
writings to mass participation and from seemingly non-political events, such as 
artistic expression, to political engagement. All these forms are indicative of the 
dynamics of civil society activism, as well as having implications in respect of 
changing state-society relations in authoritarian regimes (Cavatorta, 2012).  
 
The rendezvous between non-democratic political systems and varying forms of 
associations and engagements outside the state apparatus along with the growth of 
grassroots activism, are helping to make state-society relations under these regimes 




to explain. Despite the variability of approaches to researching this topic, there are 
a number of common observations within this emerging literature. In the following 
sections I detail these commonalities. 
 
 
2.1. Weakness of the liberal perspective 
 
Much of the scholarly work on civil society activism under authoritarianism 
contradicts the dominant liberal perspective that portrays civil society as a distinct 
sphere from the state and as a site of confrontation to state hegemony (e.g. Teets, 
2014; Hannah, 2007; Cheskin and March, 2015).  
 
Civil society theory in modern times has been dominated by the political liberal 
tradition that is deeply rooted in Tocquevillean thinking. For Tocqueville, civil 
society is supposed to restrict state power; emancipation can only be pursued and 
attained in the associational sphere outside the state. In other words, freedom 
belongs to civil society and coercion, either autocratic or paternalistic, belongs to 
the state. Consequently, he draws attention to the need to create an autonomous 
space for associational life in order to avoid state despotism (Vinod, 2006). The 
Tocquevillean view has been advocated by liberals and embraced by development 
agencies over the past decades, especially with respect to the discourse of aid 
conditionality, the rhetoric of governance reform and NGO support.   
 
Salient to liberalism is its emphasis on autonomy as a pre-requisite conducive to a 
functioning and robust civil society. Proponents of this view strongly ascribe civil 
society with a role in promoting and consolidating democracy. This view prioritises a 
polarity between state and civil society, stressing the need to create and sustain a 
sphere of individual and social interaction free of state intervention (Chandhoke, 
1995). Beckman goes so far as to claim that “the liberation of civil society from the 
suffocating grip of the state has become the hegemonic ideological project of our 
time” (Beckman, 1993, p. 20). Liberals’ emphasis on the state-society divide also 




hence, it tries to maximise the role of civil society in resisting the expansive state 
(Parekh, 2004). 
 
The most commonly used definition of civil society, which is enmeshed with liberal 
thinking, derives from Larry Diamond’s work: “the realm of organized social life that 
is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (Diamond, 1994, p. 5). Diamond’s 
definition focuses on civil society in relation to autonomy and the degree of 
separation from the state, whereby he indicates that actors in civil society need the 
protection of an institutionalised legal order to guard their autonomy and freedom 
of action. This autonomy, he argues, is necessary for civil society in order to restrict 
state power as well as to legitimate state authority (Diamond, 1994).  
 
The structural ‘autonomy’ of civil society privileged by liberalism has received a 
wave of criticism from scholars working on civil society activism under authoritarian 
rule. This is because the concepts of state or society, in isolation from one another, 
become too analytically simplistic and obscure the dialectic and complex 
relationships between the two sectors. Moreover, local evidence regarding 
associationalism in these contexts challenges this normative value. In fact, civil 
society and the state under these regimes enmeshed within a grid of 
heterogeneous relationships ranging from co-optation to collaboration, from 
complementariness to ambivalence as well as from antagonism to contention 
(Farrington and Lewis, 2014). Civil society organisations in many instances opt for 
giving up some degree of their autonomy to be incorporated into the authoritarian 
state in the search for opportunities and funding (Foster, 2001). Local NGOs are 
incentivised to seek incorporation into the state to get access to state subsidies and 
political connections, which facilitate them to accomplish their organisational and 
development goals (Heurlin, 2010).    
 
In problematizing state-society relations in China, Spires (2011, p.2), for example, 
examines the nexus between unregistered grassroots NGOs and local government 
through bringing insights into what he refers to as “contingent symbiosis”. This kind 
of relationship, he explains, emerges when the unregistered NGOs and local 
government covertly agree on an arrangement potentially beneficial to both, in 




latter will ignore the former’s illegality as long as they do not encroach onto 
sensitive and fuzzy areas, such as democratisation or political representation or 
areas that might invite public criticism towards local officials’ misconduct (Spires, 
2011).  
 
Rejecting the liberal perspective of civil society is one of discernible observations 
pertaining to the emerging literature on civil society activism in authoritarian 
contexts. The simplistic view of civil society found in liberal tradition is ill-equipped 
to understanding the complexity and the changing dynamic of state society 
relations under these contexts, such as Vietnam where patterns of state-society 
interactions run counter to many of the assumptions underpinning this Western 
model of civil society. 
 
 
2.2. Linkage between civil society and democratisation 
 
The myth that ‘civil society activism is conducive to democratic change’ seems most 
contested in the existing literature of the topic (Cavatorta, 2012; Lewis, 2013). This 
myth implies that where authoritarian rule exists, the rise of civil society activism is 
always conducive to democratisation, in other words to weakening authoritarian 
state power (Hyden, 2010).  
One of the main factors leading to this assumption can be traced back to the 
historical experience of democratic transformation in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the aftermath of the breakdown of 
formerly communist nations, civil society was brought back to the fore by liberals as 
an engine of political change. Historical events of that period enhanced liberals’ 
belief that the advanced western liberal democratic model could be transplanted 
into the global south (Parekh, 1992). Civil society was then seen as having the 
democratising and emancipatory power to render political change and bring down 
oppressive regimes (Cavatorta, 2012). This liberal assumption places civil society in 
opposition to the state and obscures many other forms that prevail in state-society 
relations under non-democratic regimes. In critique of this idealistic view of civil 
society, Chandhoke (2007) demonstrates that civil society, once constructed and 




that its actions will automatically be transformed into the triumph of democratic 
projects.  
 
Much scholarship on civil society activism under authoritarianism contests this 
idealistic normative “civil society-as-democratization” (Lewis, 2013, p.327). 
Evidence shows that, instead of promoting democratisation, civil society turns out 
as enhancing authoritarianism on varying levels by promoting development goals 
set out by the state (Koh, 2000; Spires, 2011). Despite the growth of grassroots 
activism and public contestation, the enduring authoritarianism in China, Vietnam, 
Singapore, Central Asia, East Asia and the Arab world, has led many to go so far as 
to state that civil society organisations in fact are enhancers of authoritarianism. 
This is because they are appropriated as a useful tool by the ruling regimes to deal 
with the international community under the pressures of liberalisation (Cavatorta 
and Durac, 2010).  
 
Examples of civil society activism conducive to reinforcing the authoritarian state 
are not few in number (e.g. Hsu, 2010; Spires, 2011; Koh, 2000; Jamal, 2007). 
Wischermann et al. (2016), who examine whether Vietnamese civic organisations 
are supporters of or obstacles to democratisation, found that those most engaged 
in social service delivery were helping to legitimise and uphold the authoritarian 
structures and discourses. They argue that these organisations undermined citizens’ 
individual and collective self-determination and autonomy.      
 
In another regard, the scholarship sceptical of the democratic role of western - 
funded official civil society also accounts for a notable part of the literature on civil 
society under authoritarianism. Looking at civil society experiences in the Arab 
Spring, the masses revolted and took to the streets, but the role of traditional 
NGOs, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the largest civil society 
organisation in Egypt, was trivial owing to their reluctance to join demonstrations 
from the early days and their unwillingness to offer logistical support to the uprising 
(Challand, 2011; Cavatorta, 2012). Challand (2011), in particular, is critical of the 
effectiveness of the international aid channelled to democratisation in the Arab 
world. He demonstrates that opposition to the authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East and North Africa had nothing to do with donor aid earmarked for the so-called 




absence of official advocacy groups and donor-driven NGOs in the street protests 
across the region was equally remarkable (ibid).  
 
 
2.3. Advocating a relational approach to civil society  
 
Since the normative values implied by the dominant western civil society model are 
highly controversial, especially in authoritarian contexts, much of the emerging 
scholarship on this topic has shifted focus away from looking at civil society in terms 
of organisational structures to approaching it from the relational approach (e.g. 
Uphoff and Krishna, 2004; Lorch, 2006; Wischermann, 2011; Silva, 2006). 
Specifically, rather than seeing civil society as a pre-established static object with 
prescribed values that would correspondingly predetermine the way it interacts 
with the state and the politics, the relational perspective looks at it in terms of 
social processes and relations with other objects, examining how it is constructed 
after such interactions (Elias, 1999 cited in Silva, 2006). In so doing, civil society is 
not assumed to have a pre-established nature, devoid of historical, cultural and 
socio-political characteristics, but rather, it is approached in its specificity and 
complexity (Silva, 2006). Drawing on the sociological relational perspective, much of 
the scholarship of civil society activism under authoritarianism focuses on civil 
society in terms of its social interactions and actions rather than as a fixed entity. In 
other words, this is a shift from looking at what civil society is to what it does in 
relation to state institutions.  
 
In the light of this approach, Uphoff and Krishna (2004), for example, offer a unique 
continuum of institutions and organisations coming from either society or the state 
that are stretched along the two continua of embeddedness - to - autonomy (see 
Figure 6 below). Through this continuum, they indicate that a variety of institutions 
and organisations that promote civil society purposes do not necessarily dissociate 
from or run counter to the state. They explain how institutions such as the 
legislature, are necessarily embedded within the state, but in order to be effective 
they must be linked with non-state institutions and organisations.  Likewise, 
organisations and institutions at the right end of the continuum such as NGOs and 
grassroots organisations, may not be very efficient in strengthening civil society if 




argue that in order to understand how strong or weak civil society is, it is 
paramount to look at the full set of sectors and branches and to examine how these 
are operating and relating to one other, rather than simply looking at the actors at 
the extremes of the continuum. Only looking at those most dissociated and 
autonomous from the state will confine our understanding of how much 
potentiality and opportunity for effecting power that individuals have within that 
political system. It will, moreover, overlook the array of actors located in the middle 
range of the continuum who also have capacities and opportunities for power and 
influence. 
Figure 6. Civil society organisations and institutions as a continuum of interaction 
among non-state institutions and with state institutions 
State Institutions  Societal Institutions/Organisations 
Core Interface  Interface Semi-Autonomous Autonomous 
S1. Executive S4. Legislature  1. Political parties 4. Business sector 8. Trade unions 








 3. Local governments 6. Foundations 10. Non-government 
organisations 
    7. Universities  
Embedded in the state ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Autonomous from the state 
Autonomous from society --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Embedded in society 
 (Source: Uphoff and Krishna, 2004, p. 361) 
 
In a similar way, drawing on a sociological understanding of civil society, in his 
extensive accounts on Vietnamese civil society, Wischermann (2010, 2011) 
introduces a model of ‘Civil society action’ (CSA), which views it as a specific mode 
of social action and interaction within a given society and not a fixed entity. Civil 
society action is seen as “a relationship (between people; between people and the 
state and/or the economy; between various actors’ practices and what constitutes 
those practices, value- and/or norm-wise, etc.)” (Wischermann, 2010, p.9). In 
particular, Wischermann contends that civil society action is not only found in the 
sphere of civil society, for it is also within the state itself as long as the action it 
pursues is supported by actors in civil society. He explains further how civil society 




implying respect, empathy/sympathy, compromising and sticking to rules once 
agreed upon) can be found among those state agents who, for example, issued the 
law against domestic violence and that against the discrimination of PLWHIV 
(people living with HIV). In issuing these laws, the state received support from local 
NGOs and experts. So, civil society action can be a specific type of interaction that 
takes place in the public sphere as well as in others (Wischermann, 2011).  
 
A range of scholars advocate the understanding of civil society “as a continuum and 
not as a buffer zone” (Uphoff and Krishna, 2004, cited in Wischermann, 2010, p.8), 
which embraces a variety of actions, roles, attitudes and behaviours that pertain to 
civil society (e.g. Coston, 1998; Fisher, 1998; Young, 1999; Najam, 2000; and 
Hannah, 2007). Deviating from viewing civil society as a fixed structural entity 
ontologically distinct from the state, the ‘continuum’ approach provides a more 
nuanced view of state-civil society relationships, whereby civil society organisations 
and the state are intermingled in “a complex and multi-layered network of material 
transactions, personal connections, and organisational linkages” (Lewis, 2013, 
p.326). Under this approach, it is envisaged that there will be transgressions 
between standpoints insofar as the continuum allows, meaning that civil society 
actors are not always satisfied with the existing position they are entitled to.  
 
In another context, Cheskin and March (2015) provide a unique continuum of 
contention under the semi-authoritarian regime of Russia, which includes forms of 
consentful as well as dissentful contention within civil society. Stretching along the 
behavioural and motivational axes are a range of motivations varying from 
consentful to dissentful and also a range of behaviours from compliant to 
contentious. Within this grid, combinations can include consentful contention (i.e. 
behaviour is contentious, but the motivations are consentful), dissentful contention 
(contention with anti-regime motivation), consentful compliance (compliance 
backed by firm ideological motivation), and dissentful compliance (begrudging 
compliance that lacks ideological motivation). They argue that this model opens up 
much room for shedding light onto state-society relations in Russia, where 
dissentful contention is not always overt and people tend to show either consentful 






2.4. Civil society and contestation 
 
The reductionist view of the liberal perspective is detrimental to understanding 
analytically changing state-society relations in nondemocratic regimes; much of the 
scholarship on the topic therefore appeals to a more sophisticated approach, the 
Gramscian perspective. The reasons for adopting Gramsci lie in that he conceives 
civil society as a contested sphere with a discursive nature, and that he transforms 
the simplistic form of state dictatorship into state hegemony over society through 
domination and consent (Fontana, 2002; Ramasamy, 2004; Landau, 2008).  
 
Hegemony in Gramsci not only rests on coercion, but also consent (Buttigieg, 1995). 
In the hegemonic project located within civil society, the ruling classes endeavour to 
convince the ruled classes to accept the way in which society is developing, as well 
as use coercion upon them at times when some sections seek to counter the system 
that oppresses them (Chandhoke, 1995). Moreover, Gramsci suggests that “states 
that do not possess civil societies are more vulnerable than those that do possess 
them” (Chandhoke, 2007, p.611). In order to build consent in society, the state, 
according to Gramsci, needs to establish mechanisms and legitimate institutions 
deeply entrenched in that society (Fontana, 2002). Appealing to both popular 
consent and coercion is a powerful governing tactic that enables authoritarian 
regimes to sustain their survival.  
 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be evidenced in many contemporary 
authoritarian systems. In Vietnam, for example, an expression of state efforts in 
building consent in society is the presence of large-scale state-owned mass 
organisations that function as extended arms of the state stretching from the centre 
to grassroots levels to carry out party propagation and to mobilise mass support for 
its agenda. Yet, the state, from time to time, uses coercive measures (e.g. physical 
attacks, house arrest, detainment, intimidation, or livelihood destruction) to 
suppress opposition from those who seek to challenge its political hegemony.  
 
Also in the light of the Gramscian perspective, Wiktorowicz (2000) showcases a vivid 
picture of how civil society is appropriated in the state hegemonic project in the 




2007). CSOs in this region, once established, are entangled into a web of 
bureaucratic practices and mechanisms that contain them and concurrently enable 
the ruling elites to monitor and regulate associational activities. Wiktorowicz adds 
that, in applying this mechanism, the state seeks to undermine potentialities of civil 
society challenging its regime authority, whilst at the same time tactically co-opting 
CSOs to make them become a vehicle for controlling society, rather than an engine 
for democratic change (ibid).  
 
Elaborating upon Gramsci, Landau (2008) identifies that civil society in Cambodia 
functions as an important force in realising the state’s hegemonic project by 
enhancing political legitimation of the authoritarian government through shaping 
public opinion and building consent, whilst simultaneously leaving space for state 
coercion and repression. Freedom of assembly and association is constitutionally 
safeguarded, but many leaders of trade union movements have been exposed to 
physical attacks, murders and death threats. The government issues various legal 
documents deliberately worded in vagueness to clamp down on publications and 
editors who criticise top leaders in the National Assembly and the government 
(Landau, 2008).  
 
Another critical element of Gramsci’s approach is that civil society accommodates 
both hegemony and counter-hegemony, which implies a discursive nature inherent 
in civil society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In its discursive nature, the seeds of 
counter-hegemony (i.e. contention, competition, and struggle) can also grow. The 
ruled classes could converge and organise themselves to resist political hegemony. 
Counter-hegemonic forces in the authoritarian state can be seen both in the real 
and virtual spheres. In Vietnam, for instance, farmer protests for land expropriation, 
workers’ strikes against deteriorating conditions, and street protests in the anti-
China nationalist movement as well as environmental campaigns, are scaling up. An 
accelerating number of bloggers and internet activists are adopting digital and 
modern technological tools to criticise and oppose the wrongdoings of public 
officials and unpopular government policies.   
 
The discursive nature of civil society shows how Gramscian readings foresee the 
potential to oppose the state via civil society, a role advocated by liberals. 




the sense that there are both the domains of hegemony and counter-hegemony, 
whereas liberals only recognise the latter.  
 
To some certain degree, the Gramscian approach is useful for elucidating some 
important episodes of state-society relations in authoritarian contexts. 
Nevertheless, there are some significant phenomena concerning the nexus between 
these two actors, which fail to be captured by Gramsci. For example, there is strong 
evidence that under authoritarian systems political debates and contestations are 
found within the state itself rather than within civil society, which is believed by 
Gramsci to be a sphere of contestation (Landau, 2008). Similarly, it is observed 
elsewhere that some components of civil society have succeeded in circumventing 
the political hegemony by appropriating the existing formal system to make it work 
for their organisational objectives (Foster, 2001). This resonates with the 
phenomenon in which non-state associations sacrifice some degree of their 
autonomy to seek incorporation into the authoritarian state, so that they can gain 
access to funding and political connections for their short-term and long-term 
strategy. The umbrella organisation in Vietnam, VUSTA (Vietnam Union of Science 
and Technology Associations), for example, is considered an official representative 
of many local NGOs, but it has striven with much effort to be closer to the state, 
rather than to its members, so that it can enjoy more power and benefits due to 
this closeness (Interview, 12 December 2014, Hanoi).   
 
State-society relations in authoritarian contexts are restructuring with greater 
intricacy. Moreover, civil society activism, as illustrated, is not marching toward 
democratisation as its sole cause. It is therefore incumbent on the research 
community regarding this topic to pay equal attention to the different forms and 
outcomes of activism that prevail in civil society in authoritarian contexts. 
Overemphasis on traditional NGOs or a particular form of action or the normative 
values of civil society often leads to narrow empirical focus and precludes analytical 







2.5. Beyond civil society 
 
As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, I followed an eclectic approach to 
conduct the theoretical review of my thesis, and using this allowed me to respond 
quickly to the new phenomena emerging from the field. In addition to having good 
understanding of civil society theories, it was necessary that I open my exploration 
up to social movement theories to examine whether and if so, how they are 
relevant to my case studies. In reviewing the literature on civil society activism in 
authoritarian contexts, it became clear that many accounts adopted dominant 
analytical dimensions of mainstream social movement theories, in varying degrees, 
to investigate different episodes of public contestation (e.g. Kuah-Pearce and 
Guiheux, 2009; Zuo and Benford, 1995; Schock, 1999; Beinin and Vairel, 2013).   
 
The rise to prominence of collective action from below in many authoritarian 
political systems such as Vietnam, China, Burma, or Russia has contested further the 
conventional civil society framework in explaining the emerging phenomenon. It has 
also necessitated the search for an alternative conceptual framework that is 
sufficient to understand analytically the emerging forms of contestation (public 
protests or social movements). In addition, empirical evidence elsewhere (e.g. the 
success cases of democratic transition in Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya [Pace and 
Cavatorta, 2012]) shows that state hegemony, co-optation of civil society, NGOs or 
development focus within the traditional civil society framework fails to deal with 
bottom-up social movements. Likewise, donor-funded NGO-led activism constitutes 
just one element within the whole landscape of civil society activism, for many 
other types of such activism are often present in authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, 
different analytical dimensions of mainstream social movement theories are 
employed to examine the dynamics of emerging public contestation in authoritarian 
states, including contentious collective actions, political opportunity structures, 
mobilising structures, and framing processes (political process), and symbolic 
features and collective identity-building processes (new social movement theory).  I 
will particularly discuss these concepts to explore why and how they have been 
applied to explain grassroots collective actions in these contexts.  
 
Political process theory (PPT) was developed by the leading American theorists of 




1977; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 2010; Tilly, 2015). PPT, the dominant paradigm in the 
study of social movements and contentious politics (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004), by 
and large, follows a state-centric approach, whereby the state is perceived to affect 
both the distribution of power and resources in society and to define possibilities 
for challenge. Social movements under PPT transform social contests in which they 
operate (Smith and Fetner, 2009). Shifting focus away from factors internal and 
external to the movement, PPT provides an extensive account of the emergence of 
the movement (McAdam, 2010). Social movements under this theory are defined as 
“collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow, 1994, p.4). They 
emerge “when expanding political opportunities are seized by people who are 
formally or informally organized, aggrieved, and optimistic that they can 
successfully redress their concerns” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, p.17).  
 
This model overlooks the role of intense grievances and extensive resources, which 
its proponents consider less important to the rise of social movements, and instead 
it places emphasis on the opening of political opportunities as a requisite that gives 
rise to social mobilisation (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). Moreover, the model 
focuses exclusively on movements engaged in political conflict, especially on direct 
confrontation between insurgents and authorities. Under PPT, overt confrontation 
is considered to constitute the crux of the dynamics (Gamson, 1983 cited in Morris 
and Herring, 1987).   
 
The founding scholars of PPT (Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, Charles Tilly) to some 
certain extent, agree upon the three vital components shaping the emergence and 
development of movements, including: the political opportunity structure, 
mobilising structures, and framing processes. Among them the political opportunity 
structure stands out most dominant.  
 
Political opportunity structure: Despite being one of the most influential concepts in 
dominant social movement theories, political opportunity structure entails much 
ambiguity and pliability, for it can be ascribed to anything exogenous to a social 





Political opportunity structure, in Tilly and Tarrow (2015, p. 49), “refers to features 
of regimes and institutions (e.g. splits in the ruling class) that facilitate or inhibit a 
political actor’s collective action and to changes in those features” and “it 
emphatically includes not only opportunities but also threats”. When these 
opportunities and threats accumulate and combine, at a certain point, they will 
result in changes in regimes, such as democratisation (ibid). Accordingly, Tarrow 
(1994, p.85) argues that the reason lurking behind people’s embarkation on 
contentious politics, derives from the dimensions of political environment, in other 
words political opportunities, which “provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure”. 
 
The terms ‘political opportunity structure’ and ‘political opportunities’ are often 
used interchangeably under PPT, which has induced some confusion (Meyer, 2004). 
It would be flawed to understand political opportunities in terms of ‘structure’ (or 
structural change), because they do not mean the same thing and often refer to 
differing things. If it is mentioned as being an ‘opportunity’, in what sense it is 
structural; if it is an ‘opportunity structure’, what makes it political? (Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2004). What is more problematic is the concept’s lack of specificity, which 
leaves researchers struggling to figure out which aspects of the political 
environment affect the rise of social movements and in what way this rise is 
affected (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). McAdam (1996, p.26) brings forth a list of 
dimensions of political opportunity, which he believes to be highly consensual:  
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that 
typically undergird a polity  
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression   
 
Within this consensual list, the political opportunity structure (POS) takes into 
account the changing exogenous political opportunities prevailing in the political 
environment, i.e. the likelihood for a movement to arise is conditional on the 
emergence of changes in the political system (i.e. the state). As a consequence, the 
movement’s success or failure, or the social movement agency, as Morris (2000) 
puts it, rests largely in the hands of external actors, thereby overlooking the 




On one level, some agree that changes in political opportunities are associated with 
changes in the tactics of social mobilisation, whilst on another, confusion continues 
to exist, because very little is understood regarding the passage from opportunities 
into collective action (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). Chapter 4 of the thesis will 
provide an in-depth account of how the mobilising groups transformed political 
opportunities into collective action in the Trees Movement.   
 
Mobilising structures, as defined by McAdam et al. (1996, p.3), are “those collective 
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in 
collective action”. Salient to this concept is an emphasis on the flexible use of both 
formal and informal institutions/networks/channels, and the combination of diverse 
constellations of actors that are explicitly organised around movement goals and 
others that are organised for other purposes in contemporary social movements 
(McCarthy, 1996 cited in Smith and Fetner, 2009). In the Trees Movement (Chapter 
4), as will later be seen, the mobilising groups strategically navigated both formal 
and informal channels to orchestrate collective action.  
 
Framing processes emerged when the political process theorists increasingly 
realised that cultural dynamics are important for understanding the course and 
trajectory of social movements (Benford and Snow, 2000).  Equally noticeable is 
that social movements, in turn, have become a critical force of cultural dynamics in 
the shaping of new identities and ideologies (Swidler, 2000 cited in Brown, 2004).  
 
Frames are understood as “schemata of interpretation” – they help to organise and 
strategise events meaningfully and guide actions (Gamson, 1992, cited in Benford 
and Snow, 2000, p.614). However frames are not simply a rough aggregation of 
discrete behaviours and perceptions, for they themselves are also the outcome of 
negotiating shared meaning (ibid). The concept of framing, in other words 
incorporates a variety of factors, including collective identities, repertoires of 
contention, beliefs, meanings, political ideology and discourse, as well as cultural 
practices, which once established will allow social movement actors to legitimise 
their activities and accelerate mobilisation process (Benford and Snow, 2000). Given 
this situation, framing processes provide an analytical lens for understanding why 
people participate in the social movement and also why movement actors (i.e. 




Movement will illuminate how the challenging groups appropriated the existing 
formal discourse to construct their identities and the meanings of their mobilisation 
to generate legitimacy, how they framed their mobilising strategies and repertoire 
of actions to recruit participants to intensify collective pressure on the government.         
 
Nevertheless, the existing scholarship of civil society activism in authoritarian 
contexts contends that whilst the explanatory terms as above discussed are useful 
for explaining factors that give rise to social movements and specific moments of 
contention, the model places too much emphasis on the movements targeted at 
the state or overt forms of political contestation (Cheskin and March, 2015; 
Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). The state is treated as a unit of analysis, the action of 
which is a determinant factor shaping movement emergence, dynamics and 
outcomes (Voss and Williams, 2012). As a result, only movements and forms of 
activism that directly confront the state are favoured. The model also tells us very 
little about the agency of challenge groups, leadership, the mobilisation process, 
dynamics, interactive sequences, etc. during the course of movements. The prism of 
this emphasis consequently dismisses a range of forms of civic mobilisation/activism 
which confrontation with the state is not always overt and straightforward, which is 
a common practice of the public sphere in many authoritarian regimes including 
Vietnam.    
 
 
3. Understanding civil society activism in Vietnam’s 
authoritarian one-party context 
 
As above discussed, there are certain limitations concerning dominant civil society 
theories as well as social movement theories. Discussions on civil society 
traditionally are NGO- and development- focused, meanwhile, civil society activism 
under authoritarianism goes far beyond NGOs and a donor-driven agenda. The 
traditional civil society framework, as a result does not facilitate the examination of 
emerging forms of activism (e.g. public protests or social movements) in 
authoritarian regimes. Against this backdrop, some dominant explanatory terms of 
social movement theories have been applied to examine these new forms. This 




contention. Critically, these two grand theoretical bodies of literature do not talk to 
one another, each being utilised without much reference to the other.    
 
Much of existing accounts on civil society activism in Vietnam focus on formal 
organisations (NGOs) and their actions (e.g. Irene Norlund, 2007); Ben Kerkvliet, 
Nguyen Quang A and Bach Tan Sinh, 2008; Joseph Hannah, 2007; or Joerg 
Wischermann, 2003 & 2013).  In particular, research on this topic written by 
Vietnamese scholars is extremely limited and the available scholarship is again 
either focused on the structural organisations of civil society (e.g. Bui The Cuong, 
2005) or the socio-economic functions of civil society organisations (Bach Tan Sinh, 
2003 & 2011).  
 
Equally notable is a significant lacuna in research on grassroots citizen-led activism 
in Vietnam. Recently, there are some emerging accounts on non-NGO and non-
hierarchical forms of activism, such as Wells-Dang (2010 & 2011), with a focus on 
informal civil society networks and political space claimed from below; Carl Thayer 
(2009) on independent oppositional civil society groups, which he refers to as 
political civil society; Morris-Jung (2015) on online petition movements; and 
especially a large contribution by Ben Kerkvliet on workers’ protests (2010), 
farmers’ protests (2014a), as well as his unique account on dissidents (2014b).  
 
My thesis does not place a singular focus on either NGO-led activism or citizen-led 
activism, but rather, it is set out to pay equally significant attention to these 
contrasting forms. Therefore, it is a crucial task for me to develop an analytical 
framework that enables me to examine and compare both forms analytically. 
Drawing on the above theoretical discussions of civil society activism in 
authoritarian contexts, validated by my empirical encounters, there are three key 
concepts I will use as the analytical framework to look across both forms of activism 
of the research. In what follows, I outline three overarching themes namely, 
legitimacy, autonomy, and formality and informality of activism which prove most 
analytically relevant and combine to enable me to explore contemporary civil 
society activism along with reflecting on the politics of state-society relations in 
Vietnam. The selection of these themes was theoretically informed and 
subsequently validated and triangulated through my data collection and analysis. 




strongly with the distinctive features of civil society activism in Vietnam, where 
state-society power relations are evolving and restructuring. This framework, 
covering both forms of activism, also offers important conceptual contributions to 
the existing literature of the topic. I next explain in further detail why I have 
selected these themes for my research, and how relevant they are, both 





Legitimacy pertinent to various organisational structures of civil society under 
authoritarianism is precarious. Conceptually, unlike autonomy, legitimacy receives 
little attention in dominant civil society theories, because under the liberal 
framework civil society is normatively associated with pre-established values. There 
remains a scholarly gap in research on legitimacy regarding civil society activism in 
authoritarian contexts. In addition, the existing literature on legitimacy stresses 
more on NGOs than on social movements. The ‘legitimacy’ theme in this thesis is 
conceptually grounded in the relational approach (discussed in 2.3) and mainstream 
social movement theories. In the first place, the relational perspective shifts focus 
away from the notion of a pre-established nature of civil society and recognises the 
need to analyse how civil society expresses itself in specific contexts, as well as how 
its actors are constructed and situate themselves in the relationships that they 
respond to and become enmeshed within. The adoption of relational thinking also 
enables us to look at processes of social interaction and mobilisation, as well as the 
ties that such interactions generate. Using this approach to understand how civil 
society expresses itself in specific contexts and in terms of the intricacies of 
relationships they have with the state, ‘legitimacy’ emerges as an integral part of 
the processes through which civil society expresses and relates itself to the state. I 
will examine how civil society groups generate and maintain legitimacy for their 
organisational structures and for their collective actions.     
 
Second, the ‘framing processes’ of social movement theory (discussed in 2.5) is the 
term that resonates with legitimacy: “frames help to render events or occurrences 
meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action” (Benford 




identities, beliefs, meanings, political ideology and discourse, as well as cultural 
practices, which once established allow collective actors to legitimise their 
activities, to garner bystanders’ supports and to accelerate the mobilisation process 
(ibid).  
 
Legitimacy can constrain or stimulate different actors’ ability to act. I chose 
legitimacy as a key dimension to examine the two case studies because it is a long-
standing issue among CSOs in Vietnam. This insight grows out of researching a wide 
array of secondary data and my empirical encounters. Specifically, the term ‘civil 
society’, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is unused in any official documents 
in Vietnam, meaning that the state has continued not to admit its official existence. 
The Law on Association, which is expected to create an enabling framework for the 
associational activities in Vietnam, has long been delayed for approval, being 
subject to over twenty five years of revision. In general, the institutional 
preconditions for associationalism in the country are widely lacking. The two case 
studies of the registered NGO ‘CCERD’ and the citizen-led Trees Movement are the 
main components of Vietnamese civil society, but they differ in many respects, 
namely organisational structure to position of legitimacy, degree of autonomy, as 
well as methods of activism. So, generating and maintaining legitimacy emerges as a 
top concern underpinning their strategies of social mobilisation in both cases.  
 
Legitimacy has inhabited centre stage among contemporary social and political 
scientists for decades, but there is limited definitional consensus on the concept 
partly because it is applied to almost every dimension of social life and has been 
employed by various actors at all levels. Much current scholarship on legitimacy 
builds on Weber’s idea of social order, whereby he argues that “a social order is 
legitimate only if action is approximately or on the average oriented to certain 
determinate ‘maxims’ or rules” (Weber, 1978 cited in Johnson et al, 2006, p.55). 
That social order is sustainable, Weber explains, if it is grounded in the continuity of 
its members’ beliefs in its legitimacy (Miller, 1972).  
 
Generally, a social entity is considered legitimate “if it is in accord with the norms, 
values, beliefs, practices and procedures accepted by a group” (Zelditch, 2001, 
p.33). Edwards (2001, p.147) defines legitimacy as “the right to be and to do 




justified in its chosen course of action”. Drawing on Weber, Douglas (1986) argues 
that to achieve legitimacy an institution needs “a formula that founds its rightness 
in reason and in nature” (Douglas, 1986 cited in Johnson et al., 2006, p.56). With 
particular regard to legitimation, Douglas contends, it is a process by which 
institutions are linked to a broader cultural framework of beliefs, those regarding 
the reason and nature that are presumed to be so consensually accepted that they 
are objective social facts (ibid). Likewise, legitimation, according to Zelditch (2001, 
p.9), is a process that “brings the unaccepted into accord with accepted norms, 
values, beliefs, practices, and procedures”. It is, basically, a consensus-building 
process, Zelditch explains. Johnson et al. (2006) however notice that whilst 
consensus is a necessary condition of legitimacy, it is not necessary to refer to 
actual or absolute consensus, for legitimacy can be maintained despite 
disagreement from some individuals.  
 
The literature on legitimacy (e.g. the organisations literature) so far places much 
more focus on NGOs than on social movements. Within the existing organisational 
scholarship, the definition offered by Suchman (1995, p.574), is recognised as 
influential, whereby he conceptualises it as “a generalised perception that actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. Once established, legitimacy will 
provide favourable conditions for civil society groups to mobilise the support of 
wider society and defend them from having their functionings and conducts 
questioned or sanctioned (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). More notable, however, is that 
legitimacy has a contested nature and it is generated in a lettuce of often 
competing normative and cognitive frameworks (Walton, 2013). The process of 
legitimation is not directly related to the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by its target 
(Thomas, 2013). This implies that legitimacy is not fixed, for once given or 
established, it needs to be maintained otherwise it can be removed. Understanding 
the contested nature of legitimacy, as such, gives an explanation as to why the 
different civil society groups of my research had to direct their substantial efforts 
towards not only building but also maintaining their legitimacy.  
 
To date, there remain limited academic efforts aimed at unpacking what legitimacy 
means in relation to social movements. The crux of the existing accounts lies in 




strategies they employ and the claims they make are legitimate. Haunss (2007) 
argues that in addressing how legitimacy relates to social movements, focus should 
be shifted to exploring how social movements confer or deny legitimacy to political 
actors as well as the extent to which they are able to do so being contingent on 
their strategic choices or structural constraints.  
 
Since the two case studies of my research straddle several domains, it is important 
to search for a proper interpretation of legitimacy that is analytically agile and 
relevant for application across these cases. Legitimacy in this research is of course 
not limited to a legal registration or a legal status, nor is it simply an internal trait of 
a particular organisation. Rather, drawing on Suchman (1995), Zelditch (2001), 
Edwards (2001) and Douglas (1986) above, legitimacy in this thesis is construed in 
terms of how to be socially accepted and recognised for the acts that are right in 
reason and in nature, desirable, proper, admissible and justifiable and thus, enjoy 
the support of an identifiable community. I developed this definition rather than 
adopting completely any of those formulated by the authors above, because it 
opened enough analytical space for me to examine two contrasting forms of civil 
society activism, NGO-led and citizen-led activism. Understanding legitimacy in this 
way not only avoids the unpleasant confusion of this term when applied to different 
organisational structures embedded in the case studies of this research (e.g. how to 
understand legitimacy of a social movement and an NGO at the same time). It also 
avoids the risk of downgrading the legitimation processes of groups without legal 
status. In addition, it provides a key to understanding the importance of legitimacy 
in social mobilisation orchestrated by different civil society groups in Vietnam.  
 
Regarding types of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) brings to the fore four types of 
legitimacy. Specifically, regulatory legitimacy is reliant on conformity with the 
existing laws and regulations; normative legitimacy refers to congruence between 
the values pursued by organisations and wider societal values; “cognitive legitimacy 
is related to conformity to established cognitive structures in society, what is often 
described as having ‘taken-for granted’ status” (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999 cited in 
Lister, 2003, p.179); and pragmatic legitimacy derives from getting things done for 





Existing literature on legitimacy overlooks the legitimation strategies and processes. 
This research will fill this gap by exploring a series of inter-related questions in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6: How do the NGO and the Trees Movement within this research 
construct and enhance legitimacy for their activism? What mobilising strategies do 
they use to legitimise their activism and then maintain their legitimacy? In whose 
eyes are these groups legitimate? Why do certain groups with differing positions of 
legitimacy gain or lose political salience at certain times? In relation to the three key 
research questions of my thesis, legitimacy is the detectable component pertinent 
to the first: “What organisational forms do civil society groups adopt and how are 
these positioned in relation to the state?” 
 
 
3.2. Autonomy of activism 
 
Autonomy is a classical topical concern of the liberal civil society theory and also the 
new social movement literature (e.g. Offe, 1985). Whilst under the former, it is 
structurally independent from the state, under the latter it is viewed as collective 
action autonomous from the existing bureaucratic structures (e.g. unions, political 
parties). The thesis rejects the liberal understanding of autonomy that focuses on 
state-society polarity or ‘structural autonomy’ by approaching autonomy in terms of 
capacity to act in relation to the state. The understanding of autonomy from the 
new social movement perspective is also rejected through the argument that in 
authoritarian contexts, such as Vietnam, all forms of civil society activism are 
constrained by the state and they have to be aligned with the state agenda and 
discourse in order to achieve success. 
 
There exists a large variety of conceptual definitions regarding autonomy in moral, 
social and political philosophy. Bringing a detailed definitional account of this 
concept is, however, beyond the scope of the thesis. Autonomy concerns the self-
rule and states of a person (Dworkin, 1988 cited in Christman, 2008), or refers to 
the capacity of people in varying degrees to govern their lives and determine their 
course (Raz, 1986 cited in Devine et al. 2008). Self-rule, according to Dworkin, 
includes two components: the independence of one’s deliberation and choice from 
manipulation by others along with the capacity to rule oneself (Dworkin, 1988, cited 




associated with the level of competence of the person in acting, reflection, and 
decision making on the basis of factors that are somehow his/her own. In order to 
be able to exercise self-rule, one must be in a position to act competently based on 
values, conditions, desires, etc. that constitute him/her and motivate choice (ibid).  
 
In similar account, Chirkov et al (2003, p.98) indicate that “people are most 
autonomous when they act in accord with their authentic interests or integrated 
values and desires”. In particular, they offer an alternative way of perceiving this 
term in relation to dependency, whereby they problematise the relationship 
between autonomy and dependency. They argue that the two can exist at the same 
time and in many scenarios, the latter even paves the way for achieving the former. 
This means that in certain instances, people seek shelter in further dependency in 
order to pursue greater autonomy and agency (Chirkov et al., 2003 cited in Devine, 
2006). The account by Chirkov et al. is reminiscent of the question concerning 
whether embeddedness in the state by VNGOs is coincident with the productive or 
unproductive synergistic relationships between them and the state, which will be 
addressed in Chapter 5.   
 
Among influential views on autonomy is ‘relational autonomy’, which implies that 
autonomy fundamentally concerns social relations rather than individual traits 
(Oshana, 2006 cited in Christman, 2008). Under this approach, autonomy is 
understood “as a property, not merely of an individual and her capacities, but of the 
relations that comprise those conditions. To protect autonomy in this way is to 
protect those relations” (Christman, 2004, p.156). Relational views of autonomy 
“valuably underscore the social embeddedness of selves while not forsaking the 
basic value commitments of (for the most part, liberal) justice” (Christman, 2004, 
p.143). They emphasise on the role that background social dynamics and power 
structures play in the enjoyment and development of autonomy.  
 
The thesis does not focus on autonomy at the individual (personal) level, but by 
drawing on the relational views of autonomy, Chirkov et al (2003), Christman (2004) 
as well as Dworkin (1988), I view autonomy as the ability of civil society groups to 
act and to determine their course in accord with their interests or values and desires 
when negotiating especially with the state. Autonomy in the thesis is not a 




relation to ‘embeddedness’ in the state in this thesis. Specifically, the research 
involves examining the significance of the varying relations to the state that civil 
society groups are enmeshed within. It examines, based on these varied degrees of 
embeddedness in the state, how civil society groups are able to express, organise 
and orchestrate activism towards achieving collective goals.  
 
While comparing the experiences of civil society activism in Vietnam across my two 
case studies, I realised that autonomy retains strong resonance, since together with 
legitimacy it is an important factor that shapes how civil society groups can act and 
orchestrate collective actions. Similarly, since autonomy and legitimacy are 
conceived as being inter-related, I explore how the former affects the legitimation 
processes pursued by the different groups as well as how the latter affects these 
groups to deploy their autonomy.  
 
Also approaching this term in a non-conventional way, Ana Dinerstein (2010) looks 
at autonomy as an instrument to contest power. Although she does not provide a 
clear conception of what autonomy is, she argues that it involves a contested 
relationship in and against the state or “autonomy is a tool to contest power” 
(Dinerstein, 2010, p.361). Dinerstein’s argument reverberates with the experience 
of activism by different civil society groups associated with varying degrees of 
autonomy in this research. Insofar as autonomy is concerned, drawing on 
Dinerstein, I argue that given the extent of autonomy that is available to them, civil 
society groups become attuned to their connections to political power and decide 
to act accordingly. They become strategic mobilisers by taking advantage of their 
differing levels of embeddedness in the state in order to realise their collective 
goals. This argument seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of civil society 
activism in authoritarian contexts, where civil society groups do not always promote 
a co-opted form of political activism that upholds rather than contradicts the status 
quo.  
 
Autonomy will be addressed in detail throughout my empirical analysis in Chapters 
four, five, and six. Together with legitimacy, providing an insightful account of 





3.3. Formality and informality of activism 
 
(In)formality of activism is the third integral element to civil society activism in 
Vietnam. Bringing insight into formality and informality of activism involves 
investigating processes of social mobilisation through which different civil society 
groups associated with varying degrees of autonomy and legitimacy strategically 
articulate the interplay of formal and informal processes to achieve collective goals.  
 
This theme is theoretically informed by the relational approach (see section 2.3) as 
well as the dominant explanatory term, ‘mobilising structures’, of social movement 
theories (see section 2.5). As indicated, the relational perspective considers civil 
society in terms of social processes and relations with other objects and examines 
how it is constituted after such relations and interactions. If ‘framing processes’ of 
social movement theories shed some needed light on the concept ‘legitimacy’, 
‘mobilising structures’ are the term that resonates with (in)formality. The latter is 
defined as the collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people 
mobilise and engage in collective action (McAdam et al., 1996). Salient to this 
concept is the emphasis on the flexible use of both formal and informal channels 
and institutions as well as the combination of diverse constellations of actors that 
are explicitly organised around movement goals.  
 
There is no rigorous and systematic conceptualisation in the literature on 
(in)formality, for it encompasses a wide range of strands that consider these terms 
in varying or even competing views. There is some consensus that formality relates 
to coming within the ambit of state regulation (Sinha and Kanbur, 2012). In 
comparative politics, for example, a common distinction between formal and 
informal institutions is state-societal. Whilst the former refers to state bodies 
(legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, 
regulations), the latter pertains to civic, religious, and other societal rules and 
organisations (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). In attempt to overcome this divide, 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004, pp. 8-9) define “formal institutions as rules that are 
openly codified, in the sense that they are established and communicated through 
channels that are widely accepted as official. By contrast, informal institutions are 
socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 




From a sociological perspective, drawing on Goffman (1983), Morand (1995) 
considers formality and informality as two distinct types of interaction orders. 
Goffman’s interaction order refers to the situation that when participating in social 
gatherings, actors tend to generate a set of conventions or rules for co-mingling, 
which shape how individuals are to conduct themselves (Goffman, 1983 cited in 
Morand, 1995). Formality and informality are construed as two different types of 
interaction orders, since, Morand (1995) explains, each exhibits a distinct set of 
understandings or conventions about how actors are to perform. The latter is 
characterised by looser, more casual modes of behaviour and situational 
involvement, whilst the former is characterised by tighter, more disciplined ones 
(ibid).  
 
Formality and informality of activism in this thesis are formulated based on Helmke 
and Levitsky’s (2004) and Morand’s (1995) perspectives, as provided above. This is 
first done in relation to a number of related concepts: formal vs. informal 
structures, and formal vs. informal channels. A formal structure is defined as an 
officially institutionalised one with a physical head-office (e.g. a registered NGO or a 
structure belonging to the state, such as a mass organisation) that works within the 
rules that are openly codified. In contrast, an informal structure refers to a loosely 
organised and non-institutionalised one (e.g. an independent group of activists, or 
an informal civilian network, or an independent/unregistered group) that works 
outside of the officially institutionalised structure. Drawing on this definition, it can 
be seen in this thesis that the case study CCERD, a local registered NGO, has a 
formal structure, whilst the mobilising groups in the Trees Movement have informal 
structures. Formal channels are officially sanctioned mechanisms (e.g. receiving 
office for citizens in government departments, state laws, policies, state-
propagandised commitments and authorised activities). Informal channels concern 
mechanisms that tend to exist or to be enforced outside officially sanctioned 
channels (e.g. petition signing, public demonstration, civil disobedience, or 
Facebook).    
 
Formality and informality of activism will be approached in terms of processes and 
interactions performed by different structures, formal or informal, in this thesis. 
Specifically, I define formal activism as a process through which different groups 




structures. In contrast, informal activism is a process through which different groups 
engage with and/or perform their acts through informal channels and structures in 
either an overt or a covert manner. For example, when a mobilising group in the 
Trees Movement (i.e. an informal structure) convened at the city government (i.e. 
formal structure) to demand a formal meeting (formal channel) with the city 
leaders, this can be considered as formal activism. Covert activism, by contrast, is 
considered as informal activism. As an example of this came when the NGO case 
study covertly worked with a centrally-based formal structure, i.e. the NGO ‘Toward 
Sustainable Development’ based in Hanoi, so as to gain more support from the 
central level.  
 
Asking ‘whether civil society groups associated with greater legitimacy and 
embeddedness in the state only resort to formal activism  and vice versa’ or 
‘whether these different groups deploy both formality and informality and how 
they do it’, will open up an important avenue for understanding the dynamic of 
activism performed by these groups. Ethnographic research provided me with the 
opportunity to observe the unobservable, to make sense of everyday acts of my 
target groups and to comprehend the logic and motive underlining their decisions. 
Moreover, during my comparative efforts of the two case studies, an array of novel 
insights came out, which enabled me to give an answer to why different groups 
adopted certain mobilising strategies and why they strategically navigated both 
formal and informal channels at certain times during the course of mobilisation.  
 
James Scott (1998) argues that what constitutes formality always has an informal 
underpinning. As we will see later, underpinning the mobilisations led by the formal 
structure (i.e. the NGO-CCERD) as well as by the informal structure (i.e. the Trees 
Movement) were dynamic interactions between formality and informality.  
 
Along the lines of the discussion about formality and informality, it is pertinent to 
mention the term ‘embedded activism’, which has been used by Peter Ho (2007), 
and Ho and Edmonds (2007), in their wide ranging account on civil society activism 
in China, and Wells-Dang (2011) on informal civil society networks in Vietnam and 
China. This form of activism, to a certain extent, resonates with the experience and 
practice of NGO-led activism in this thesis, it therefore deserves some clarification. 




is led by a formally organised structure or engages with authorities. It uses 
institutionalised structures along with formal channels such as state laws, policies, 
officially promoted values or state-propagandised agenda as well as mainstream 
media to frame mobilising structures around controversial issues in a non-
confrontational manner. Ho, however, notices that embeddedness does not 
indicate a submissive and silenced movement, but rather, this form of activism is 
continually negotiated and therefore effectively adapted into the existing political 
environment through which some extent of political influence can be effectuated.  
 
Drawing on Ho, embedded activism could be evidenced in the NGO-led activism 
case study of this research. The NGO engaged with or even manipulated formal 
power structures and deployed formal channels to mobilise collectively in order to 
compel the local government to deliver progressive policy outcomes to the local 
poor.  
 
In contrast to embedded activism is autonomous citizen-led activism, which is 
embodied by the Trees Movement case study. Civil society activism across regions, 
Cavatorta (2012) argues, goes beyond formal hierarchical structures and 
organisations. Engagement with socio-economic and political affairs is no longer 
only limited to formal structures. Instead, ordinary people with increasing 
awareness of their citizenship and civic duties become activated citizens taking 
initiatives to organise themselves and exercise critical activism in many 
authoritarian contexts.       
 
Formality and informality of activism is the element pertinent to the second 
research question of the thesis, whereby I ask “what strategies of engagement do 





This chapter has traced and explored theories and concepts relating to civil society 




civil society and social movement theories in non-democratic regimes such as 
Vietnam. Evolving state-society relations in Vietnam are running counter to many of 
the assumptions underpinning this traditional civil society model and many 
episodes of public contestation are not always covered by social movement 
theories.  
 
Drawing on these theoretical discussions and particularly validated by my empirical 
findings, I developed three key concepts: legitimacy, autonomy of activism, along 
with formality and informality of activism. These concepts have enabled me to 
engage analytically with the realities and experiences of civil society activism in 
Vietnam and to reflect upon the politics of changing state-society relations. These 
elements constitute the analytical framework of the thesis, which guides my 
empirical analysis in the chapters that follow. They are considered as possessing the 
explanatory power to respond to my concrete empirical encounters. Each of them 
alone provides a particular slant of the complexity and dynamics of the evolving 
state-society relations in Vietnam. This framework is also expected to have wider 








Social science research is a dialectic and interactive process that is characterized by 
various continual negotiations. According to Devine (1999), dialectics and 
interactions are constitutive features of all phases of research rather than restricted 
to a certain one. Struggles to finalise research questions, data collection and 
empirical analysis pertaining to my research cost me a great deal of energy and 
effort to accommodate, improvise and even take risk to reach where I am now. 
Dozens of questions arose at critical moments of my research, which necessitated 
taking a decisive step. Along that journey, aside from aspects such as the 
psychological, behavioural, cultural, and political, I realised that I would also need to 
take into account the aspect of emotional feeling. Being a female researcher 
undertaking research about civil society activism in my home country, seeing 
civilians in my city being attacked and assaulted in the Trees Movement, several of 
whom were my key informants, neutralising my feelings to observe and analyse in 
the role of an impartial researcher obviously was a challenging task.  
 
This chapter aims to explain the methodological process through which I negotiated 
case studies, collected data, refined the research questions and addressed the 
research challenges as well as ethical issues including ethical considerations 
concerning online research. I also highlight the challenges I encountered and how I 




2. Epistemological framework  
 
In this research, I adopted a constructivist paradigm in which I pursued an 
interpretive-interactive- hermeneutic approach. Taking such an epistemological 
stance allowed me to understand social phenomena in terms of relationships and 
processes, while fully acknowledging their specific context. In what follows, I explain 




Positivism and constructionism are the two traditional ontological approaches in 
social science, but they differ sharply in terms of how the world is conceived. Under 
the former, there is the belief of the existence of a real world out there, but this 
world is autonomous from human agency. The aim is to discover and explain 
patterns that are supposed to be rooted in nature (Giddens and Giddens, 1974). In 
contrast, regarding the latter, its proponents contend that such patterns are a 
product of our own making and the belief in a universal and objective knowledge is 
disputed (Lynch, 1998). Constructivists believe that the “knowledge and reality that 
people hold is socially constructed through the use and interpretation of language, 
consciousness and shared meaning” (Habermas, 1972 cited in Pansiri, 2013, p. 24). 
Social constructionism seeks to capture and understand “the processes by which 
people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world (including 
themselves) in which they live” (Gergen, 1985, p.266).  
 
My research was fundamentally approached from a qualitative constructivist-
interpretivist perspective, which threw more light on understanding and 
interpretation and less on verification. Following this stance allowed me to gain in-
depth insight into a particular social phenomenon emanating from the public 
sphere in Vietnam, where civil society groups associated with different institutional 
characteristics exercised different forms of activism conducive to (re)structuring 
state-society relations in the country. In the constructivist interpretivist approach, 
“social reality is regarded as the product of processes by which social actors 
negotiate the meanings for actions and situations” (Blaikie, 1991, p. 120). The social 
world is a universe of meanings, it suggests therefore that to understand this world 
of meanings one must interpret it (Schwandt, 1994). It is incumbent on the inquirer 
to elucidate the process of meaning construction, along with what and how 
meanings are illustrated in the language and actions of social actors (ibid).  
 
This epistemological framework also indicates that my research process is 
inherently hermeneutic-dialectic, which lies at the centre of constructivist tradition 
(Guba and Lincoln, 2001). “Hermeneutics seeks to gain insight into society by 
interpreting what motivates others (introspection), ‘understanding’ in the sense of 
empathy” (Van der Pijl, 2009, p. 88). It is a recognised procedure of the 
interpretation, whereby any understanding must manifest to fit a distinct historical 
and social context (Dilthey, 1979 cited in Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p.187). In its 
essence, the particular is juxtaposed with the general, and the local with the 




components, but in order to understand the constitutive components one has to 
understand the whole (Reason and Rowan, 1981). Dialectics, as opposed to 
hermeneutics, examines internal contradictions (Kvale, 1996). The logics of the two 
processes seem to contrast in that hermeneutics attempts to combine meanings, 
whereas dialectics seeks to expose contradictions in those that are formed (ibid). In 
the light of this interpretation, the hermeneutic-dialectic approach is inherently 
comparative and contrasting between particular events, whilst general norms help 
constructivists widen their understanding of the event  beyond the particular or 
local (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). They employ comparisons to strengthen not 
weaken the local significance of knowledge, with no attempt to draw out larger 
generalisations regarding the nature of the social phenomenon. In particular, they 
seek to interpret certain events as set against larger contextual settings, which they 
consider to provide constitutive meanings to those events (ibid).  
 
Drawing on the constructivist paradigm and interpretative-interactive-hermeneutic 
approach, I engaged with the subjects pertinent to my in-depth case studies (who 
came from a wide array of backgrounds with varied beliefs and values) by 
enmeshing myself within the frames in which they construct meanings for their 
identities and actions, as well as the processes through which they undergo and 
reach decisions. My research offers two in-depth case studies of civil society 
activism, which proved to be contrasting, but also complementary to one other, 
which helped me illuminate different slants of Vietnam’s associationalism and 
reflect on the politics of the changing state-society relations in the country. I justify 
my case selection in the coming section. 
 
As indicated clearly in the introduction, my research is an attempt to contribute to 
understanding the politics of change by looking at the phenomenon of civil society 
activism. I viewed the phenomenon of change in terms of processes rather than in 
static terms. Process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis, which is 
defined “as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” 
(Collier, 2011, p.823). It focuses on the unfolding of events or situations over time 
and yet, Collier suggests, this unfolding will fail if one cannot adequately describe an 
event of situation at one point in time. Hence, insightful description, a fundamental 
component of this technique, should be started not with observing change or 
sequence, but rather with capturing a series of specific moments, then penetrating 




a good analytical account of processes of change (Collier, 2011). In the same vein, 
Vennesson indicates that process tracing used in the inductive constructivist 
tradition shifts the research focus from what happened to how and why it 
happened; it offers a means to discover the preference and perceptions of actors, 
their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that 
face them (Vennesson, 2008, cited in Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p.225).  
 
In investigating civil society activism in Vietnam, my research drew on a flexible 
combination of outside-in and inside-out perspectives. Specifically, the former 
involved describing and analysing contextual factors that underpin and shape civil 
society actions, such as structural links, ‘king’s rules’, and local norms as well as 
formal and informal institutions. Meanwhile the latter concerned examining the 
internal decision-making processes of the studied civil society groups, as well as 
capturing their internal dynamics and driving forces of their shift in actions or 
strategies when necessary. Having said that, it does not mean my approach to 
researching simply embraces discrete interrogations of external and internal 
dimensions and processes. Rather, I was informed by Goffman of a challenge that 
prevails regarding how to relate the ‘front stage’ to the ‘backstage’ and how to find 
that pathway for reaching the backstage, which is often deliberately defended 
(Goffman, 1959 cited in Devine, 1999, p.118). What actors perform on the front 
stage is explicit and accessible to the audience, whereas the backstage - where the 
decision-making process actually happens and where they construct, prepare and 
rehearse what they would perform on the front stage - is conventionally not 
accessible (ibid). The front stage only works because of multiple backstage 
activities. The explored civil society groups of the research performed various 
formal and informal processes on both the front and back stages to orchestrate 
their mobilisations. Hence, gaining in-depth insights into the intricacies of their 
performances at both these stages, as well as understanding the dynamics of their 
movements between them, was the ultimate aim of my empirical data collection.    
 
Regarding the positionality of the researcher, in securing impartiality in research I 
used my personal insight while taking a non-judgemental stance to understand, 
triangulate, and interpret the lived experience, behaviours and perspectives of my 
respondents as they participated, constructed and interpreted the meaning of their 





3. Evolution of the research questions 
 
My thesis evolved in terms of the themes and questions from what I had intended 
to address at the beginning of my research. In my first PhD seminar at Bath (12 June 
2014), I explained that my initial research objective was to explore the nature of 
change arising from the rise to prominence of NGO-led civil society in the 
authoritarian state of Vietnam. This would involve examining political significance 
effectuated by local NGOs in two main areas: social service provision (i.e. 
microfinance) and policy impact (i.e. land issues). I planned to limit my research 
focus to NGO-led interventions in order to examine changing state-society relations 
in a transitional Vietnam. This plan was designed on the basis of information 
gathered from literature, as well as preliminary interviews and conversations I had 
conducted via Skype along with emails with NGO leaders, experts, academics and 
journalists.  
 
The fact that my research followed an inductive data-driven approach, as well as an 
interpretative-interactive-hermeneutic approach, did not mean that I would simply 
enter the field with no questions. On the contrary, the initial questions, Maxwell 
(2008) points out, help to frame the study in important ways and influence 
decisions concerning methods. In particular, they are instrumental for developing 
questions with greater specificity. It is essential that a researcher starts out with a 
substantial amount of foundational experience and theoretical knowledge, which 
will help her/him produce certain questions in relation to the phenomena studied. 
My theoretical focus before I entered into the field was centred on civil society 
theory, in general and civil society in authoritarian contexts, in particular, which was 
underpinned by my expertise and foundational experience as a development 
practitioner who had spent several years working for a number of projects by the 
World Bank and UNDP.   
 
Empirically, the existing literature informed me how Vietnam in the aftermath of 
doi moi has undergone a major restructuring of society evidenced in the emergence 
and rise to prominence of new societal actors such as NGOs (Sidel, 1995). This has 
opened up new spaces and new forms of engagement for civil society actors 
seeking social change and policy impacts (Kerkvliet, 2001). I initially proposed to 




of their significance in relation to the country’s development course, as well as 
within the NGO sector itself. Microfinance is seen as a popular instrument, utilised 
by both government-owned NGOs (i.e. mass organisations) and local NGOs in 
combatting poverty. Consequently, it is considered instrumental to enhancing 
NGOs’ legitimacy in welfare service delivery and nurturing collaborative 
relationships between the state and society. Land issues (e.g. lack of access to land 
encountered by ethnic minority groups, relocation and resettlement problems 
facing the affected groups from hydropower plants construction, etc.) were planned 
to be selected with a view to incorporate organisations working in a more 
‘contentious’ area.  
 
Conceptually, the dominant civil society theory that assumes an autonomous civil 
society and ascribes the role in democratisation to it, fails to capture civil society 
practice as well as the intricacies of the changing state-society relations in 
authoritarian states like Vietnam.  
 
Research questions are an impetus to the choice of research design and 
methodology. In social sciences, what tends, however, to be observed in reality is 
that they often change either in subtle ways or to substantial degree in response to 
real conditions encountered in the field or to make up for the discovery of new, 
unexpected phenomena (Walton, 2010). What I unexpectedly encountered in the 
field caused the initial objective of my research (i.e. to examine local NGO actions in 
the authoritarian context of Vietnam) to evolve in response to the new phenomena. 
Specifically, whilst NGO activism still constituted a main component of my research 
focus, another form, citizen-led activism (non-NGO focused), which I came across in 
the field, was also incorporated into my research. Accordingly, the research 
objectives and questions were expanded and adjusted to respond to this new 
phenomenon growing out of my field encounters. In particular, the contested 
nature inherent in Vietnam’s public sphere expressed in this emerging form of civil 
society activism (i.e. citizen-led), became more tangible and dynamic. These forms 
of activism were deliberated at length through my in-depth case studies. In what 
follows, I explain in more detail the transformation of my research questions.  
 
During the early stage of my fieldwork, I sought to gain as much access to and to 
review secondary data on historical development and others issues related to 




documents that assisted me to formulate my research and conceptualise my 
understanding about Vietnamese civil society came from English sources, which 
resulted in an important gap in my understanding of the subject matter. In Vietnam 
I began to examine the Vietnamese sources. Concurrently, the insights gained from 
these sources opened the door for me to identify key contacts and potential case-
study NGOs. I strived to obtain insightful knowledge of their activities and historical 
engagements with the state in Vietnam. Coupled with preliminary information 
collected from dozens of precursory interviews (with a variety of respondents 
including prominent NGO leaders, local experts, academics, and journalists) 
regarding the nature of political change, civil society space and associational life at 
the general level, all data collected indicated that there was important knowledge 
concerning civil society activism that could only be obtained and understood 
through fieldwork. Three notable realisations arose regarding civil society actions in 
Vietnam during this period.  
 
First, VNGOs, formally organised structures of civil society mandatorily tied to the 
state via legalistic requirements, obviously continued to be a key component of my 
research locus. Yet, there were new insights regarding this sector that needed to be 
incorporated into my research. Specifically, it came to my realisation that VNGOs 
working on land conflict comprised a very modest proportion of the total and that 
there was no NGO that had committed itself wholly to only addressing this issue. 
Instead, land was mainstreamed and integrated with other areas that VNGOs were 
involved in. Moreover, I found out that almost every civil society role in Hannah’s 
civil society spectrum (indicated in Chapter 1) could be observed in present-day 
Vietnam’s associationalism, including from state policy implementers, watchdog, 
civil disobedience, opposition, and regime change. It should be noted that this 
model was generated in 2007, by which time Hannah had argued that most VNGOs 
had recourse to service delivery for their emergence and operation. Subsequently, 
their social service engagement would gradually open up space for them to 
manoeuvre and encroach on more contentious areas. Since the late 2000s, 
however, this situation appears to have changed with a number of NGOs bypassing 
the point of entry as social service providers to engage directly in areas such as 
policy lobbying, advocacy and watchdog. This phenomenon has risen to more pre-
eminence and signals a dynamic of change pertaining to the NGO sector in Vietnam. 
In the aftermath of the state-led reform of the 2013 Constitution, several laws 
concerning civil liberties, including the Law on Association and the law on Access to 




2014-2015 period, after years of delay. During this period, it was observed that the 
NGOs actively participated in state-led public consultation regarding these 
legislations. Notably, their engagement efforts were acknowledged as being fruitful 
in issues such as LGBT (e.g. the revised Law on Marriage and Families removed the 
article that opposed same-sex marriages) and budget law (NGOs made this law 
more comprehensible and accessible to the average population).        
 
Second, the period 2014-2015, especially 2015, was a dynamic time that witnessed 
a series of events that had been unseen in the associational life before. In parallel 
with local NGOs’ efforts at ensuring progressive policy outcomes, were the 
increasing actions performed by independent (unregistered) civil society groups. 
Their activities sought to push for more government accountability and rule of law. 
A stronger activism in both the virtual sphere and real life by these groups (e.g. 
dissidents, victims of injustice, radical academics, bloggers, radical lawyers, informal 
networks on environmental issues, or rights activists) signifies emerging public 
contestation in present-day Vietnam. This phenomenon has increasingly 
embarrassed the ruling regime, which finds these organisations difficult to 
anticipate and respond to (Abuza, 2015). In particular, the anti-China nationalist 
movement has yielded a generation of regular independent activists, who have 
become key players in contesting the political hegemony.  
 
Third, accompanying the stronger engagement of independent civil society groups 
has been increasing state coercion. The state arbitrariness has become more 
ruthless, which is evidenced in the fact that many activist-lawyers, rights activists, 
and bloggers were intimidated, attacked and detained under the same label 
imposed by the state, i.e. evil forces who seek to overthrow the socialist state. In 
particular, the abuse of power and violence perpetrated by public security against 
the opposition, has become highly worrisome. Yet, despite the grip being more 
tightened, the contention in civil society has become more acute rather than 
disrupted. The increasing activism by these autonomous groups is accentuating the 
‘contested’ nature of civil society that has been long obscured by the rhetoric that 
civil society in authoritarian regimes like Vietnam is either co-opted or suppressed. 
Becoming aware of this phenomenon prompted me to investigate it further, and 
also left me struggling to figure out what exactly I would seek to examine in relation 
to it and which case study I should select to capture its nuances. Moreover, I 
needed to work out how to incorporate it into the overarching aim of my research, 




state-society relations in Vietnam. While I was still grappling with case selection to 
convey this phenomenon, the Trees Movement began. It emerged at the very right 
moment for my research to evolve, and eventually became a strong case of citizen-
led activism, contrasting to NGO-led activism of my thesis. Taken together, they 
sufficed in showcasing the dynamics of civil society activism under the single-party 
rule of Vietnam. 
 
From being overlooked in my initial research proposal, citizen-led activism 
eventually became a pillar of my research along with NGO-led activism. This shift 
signified that my research had evolved from exploring civil society actions with NGO 
focus, to a more politics informed analysis with greater diversification of the 
subjects involved and greater intricacies regarding contestation. In so doing, I 
sought to examine varying forms and processes of civil society activism, as well as 
how they were structured, organised and mobilised and in what way they could 
effect change and (re)structure state-society relations in Vietnam. In sum, I was 
motivated to make certain adjustments for my research objectives and central 
research questions so as to accommodate the discovery of the unexpected 
phenomena emanating from my empirical findings.  
 
Specifically, the aim of the thesis was to explore contemporary civil society activism 
in Vietnam and reflect upon the politics of the changing state-society relations in 
the country. This was achieved through an analysis of two different forms of civil 
society activism, with an examination that located these activisms in a wider 
historical context. The following research questions were formulated to assist me to 
attain the research objectives.  
 
First, what organisational forms do civil society groups adopt and how are 
these positioned in relation to the state?  
 
Second, what strategies of engagement do civil society groups adopt in order 
to achieve their goals?  
 
Third, how do the different forms of civil society activism illuminate evolving 
state-society relations in Vietnam?   
 
These questions allowed me to discover and triangulate different empirical 




society activism in Vietnam, which I formulated under the key themes I indicated 
previously: legitimacy, autonomy as well as formality and informality of activism. 
Simultaneously, they also allowed me to reflect upon the evolving state-society 
relations in Vietnam.  
 
 
4. Research methods 
 
The choice of research methods is contingent on the nature of the social 
phenomena to be explored as well as the research questions (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980). Given that my research was aimed at examining civil society activism in 
Vietnam, I adopted a research approach that allowed for prolonged interactions 
and engagements with a variety of players, as well as triangulation of different 
sources of evidence. Accordingly, I decided to adopt the in-depth case study and 
ethnographic approach to realise my research objectives. In doing so, I 
endeavoured to understand my research participants’ perspectives from the inside 
as well as to observe them along with their behaviours and actions more distantly at 
the way that might be unfamiliar to them. This dynamic of ethnographic research 
enabled me to obtain an insightful understanding of how people say and what they 
actually do differ and what they think and do also differ. I conducted eight months 
of fieldwork in Vietnam from October 2014 till July 2015, mostly in Quang Binh 
province and Hanoi city, with research visits to provinces, such as Hue and Da Nang 
in the central region and Ho Chi Minh City and Dong Nai province in the south.  
 
 
4.1. Why case studies? 
 
My thesis offers a comparative in-depth bottom-up account of two contrasting case 
studies of civil society activism in Vietnam. Adopting case study approach fitted well 
the constructivist paradigm and allowed me to go so far as to convey the in-depth 
insights of the social phenomenon that I endeavoured to examine. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
suggests that the selection of cases is importantly based on clear objectives, rather 
than their easy accessibility. In particular, in order to provide a strong comparative 
account, it is imperative that the case studies selected pursue similar objectives but 




According to Dooley, case study research emphasises “detailed contextual analysis 
of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships” (Dooley, 2002, 
p.335). Meanwhile, this approach for Yin (2003) takes most effect when the focus of 
the study is to research phenomena that are highly complex, or to look for evidence 
in answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions rather than ‘what’. The case study 
researcher aspires to observe all of the variables and their interacting relationships, 
rather than to control them. This contrasts for example, with statistical studies that 
omit all contextual and intervening factors except those codified in the variables 
selected for measurement or used for constituting a population of cases (George 
and Bennett, 2005). In the same vein, Walton (2010) argues that this approach 
allows researchers to examine not only variables that might hold most significance, 
but also how and why these variables can be or are connected to one another. This 
thesis aimed to provide an in-depth investigation into the complex processes of civil 
society activism led by different groups associated with different institutional 
characteristics. Given this goal, case studies were deemed to be an appropriate 
well-tested method.   
 
Whilst the two identified in-depth case studies differed in a number of important 
respects such as degree of autonomy, strategy of legitimation, organisational 
structure, and mobilising structure, their activisms were commonly geared towards 
influencing the state power in order to attain their mobilising objectives. 
Comparison, Collier (1993) points out, sharpens our power of description and plays 
a central role in concept-formation by elucidating suggestive similarities and 
contrasts among cases. With particular reference to small n comparative cases, he 
argues, the objective is to highlight how contrasting they are, thus “establishing a 
framework for interpreting how parallel processes of change are played out in 
different ways within each context” is incumbent upon the case study researcher 
(Collier, 1993, p.108). A thorough understanding of each case study is, therefore, 
needed in laying the ground for an analytical framework that will be used in cross-
case comparisons (Goodrick, 2014).  
 
Drawing on Goodrick and Collier and based on the deep understanding of each 
case, I managed to set out the key overarching themes (i.e. legitimacy, autonomy as 
well as formality and informality of activism) cutting across the two case studies, 
whereby similarities and differences between them were elucidated. The 
juxtaposition of two contrasting cases in this thesis allowed me to examine in more 




which I could explain how and why these differentiations mattered and how 
significant these cases were in relation to the growing civil society activism and 
evolving state-society relations in Vietnam.  
 
In utilising a case study approach, I was, however, aware of its most distinctive 
limitation, i.e. the lack of its generalisability. Yet, the use of structured, focused and 
comparative case studies, as I indicated above, assisted me to tackle this limitation 
to a large extent. In particular, as explained previously, the strong impetus driving 
my selection of these two cases rested on the fact that they opened much room for 
comparisons across several domains pertaining to them, such as mobilising 
strategies, leadership, and methods of activism. This modest comparative account 
also opened an avenue for me to draw important conceptual implications for civil 
society activism under authoritarian regimes. 
 
Moreover, the most salient advantage of the case study approach lies in that it 
allows researchers to triangulate multiple evidence sources as well as using diverse 
techniques and procedures for data collection, therefore ensuring the rigour of the 
data analysis. In sum, it is stressed once more that for this thesis, my aim was to 
examine the depth, the intensity and the complexity of civil society activism in 
Vietnam; hence, a case study approach was deemed the most powerful tool 
conducive to achieving this.  
 
 
4.2. Case selection and ethnographic fieldwork 
 
As briefly explained above, my research plan during the first two months of my 
fieldwork (November – December 2015) was almost unchanged, with the focus 
being on VNGOs’ action, in which the primary task was to select two in-depth case 
studies involving local NGOs, one specialising in delivering micro-finance services 
and another working with landless people, being committed to land reform. Each of 
the selected organisations would bring to light varying aspects of the NGO sector, as 
well as the practice and dynamics of civil society in Vietnam. I also aimed to work 
with organisations in the central region of the country, since unlike their 
counterparts in the two largest cities Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, these 




Vietnamese ones. Targeting NGOs in this geographical location would thus reinforce 
the empirical contribution of my research.  
 
 
Preliminary case studies 
 
The fieldwork started out with a strategic mapping exercise, which was 
underpinned by my initial review of the historical development of local NGOs and 
Vietnamese civil society. The reading of Vietnamese writings and the information 
gathered from roughly 20 interviews with NGO representatives, local experts, and 
state officials in Hanoi, allowed me to identify potential VNGOs that focused their 
work on land reform and microfinance service delivery. After mapping, the next task 
was to select preliminary case studies to pay field visits.  
 
It is notable that the process through which I had to negotiate and determine the 
case studies for my research was undertaken with timely needed adjustment to 
articulate new findings, and respond to a new phenomenon emanating from the 
field. I left Bath for the fieldwork in Vietnam with the idea of searching for two 
VNGOs committed to microfinance and land issues, one more inclined to service 
delivery and another more concerned with policy impact. This idea, however, 
changed and I had to move away from micro-finance NGOs. This was because being 
embedded in the field for a while, I realised that it would be erroneous to overlook 
the ‘political’ nature of the NGO actions as well as civil society action, in general.  I 
saw how this political nature required detailed attention as this shed light on the 
dynamics of civil society activism as well as changing state-society relations in 
Vietnam. In particular, I came to recognise that this ‘political’ dynamics manifested 
itself more in the land NGO context than in the micro finance one. This was 
considered the first important shift in my research.  
 
My research aimed to provide an in-depth bottom-up account of civil society 
activism. Hence, purposive sampling with a ‘small n’ was selected to take advantage 
of my ‘insider knowledge’, as well as my familiarity with the context and population. 
That is, the objective was to move beyond superficial observation to capture 
complex processes, the influence of context and the significance of time. Based on 
variables generated from the mapping exercise (e.g. size of organisation, years of 




coverage, relationships with stakeholders, and areas of focus), coupled with my 
initial empirical investigation, I managed to identify a group of six local NGOs 
involved in land issues as my preliminary case studies, among which two had a head 
office in Hanoi and the other four were based in the central provinces of Hue and 
Quang Binh, about 500 km away from the capital city, Hanoi. 
 
I continued further investigation into these six preliminary case studies by 
conducting a number of field visits, along with dozens of interviews with staff 
members, leaders and their representative clients. I also became involved in the 
related activities of these organisations (e.g. workshops, grassroots community 
meetings and training activities). Concurrently, I endeavoured to search for any grey 
material, secondary data, reports and local media writings on these organisations. 
Preliminary case studies, George and Bennett (2005) argue, are instrumental to 
determining whether further examination is warranted, which means that this 
phase allowed me to probe the plausibility and feasibility of seeking more in-depth 
accounts of these organisations. They also helped me position in-depth case studies 
more effectively as opposed to other potential cases in the same cluster. All the 
evidence collected from these preliminary cases, Walton (2010) suggests, provides 
useful inputs for subsequent decisions upon in-depth case selection, as well as 
additional information to assist the analysis of the chosen case studies during the 
writing up phase. This also allows for drawing broader conclusions from the in-
depth cases studies and shaping clearer boundaries for generalisation (ibid).    
 
 
In-depth case studies  
 
After preliminary studies, I decided to select an NGO in Quang Binh called ‘Centre 
for Community Empowerment and Rural Development (CCERD) and another named 
the ‘Centre for Poverty Research’ (CPR) in Hue province as my research sites. These 
two cases working on land issues were expected to provide enough space for 
comparisons across a number of respects, including the advocacy strategies and 
methods of mobilisation. These organisations were of similar medium-size located 
in two different provinces of the central region of Vietnam, which have been 
understudied by both local and external scholars and where the land issues facing 





CCERD, established in 2003 a couple of years before CPR, was the very first local 
NGO in Quang Binh province. It was founded with the charitable purpose of being 
committed to reducing poverty and increasing livelihoods, especially for poor ethnic 
minority groups in the locality. The NGO’s historical engagement in local socio-
economic development has helped to enhance its legitimacy, from which it carved 
out more space to encroach upon a non-service delivery area, i.e. land advocacy for 
local ethnic minorities. CPR is located in Hue province about 200 km distant from 
Quang Binh. While CCERD focused upon claiming forest land for local ethnic 
minorities, CPR directed its advocacy activities towards controversial hydropower 
plants and dam constructions. Service delivery was employed as an entry point for 
CCERD, whereas CPR emerged and directly engaged in policy advocacy based on site 
research and community engagement. Despite there being important differences 
between the two NGOs, they shared a number of similar traits such as hierarchical 
organisational structure, well-educated staff, influential role of NGO leaders, and 





















Map 1. Quang Binh and Hue in the central region of Vietnam 
 
 
The in-depth case studies once selected were followed by the undertaking of more 
in-depth investigation into these organisations. This was aimed at capturing more 
insights of their mobilising strategies, especially to understand how and why they 
embarked on certain modes of action to create room to manoeuvre. I decided to 
base myself at CCERD’s head office as my first research site for in-depth exploration. 
Whilst I was based in Quang Binh to examine the first case study, I still managed to 




visited their project sites, since there were several activities implemented by this 
organisation during this period.  
 
Nevertheless, there were critical findings emerging, which shifted the selection of 
my second in-depth case study intended to be CPR. In particular, when I was about 
to accomplish my fieldwork with CCERD, the associational life in Vietnam changed 
radically. The citizen-led Trees Movement occurring in the capital city of Hanoi was 
a particularly prominent example of an emerging form of civil society actions, where 
local people were rallying to oppose the city government’s decision to cut down 
thousands of large old trees lining the streets. Speaking out against the ruling 
regime could earn a Vietnamese a jail sentence, but the movement seemed to start 
out as an apolitical issue which opened a window for ordinary civilians to delve into 
and orchestrate mobilisation. This was the first time that a social campaign had 
been initiated on a virtual network with participation cutting across social 
spectrums and questioned the government’s misconduct. Critically, it was not just 
limited to online activism, but was quickly transformed into real life practice.  
  
This new compelling phenomenon prompted me to reconsider the selection of my 
second in-depth case study. The discussions via Skype and emails with my 
supervisors were of great help, reinforcing my intuition during this period, whereby 
the Trees Movement became more appealing to me. There was a strong reason to 
justify this shift. As light was shed on the mobilising strategies of CCERD and CPR, I 
came to realise that they were almost identical. In essence, their activism followed 
a non-adversarial approach and sought to pressurise the local government to 
enforce effectively the policies and agenda put in place by the central government. 
So, in effect both of them orchestrated activism within their legal bounds and their 
limits of permissibility.  
 
I understood that the points of entry of the two NGOs differed, i.e. CCERD resorted 
to service provision, whereas CPR bypassed service delivery and embarked directly 
on policy advocacy. However, a strong comparison requires similar objectives, but 
different approaches and this difference (i.e. difference in terms of the point of 
entry) of the two organisations was not indicative of a strong comparative account. 
Nevertheless, for my subsequent analysis of the NGO-led mobilisation case study, 
what I had learnt about CPR was greatly informative. With an aim to make the 
thesis a nuanced and rigorous comparative account, the citizen-led Trees 




structure, organisation, and evolution of the TM were also seen as unprecedented 
in Vietnam’s associationalism. The NGO-led (CCERD) and the non-NGO led activism 
(the TM) were juxtaposed to examine civil society activism in Vietnam.  
 
 
Case study 1: CCERD 
 
I spent three and half months based in CCERD’s office to observe the organisation’s 
everyday acts. In addition to participant observation, various other research 
techniques were applied to harness and triangulate evidence and information. They 
included in-depth interviews (i.e. informal unstructured interviews, semi-structured 
interviews, and key informant interviews), focus group discussions with a variety of 
organisational workers, documentation of its grey literature, extensive discussions 
with other stakeholders including local officials, mass organisation officials, local 
experts, donors, grassroots community leaders and staff from other NGOs in the 
region.   
 
I also engaged in many other organisational activities such as capacity building for 
clients and community meetings attended by different stakeholders. In addition, I 
visited the organisation’s key project sites located in the hotspots of forest land 
conflict in the region. A large volume of the organisation’s materials inclusive of 
project reports, research findings and publications on the impacts of lack of access 
to land on the local poor as well as other relevant organisational literature, were 
extensively probed.    
 
Given that the research questions I formulated were not the type that could be 
addressed quickly, the ethnographic methods indicated above were particularly 
conducive to addressing these questions. Exploring the nature of social change or 
the intensity and complexity of a social phenomenon requires the kind of familiarity 
derived from embeddedness in the context and engaging with the subjects. 
Participant observation “is useful for gaining an understanding of the physical, 
social, cultural, and economic contexts in which study participants live; the 
relationships among and between people, contexts, ideas, norms, and events; and 
people’s behaviours and activities – what they do, how frequently, and with whom” 
(Mack et al., 2005, p.14). Participant observation, Tedlock (1991) explains, makes 




dispassionate observers of the lives of others. Simultaneously, the observation of 
participation enables ethnographers to experience and observe their own and 
others’ co-participation within the ethnographic encounter (ibid). Through 
observations of people’s everyday activities, the ethnographer seeks to understand 
the processes and meanings that sustain and motivate social groups (Herbert, 
2000). This technique provides room for the ethnographer to make sense of, as well 
as to contrast the deeds (actions) and thoughts (intentions) of people as 
knowledgeable agents in their everyday lives (ibid). Spending time in CCERD’s office 
and at its project sites to observe everyday interactions and behaviours between 
the staff members, between the staff and the organisation’s stakeholders, 
especially between the staff and its target group (i.e. the Van Kieu ethnic minority 
group), opened a unique avenue for me to examine its actions and decision making 
processes, especially the logics behind these.   
 
In-depth interviews of various types were used to gain deeper insights into the 
politics within which the NGO mobilisation occurred. Since my understanding of my 
case study was still evolving, unstructured or semi-structured interviews 
characterised by open-ended questions enabled for testing out my preliminary 
understanding and probing in greater depth the subject matter, while still allowing 
for opportunities for new ways of seeing and understanding to develop (even in 
unanticipated directions) (Nhodo et al., 2013). Key informant interviews were used 
to capture multiple perceptions of a wide range of selected actors, who had first-
hand knowledge and experience about the case study. Despite reconciling their 
competing perceptions/opinions costing me much effort and time to make a strong 
sense of them, this process yielded important insights into my case study from the 
‘outside’. This induced me to negotiate with the internal knowledge I gained while 
playing the role of an outsider looking from the inside. These insights related to the 
outsiders’ (i.e. the organisation’s stakeholders) perceptions about the NGO, the 
relationships between them and the NGO as well as any conflict between them and 
the NGO. 
 
Focus groups were conducted with the organisational staff members, as well as 
with the NGO’s beneficiaries such as the members of the self-help groups 
established by CCERD, village leaders, community heads. This adopted technique 
was aimed at provoking discussions and extracting multi-faceted interactive 
information in a face-to-face manner, thereby adding insights into collective 





During my ethnographic research period in Quang Binh, 55 interviews (including 
repeated ones) (see appendix three) and five focus group discussions were 
conducted with 40 people, of which 45 % came from CCERD and other local NGOs, 
5% were representatives of INGOs, 3% being donors, 5% being local media, 12% 
were local government officials, 3% (1 interview) was a parliamentary member for 
the Quang Binh province, 10% were officials of commune and district mass-
organisations and 17% were from self-help community groups. 
 
 
Case study 2: Trees Movement (TM) 
 
The TM was a broad-based citizen led movement established to protest against the 
Hanoi government’s arbitrary decision to cut down thousands of large old trees 
lining the city’s streets. It took place in mid-March 2015, coincident with the period 
of my field research, whereby I could become involved as a marginal participant to 
capture the fresh and real-life moments of the movement. During my fieldwork, I 
followed closely the TM and collected primary data from extended conversations 
and in-depth interviews, with a wide range of actors who were closely associated 
with the movement, including local NGO leaders, dissidents, independent activists, 
bloggers, human rights experts, artists, intellectuals, housewives, journalists, etc 
(see appendix three). 
Hanoi is the biggest hub of local NGOs in Vietnam. Since doi moi in 1986, local NGOs 
have received large amounts of development aid and they have increasingly 
expanded in number. The associationalism of Vietnam in the aftermath of doi moi 
was consolidated by the emergence of registered NGOs and the growing number of 
independent activists as well as dissidents dedicated to rights advocacy, 
democratisation and social change. Taylor et al. (2012) in their comparative study of 
civil society organisations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City demonstrate that those in 
Hanoi are much more engaged in establishing networks with government agencies, 
as well as in the policy advocacy domain. To some extent, this practice provides 
explanation as to why there were a number of vibrant NGO leaders and staff 
actively engaged in the TM when it happened.    
Given the fact that this movement was facilitated via Facebook, it was incumbent 




the front stage. The key mobilising groups set up both closed and open platforms 
(i.e. closed and open Facebook groups) for collective mobilisation. Regarding which, 
the closed platforms were only used for discussions and interactions between the 
members within the core team of each movement group, who took leading roles 
and made decisions for activities on the front stage, and the open platforms were 
for interacting openly with the public to mobilise wider social participation. In order 
to capture the insightful dynamics of mobilisation and decision making processes of 
the TM, being immersed in the ‘closed’ platform (i.e. the back stage) was 
imperative.  
This was a challenging part of my fieldwork, specifically in what way I could make 
them trust me to allow me, an independent researcher, to join their ‘secret’ group. 
The first important thing to do was to identify the founding member(s) or 
administrator(s) of the closed groups. A great deal of efforts had to be made to this 
end, and it was not easy for those who had this information to reveal it owing to the 
safety needs of those people involved. Snowballing was used effectively at this 
stage to find out the gate keeper. After dozens of attentively-prepared 
conversations with my available contacts being NGO leaders and some independent 
activists, supplemented by my ‘insider knowledge’ as a locally born researcher, I 
finally found out who the founding members of this secret group were. It turned 
out that one of them participated in my interview before and I contacted this 
person, but she said she could not enrol me for two reasons.  
First, to be a member of the group I was required to have a guarantor who was 
already a group member and willing to introduce me to the group. This was 
considered a precondition for the safety of other group members. Second, she 
asked me what kind of use I could bring to the group as a member; she kindly 
clarified that for the time being the group really needed those who could act and 
help, rather than just simply being an observer. Regarding the second reason, I 
strived my best to explain to her the significance of the TM in the civil society 
practice of Vietnam, which had been very much understudied by Vietnamese 
scholars and that I would, to the best of my capacity, convey this fresh experience 
of public contestation to the wider community or even the outside world. She was 
appreciative to my good intentions, but reiterated that the first precondition of 
membership was still not met. After extensive efforts spent searching for the entry, 
finally, one of my initial contacts, who was a local NGO leader and a member of this 
closed group, was willing to be my guarantor and to introduce me to the group so 




Being a marginal participant of the movement allowed me to identify prominent 
campaigners who were my key respondents, some of whom subsequently helped 
me to make contact with other ‘hidden’ independent activists, who played an 
important role in the campaign. What is notable here is that ‘independent activists’ 
and ‘dissidents’ for the ruling communists in Vietnam are trouble makers, 
dangerous and a disturbing group, being branded as ‘reactionary forces’. This label 
associated with ample wickedness and conspiracies, successfully isolates them from 
the general population. Consequently, gaining access to them requires a certain 
degree of trust to be established for the reason of their safety. Given these 
circumstances, snowball sampling was finally used in order to access this hidden 
and hard-to-reach population. The main value of snowball sampling, according to 
Atkinson and Flint (2001), is that it is a method for seeking appropriate respondents 
when they are few in number or where some degree of trust is required to contact. 
Being a marginal participant facilitated the identification of the initial respondents, 
who gave me the name of another ‘hidden’ activist, who in turn provided the name 
of the next one and so on. However, I was aware of the deficiency associated with 
this sampling technique, i.e. the researcher might end up with the same kind of 
respondents. For I sought to obtain the greatest variety and diversity of activists 
who were differentiated in terms of, for example, political views, field of activism 
and level of experience, I consequently set up different snowballing samples with 
different types of initial informants so as to enrich my data collection. 
 
Vietnam has no tradition of large-scale peaceful demonstrations marching through 
city centres and in fact, this form of activism or any other alike is rare. Yet, for the 
past few years there has been an increasing sign of public protests on varying 
scales. There are regular small-scale street protests by landless peasants and victims 
of injustice to oppose unaccountable government decisions or the increasing anti-
China nationalist movement. Likewise, large-scale workers’ strikes are seen growing 
recently. However, unlike farmer or worker protests, which are restricted to a 
specific marginalised group, the TM secured the support of both unorganised and 
organised groups, with participation cutting across societal spectrums. As a result, 
the composition of my respondents in the TM was much more diverse than in the 





To achieve validity and relevance of the data collected, a checklist of key themes 
was devised for in-depth interviews in an attempt to cover systematically a wide 
range of issues concerning the TM (see appendix one). These themes included, inter 
alia, motivations of participation, methods of activism, feelings, fear of state 
repression, perceptions, state response, etc. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
subject matter, focus group discussions were an inappropriate technique for this 
case study, thus interviews of all types and Facebook pages of the TM 
groups/activists/dissidents were exclusively employed to collect data. The 
overarching theme of most interviews was to probe different players’ motivations 
and perceptions of the TM and its significance in relation to evolving state-society 
relations in Vietnam in general and civil society development in particular. In 
addition to directly following all of the TM’s public demonstrations, I followed 
closely the Facebook pages of prominent activists, NGO leaders involved in the TM 
and many others related to it since these were important channels for evidence 
collection. For example, the experiences encountered by the activists when dealing 
with security forces were posted on their Facebook pages, were valued information 
for a nuanced understanding of this case study.       
 
My interview questions focused on the campaigners’ motivations, targets, beliefs, 
aspirations, tactics, repertoires of actions, discourses and slogans as well as their 
relationships with other groups in the TM. The interviews were undertaken in 
various forms ranging from impromptu interviews with random participants I met in 
the demonstrations, to unstructured and semi-structured interviews, whilst 
sometimes they took in the form of extended conversations. Apart from the 
impromptu ones, the interviews lasted between two and three hours and were 
conducted in Vietnamese between March and June 2015. In several cases, follow-
up communication was made via emails, Facebook or Skype. The interviews were 
then translated into English to make it easier for coding process aided by NVIVO 
software.  
In the first phase of my data analysis, I inputted all my collected data (already 
translated into English) into NVIVO. I mostly used this software for coding and 
formulating themes (see appendix two). Before starting the in-depth analysis, I 
made a rough description of all the data collected regarding each case study. 




and information, capture the story as a whole, as well as to understand its logic. My 
final analysis was underpinned by my analytical framework.           
 
 
5. Research challenges 
 
The number of Vietnamese scholars researching civil society in general and 
grassroots activism in particular is extremely small. This is partly because it is 
relatively challenging for them to research a topic which has such a fragile 
institutional support. Moreover, a prevailing practice in Vietnamese political and 
academic culture is that it does not reward intellectual creativity outside of the 
officially sanctioned channels and, hence, Vietnamese academics and government 
researchers tend to opt for safe rather than sensitive topics for the sake of their 
career safety.  
The fact that my topic on civil society activism was considered sensitive in the 
Vietnamese political context meant that I had to struggle to find a position in which 
I could gain trust from people, as well as avoid any potential political problems of 
being associated, especially with the Trees Movement. Devine (1999) holds that the 
researcher, like an actor on a stage, has to learn how to negotiate and manage 
different roles, because field relations can make or break the fieldwork experience 
and hence, it is important to negotiate research positions carefully. The TM 
campaigners could have shut all the doors to me, if for any reason I had sparked 
their suspicion regarding my motivation. The extent of their revelation was 
obviously contingent upon the degree of trust I established with them.  
 
The tree saving campaign evolved amid an intense atmosphere in Hanoi that 
involved increasing harassment and intimidation by the public security forces. Being 
born and growing up in Vietnam enabled me to use my own insider knowledge on 
searching for the way to work with ‘sensitive’ actors, such as independent activists 
(IAs) and dissidents, those labelled as hostile or reactionary forces, who also played 
a very important role in this movement. It particularly gave me strong sense of 
prudence about what I should do, whom I should contact as well as how, when, and 
where I should do it. As a matter of fact, working or interacting directly with IAs and 
dissidents in a politically restricted environment like Vietnam, engenders risks for 




in a stronger position to study this social movement than foreign researchers. For 
dissidents and IAs, their individual acts or criticism will be to some extent tolerated 
by the authorities as long as they do not seek to assemble with others or have links 
to foreigners. Taking advantage of my common nationhood, I strove to provide an 
in-depth bottom-up account of the meaning and outcome of one of the most 
significant episodes of public contestation in Vietnam recently.  
I was prudent when communicating with the IAs and dissidents. I took heed when 
selecting locations for interviews as well as the means to contact them. For 
instance, mobile phones and/or emails of these people could have been under 
police surveillance or they might have been hacked. Consequently, alternative 
means, such as Facebook or Skype (the servers of which are based overseas) were 
considered safer to use.  
 
Gaining trust with my respondents came as a challenge and keeping the ‘right’ 
distance from them was another one. In fact, grappling to find a balance between 
being a passionate supporter and dispassionate researcher proved to be much 
harder than I expected. Thousands of old trees were cut down and the movement 
happened in my city. Observing directly the peaceful female campaigners in 
traditional long dress (some of whom were my helpful respondents) being attacked 
and suppressed by the police on that Sunday 26th of April in the downtown area 
became a most striking moment, for which I had never imagined that one day I 
would ever have to witness that.  
  
A multitude of feelings emerged in the aftermath of that incident, however as a 
researcher it was mandatory to avoid emotive language and a biased view in my 
analysis. Writing a reflective journal on a daily basis became a useful tool. Writing 
things down helped me to calm down my feelings; then in the subsequent periods, 
when looking through my daily journals again for the purpose of analysis, my mind 
would become more settled, which enabled me to avoid an emotive writing style. In 
addition, writing a reflective diary also provided me useful inputs to supplement the 
other data and acted as a good aide memoire when I conducted my summative 
analysis. 
  
With respect to the CCERD case study, I was from time to time prompted by the 
NGO leader that I should not use the term civil society (xã hội dân sự) in 




their reluctance. Instead, I was advised by him to make some adjustment so as to 
make the topic less sensitive. So, for instance, I was advised to tell them that I was 
doing research on “the effectiveness and impact of SOCIAL organisation 
interventions in the locality”, rather than “social or political change effectuated by 
CIVIL SOCIETY activism”. These prompts provided me with a different slant of 
evidence aside from the information collected from other channels, which induced 
me to negotiate my interview questions. Nevertheless, I did not want my interview 
questions to be grounded in the ‘misleading’ concepts (e.g. social organisations 
rather than civil society organisations) just to avoid ‘invisible’ (or even maybe non-
existent) conflict, because using the ‘misleading’ concepts could potentially have 
yielded the kind of information that might be insignificant or irrelevant to my 
research. Hence, in order to overcome this challenge, ‘probing’ questions were 
prioritised to avoid to the greatest extent of suspicion or potential turbulence (if 
any) and to ensure the smooth flow of interviews. In particular, while engaging with 
local officials, I endeavoured to be as honest as I could in informing them of the 
topic, the themes and issues I was seeking to address within my thesis.  
 
Obviously, working with NGOs is less politically challenging than with dissidents and 
IAs. My trust building with CCERD was quite straightforward. I came to know the 
NGO leader through one of my close NGO contacts, who helped liaise me to him. 
Then, I met him at several conferences and workshops in Hanoi at the beginning of 
my fieldwork. After that, during a number of field trips to Quang Binh for my 
preliminary case selection, where the NGO was located, I engaged with him further 
to discuss his organisation’s work. I also made him aware of my professional 
experience as a development practitioner before starting my PhD. He is a man with 
an open, development-oriented mind, so this common background made it 
comfortable enough for us to interact in an effusive manner with each other. I 
explained to him attentively the aim of my research, as well as what I was looking 
for at this stage in order to realise the research objectives. While engaging with him, 
I showed him my deep interest and intention of selecting his organisation as a good 
case study in ‘mobilising’ local communities for collective purposes in the 
authoritarian one-party state. He responded positively to my request with his good 
will, but wanted me to explain to him what I exactly meant by ‘mobilising’ since he 
continually reiterated that his organisation had never involved itself in ‘agitating’ 
local people to take to the streets and that he was not an agitator. He wanted to 
make sure both he and I were on the same page in understanding the term 




‘mobilising’ was nothing related to agitation against the state agenda or anything 
alike, but rather it was about how CCERD engaged with related stakeholders to help 
the local ethnic minorities to claim land.  
 
However, there was a challenge for me in arranging interviews with the state forest 
company (SFC), the actor towards which CCERD had to direct its mobilising efforts 
to put pressure on it to return land to local communities. All my efforts to interact 
with this SFC were unsuccessful, for they did not want to open the door to welcome 
a researcher. This shows how when researching civil society activism in 
authoritarian contexts, the actors most difficult to access so as to collect rigorous 
data are those from the state sector, rather than from politically sensitive groups 
within civil society. This challenge also rings true with my encounters in the Trees 
Movement, where the Hanoi authorities refused my interview requests.      
 
Most of my interviews were arranged through the contacts I managed to establish 
for myself while staying in the field, although on one occasion I had to resort to an 
acquaintance of mine who was an acclaimed academic to help arrange a meeting 
with a radical journalist, who I failed to contact by myself.  
 
Regarding data validation, collecting data from a variety of sources and applying 
varied methods helped me to secure this. Specifically, for the NGO-led mobilisation, 
I interviewed the NGO leader and staff, its different stakeholders (local authorities, 
local communities, mass organisations and the local media) and its partners (NGOs 
in the same region and in Hanoi, INGOs, and donors). Moreover, the data were 
triangulated through the use of different methods including participant 
observation, interviews of various types, existing materials from local media 
coverage of the NGO, and especially focus groups used to provoke face-to-face 
interactive discussions. For the Trees Movement, a wide range of actors from 
different backgrounds and social spectrums were incorporated. I also reached out 
to those who did not get involved in the TM (those not participating in the TM’s 
protests or those ambivalent or supporting the government tree felling project) as 
well as retired high-ranking state officials, state media journalists, academics, 
foreign embassies’ senior staff and Hanoi-based INGOs. In addition, I closely 
followed mainstream and social media along with the international press such as 
Voice of America, BBC Vietnamese, and The Economist (those covering this 
movement). In sum, I combined both virtual (online) and onsite ethnographic 




6. Ethical issues 
 
Comparative case studies in social sciences involve intensive description of real-life 
events, where conveying the richness of the cases must take into account the risk 
that the focal participants could be identifiable. Research ethics always reminded 
me that the confidentiality and safety of my participants must never be 
compromised. Similarly, by virtue of many of my questions being politically 
sensitive, I repeatedly informed my interviewees of my unwavering intention to use 
pseudonyms rather than their real names when writing up my thesis. Despite the 
leader of the NGO case study allowing me to reveal the real name of his 
organisation, I decided not to do so, for my ultimate concern was to ensure safety 
for those who confided in me unconditionally and supported me with their 
enthusiasm, generosity and honesty.  
 
Nevertheless, in some cases it was not reasonable or possible to follow the 
pseudonym and anonymisation strategy when the names of Facebook pages or 
Facebook groups and the names of certain actors or organisations were publicly 
covered in either mainstream or social media. Falling in this situation, prompted by 
Devine’s (1999) dual strategy, I decided not to change the names when these 
instances were already circulated in the media, but where I used the information 
collected from personal interviews with these actors, I had to anonymise them.    
 
An important amount of data from the TM was collected from online communities, 
this pointed to some ethical considerations concerning online research that needs 
to be addressed in this thesis. Before discussing online research ethics, there are 
some clarifications concerning the scope of the online research in the thesis that I 
need to make. First, I conducted virtual ethnographic research on the TM, but 
online surveys or online questionnaires to collect data were not applied. That is, 
most of my interviews were conducted through face-to-face direct interaction with 
my respondents/participants. There were, however, a small number of follow-up 
interviews made online (via Facebook or Skype). I largely used social media sites to 
approach the politically sensitive groups (i.e. hard-to-reach population), which is 
considered a general advantage of online research. Second, I used pre-existing data 
on Facebook pages of the movement groups and key activists, which are publicly 
accessible. Third, I was a member of both closed and open forums of the movement 
groups, so I collected data from following their conversations, discussions, posts or 




participant observer (i.e. where relevant and possible I participated by 
commenting).  
 
Due to the relative infancy of internet mediated research, critical and detailed 
discussion of ethical considerations regarding online data collection and analysis 
remains scarce. There is no consensus as to what constitutes appropriate ethical 
conduct for online research (Jones, 2004). It is therefore, as Rodham and Gavin 
(2011) suggest, very much left up to individual researchers to make themselves 
familiar with the current debates concerning online research. Like onsite research, 
consent and anonymity are also major issues in online research ethics. As I indicated 
above, I did collect data from open sites. When harvesting this kind of data, 
Rodham and Gavin (2011) suggest that both the composers of the words and the 
name of the site hosting the message should be given pseudonyms in the writing-up 
of the research. Researchers, they warn further, should be aware that the author of 
online quotations can sometimes be identified by the use of a search engine. 
However, this was not an issue in my research, because my participants posted 
messages on their pages in Vietnamese and when I used these quotes I translated 
them into English, which the search engine could thus not identify. I anonymised all 
my respondents, as well as their relevant Facebook pages. 
 
In terms of gaining consent, there was no virtual consent in my research, for as I 
above indicated, I did not employ online interviews or surveys. Thus, all the consent 
I retrieved from my respondents was in written form and made during my direct 
interaction with them. Nevertheless, Madge (2007) indicates another thorny issue 
of gaining informed consent for participant observation in the online environment, 
i.e. ‘lurking’ in online communities might be perceived as intruding and/or 
‘deception’, which involves researchers deliberately concealing the purpose of their 
study. In this regard, I should assert that there was no lurking, nor deception in my 
research, for I was honest about my topic when I approached my respondents. As I 
explained previously, in order to gain access to the ‘closed’ ‘secret’ group to follow 
their interactions, I needed to find a guarantor who would be willing to introduce 
me in the group. When I was accepted into the group, the group administrator 
made an announcement of my presence/participation within this closed group, 
meaning that other group members were aware of my participation.  
 
Another key issue in online research ethics lies in the ambiguous status of online 




ethically justified in using publicly available information as data for his/her research 
project, even if these were provided by the internet user for private consumption? 
Or should a researcher be able to ‘data mine’ from newsgroup postings and 
individual webpages? (Thurlow et al., 2004 cited in Madge, 2007, p.14). Debates 
concerning this go on unabated and hence are inconclusive. In response to this 
conundrum, Hewson et al. (2003) conclude that “data that have been made 
deliberately and voluntarily available in the public internet domains should be 
accessible to a researcher providing anonymity is ensured” (Hewson et al., 2003 
cited in Madge, 2007, p.14). My participants posted information on their Facebook 
pages and set their pages on ‘public status’, thereby making their postings publicly 
accessible to everyone. Nevertheless, using their information, I anonymised them 





In this chapter, I have described at length the processes through which I negotiated 
my case studies, research questions and methods. In addition, I have explained how 
I narrated my fieldwork encounters, as well as how I addressed research challenges 
and ethical issues. When I started to enter onto the actual journey, it turned out 
remarkably different from what I could ever imagine or anticipate. It became an 
indispensable lived experience growing out of my research process, which I could 
have failed to discern or work out, if I had not surrendered my stubbornness and 
had thus continued to stick doggedly to the initially established framework.  
 
Throughout my research process, I endeavoured to articulate a range of vantage 
points coming from different actors pertaining to different positions and structures. 
This allowed me to examine in depth how the mundane acts as well as the 
mobilising structures, mobilising strategies and shifts in action performed by 
different civil society groups, could negotiate and restructure the relations they 
were enmeshed within. The footage of peaceful female protesters in traditional 
long dresses being thrown onto a bus on that sunny Sunday by the public security 
will perhaps for a long time continue to play on my mind. The ear-piercing volume 
generated from the police loudspeakers, the screaming of peaceful protesters and 
their solidarity spirit either standing side by side or lying down together on the 




emerged in front of my eyes. It prompted me to think about the fracturing of state-
society interaction patterns in contemporary Vietnam. The old societal structures 
are now being broken; the sign of people’s power is emerging. Ordinary citizens are 
now learning to enlighten themselves regarding their constitutional rights and the 
ruling power cannot continue to rule as it did like before. As a researcher, I myself 
was placed in a position where I had to go through what I had never thought I 
would or wanted to encounter in order to see, to hear, to think, and to feel all the 


























Chapter 4: Citizen-led activism - An antagonistic 
form of activism 




“I can’t understand this, I can’t understand why they (the city government) 
are doing this? I can’t understand what is actually behind this recklessness? 
Tons of bombs B52 by Americans failed to destroy our old trees during 
wartime, why authorities dare to cut them down now? […] If they defend 
what they are trying to do is for a more civilised and modern Hanoi, why do 
they start from cutting down trees when there are countless problems that 
are more urgent directly associated with the infrastructure and living quality 
in Hanoi, e.g. degrading roads, polluted environment, sewage, severe lack of 
public space, etc.?” (Interview, 14th April 2015, Hanoi cited in Vu, 2017, 
p.1182) 
It was a warm March in 2015 when the spring atmosphere was lingering in the 
streets of Hanoi. All corners of the capital city were displayed with red banners 
written with yellow slogan “Greet the Party, Greet Spring”, which for decades has 
become an indispensable part of the Vietnamese society to honour the Communist 
party when spring comes. The city, with its distinctive beauty of tree-fringed 
boulevards, serene lakes, pagodas and charming harmonized French and 
Vietnamese architecture, was vibrating. It vibrated not because of an earthquake or 
a natural calamity, but because the city administration had chopped down 6,708 









Figure 7. ‘Greet the Party, Greet Spring’ in Hanoi streets 
 
Source: VOV. Available at: http://vov.vn/Print.aspx?id=464464 
 
Much of the existing scholarship on Vietnamese civil society has focused on the 
activities of the NGOs, the formal structure of civil society organisation, for they are 
officially organised and their actions are more regulated. This apparently makes 
NGOs less challenging to study, especially for foreign researchers. This however is 
not the case for other more organic and sporadic social movements.  
 
This chapter fills this gap in the literature by focusing on a high-profile case of civil 
society activism that is not centred on NGO action. It focuses on the ‘Trees 
Movement’ (TM), a very recent broad-based citizen-led movement established to 
protest against a government decision to cut down thousands of large old trees 
lining the streets of Hanoi. It examines processes through which different informal 
civilian groups orchestrate collective actions to request the government to stop 
cutting down the trees, as well as to demand a deliberative and accountable 
government. It also explores what the movement tells us about the changing 
dynamics of state-society relations in Vietnam. Most importantly, however, I will 
use this case study to argue that citizen-led activism, an emerging form of civic 
engagement, is likely to play a critical role in effecting change and (re)structuring 
state-society relations in Vietnam. This is because it signals to the political elites 
how civilians can orchestrate rightful civic actions to oppose unpopular state 
decisions and policies. The TM also signals the rise of critical green activism, in 




Drawing on the TM, I highlight how strategically-organised non-violent resistance 
opens up opportunities for civil society groups wishing to stand up to the state. The 
TM was not restricted to any political rhetoric, nor was it agitated by a particular 
political ideology, religion or social class, nor did it have a single identifiable leader. 
Instead, it had a diffusive leadership (Vu, 2017). On the face of it, it seemed to be 
loosely structured, clandestine and non-hierarchical; however, in reality it was well-
organised, strategic and professionally-led. The TM’s challenging groups, considered 
as informal structures (i.e. informal civilian networks), mainly appropriated informal 
channels for their activism. However, they also used more formal channels. They 
strategically articulated the interplay of formality and informality, combining online 
activism (through social media sites) and offline activism (street protests), building 
legitimacy for their activism through appeals to the Constitution and nesting within 
the state agenda and discourse. Equally notable about this case is that it is not led 
by NGOs or any other organised form of civil society. The impetus for its collective 
actions came from a broad-based coalition of citizens across the societal spectrum.  
 
As it evolved, the TM secured the support of both registered NGOs and 
informal/unregistered groups including independent activists and dissidents. The 
surreptitious coalition of the registered NGOs and independent activists/dissidents 
in the TM, which is unprecedented in Vietnam, helped the movement avoid early 
state repression, as well as create opportunities for further civic actions. This 
phenomenon resonates with the recent social movements elsewhere, such as the 
Arab Spring, the anti-austerity and anti-capitalist movements in many parts of 
Europe, where independent activists and NGOs embarked on a relationship which 
Glasius and Ishkanian refer to as “surreptitious symbiosis” to maintain activism and 
bring about social change (Glasius and Ishkanian, 2014 cited in Vu, 2017, p.1183).    
 
The chapter examines how and why the TM campaigners embarked on specific 
repertoires of actions by capturing the evolution of the movement and dynamics of 
its activism. Bringing insights into the TM, I argue further that environmental 







2. Trees Movement: Grassroots citizen-led activism 
 
2.1. Setting of the Trees Movement 
 
In November 2013, the Hanoi Department of Construction submitted to the city 
People’s Committee (i.e. the city government) its proposal for approval of a scheme 
to renovate and replace trees in urban Hanoi during the period 2014-2015 (Hanoi 
Construction Department’s Proposal No. 8542/TTr-SXD). The project was referred to 
as the tree-felling project by Hanoians, while the government repeatedly framed it 
as a landscaping project. Its estimated cost was VND73.38 billion (equivalent to 
$US3.4 million), for which the funding would come from the city’s budget. The 
project, as the department indicated, aimed to replace the old and decaying trees 
with other types of trees or plants considered more suitable to the city outlook. On 
18 March 2014, the Hanoi People’s Committee adopted the department’s proposal 
(Decision No.6816/QD-UBND). As many as 6,708 green trees, making up more than 
a quarter of the total city greenery, would be cut down and/or replaced for reasons 
such as these trees were either dying, decayed, or bent; or they posed risks to road 
users during rainy seasons; or different kinds of trees were planted in the same 
street creating a poor aesthetic outlook; or they were detrimental to planned 
infrastructure projects. However, the Hanoians observed in reality that the majority 
of trees being cut down were healthy, luxuriant, and old having been planted during 
the French colonial rule. The timber would generate a huge source of income (see 
Figure 8 & 9), but the department provided no information of what they would do 
with the large volume of timber (Vu, 2017).  
Numerous questions and concerns arose and were centred on the project’s 
legitimacy and propriety. This triggered public anger towards the municipal 
authorities because they had decided to cut down the old trees without public 
consultation. As one protester put it: 
“Why do thousands of trees have to be chopped down all at once? I agree 
there are some trees that can cause danger to pedestrians and drivers 
during the storm season, but cutting their unsuitable branches is more than 
enough, not whole trees. For those trees unfit to the aesthetic city 
landscape as the authority persistently defends, they should be removed 




breaking. How many years do we have to wait to have shade from trees 
again, which is really needed in this city, where thousands of street vendors 
and labourers are every single day grappling with the heat in burning 
summers?” (Interview, 18 March 2015, Hanoi, cited in Vu, 2017, p.1188) 
An environmentalist revealed his dismay in the following way: 
“Under the irresistible pressure of growing population and modernisation, 
Hanoi is now heavily lacking greenery and getting stuffy and polluted, 
because of vehicles and construction work.[..] Instead of planting more trees 
and creating more green space, they are spending public money to cut down 
thousands of old trees and replace with new saplings. This sounds really 
ridiculous” (Interview, 30 March 2015 Hanoi) 
Figure 8. Healthy old trees were chopped down. Hanoi looked like a construction site 
 
Source: http://www.kienthuc.net.vn/soi-xet/ha-noi-xin-khat-hang-loat-cau-hoi-vuchat-cay-






















xanh-468493.html (cited in Vu, 2017, p.1189) 
 
Figure 10. Trees replanted in Nguyen Chi Thanh street after all the large old trees 
were chopped down 
 
(Source: http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/people-see-red-as-hanoi-starts-cutting-
down-6700-trees-40014.html) (cited in Vu, 2017)  
 
On 19-20 March 2015, hundreds of trees alongside Nguyen Chi Thanh Street, known 
as one of the most beautiful boulevards in Vietnam, were cut down. This was the 
first phase of felling the trees. Earlier, Mr Le Van Duc, Director of the Hanoi 
Construction Department, stated in a mainstream newspaper that “a total 381 




uniformity, will be replaced by Manglietia Dandyi”. The new trees, he said, were of 
high value and would provide a better aesthetical outlook for the city. However, 
these saplings looked unhealthy and almost unable to grow after being planted in 
reality (see Figure 10). Local scientists proved that these trees are in fact Magnolia 
conifera5, a deciduous tree native to China, which grows up to 30 meters in height, 
and is among the species that are not suitable for urban streets (Thanh Nien News, 
2015). Within just a few days, Hanoi looked like a construction site with loads of 
large healthy trees being cut into logs and spread on the ground. Within a very 
short period of time as many as 2,000 trees, which included a large number of old 
and valuable trees had been completely cut down (Vu, 2017).  
It was a despair for Hanoians to realise that as many as four more thousands trees 
were still waiting to be cut down. People could not understand why the green trees 
of their beloved city had survived wartime bombing, but were now being destroyed 
during peace time. Their anger increased when they realised that the decision to fell 
the trees had been taken with no public consultation, and that the authorities were 
deliberately trying to prevent open discussion and debate.  
On this ground, some people started to realise action was needed to help save their 
city. The social media was on fire with Facebook updating new images of felled 
trees or warnings of the next trees to be felled, accompanied by rallying messages 
to resist. To pacify public outcry, the head of the Hanoi People’s Committee decided 
to put the project on hold and a handful of low-ranking officials of the Department 
of Construction (but none from the Hanoi People’s Committee) were temporarily 
suspended. This was not enough, however. A blogger, and rights activist stated, 
“this is just a cosmetic tactic of the city administration” (Vu, 2017, p.1190).  
Hanoians value their city heritage and are proud of it. Tree after tree was cut down 
without consultation. People wanted to hear responsible responses to unanswered 
questions, such as “Why do streets in Hanoi have to wear ‘manglietia dandyi’ 
uniform?”, “Why are most of felled trees healthy ones?”, “Where is the timber of the 
felled trees (its estimated value is worth millions of dollars) and how will the 
government deal with the timber?”.  
In the sections that follow I first analyse why and how people took to the streets in 
the TM. I then investigate how the TM orchestrated its activism effectively with the 
                                                          
5 Manglietia Dandyi and Magnolia conifer are very much different in price, the former costs 




aid of the digital and technological tools, and finally examine how the TM, starting 
out as an environmental campaign, created a new space of contestation that aimed 
at demanding a participatory and accountable government in Vietnam.  
 
2.2. A moment to spark: constructive nonviolent tension 
 
In this section, I explain the moment when tension reached a climax, as well as its 
significance for the TM. It is said that public goods, such as trees and parks, can 
spark intense reaction in people (Clark, 2015). This can be evidenced in a wide array 
of public protests associated with public space and environmental issues across the 
world, with the Gezi Park demonstrations in Istanbul in mid-2013 being a glaring 
example, in which people protested against the demolition of a large park to clear 
the way for a commercial centre. Compared with the Gezi Park, the scale of the 
tree-saving campaign in Hanoi is smaller, but arguably has significant resonance for 
the contemporary political landscape of Vietnam.  
A good point of entry is to explore how people decided to take to the streets. Under 
the one-party rule of Vietnam, where seeking refuge in silence is a more favoured 
habit rather than speaking out, and the fundamental democratic institutions (e.g. 
law on demonstrations, law on associations, or law on referendum) are still absent, 
rallying in streets to protest against a government decision as observed in the TM is 
not common. Dr. Nguyen Quang A, a dissident, argued that the tree saving 
campaign in Hanoi awakened civil society in Vietnam and it was an encouraging sign 
for civil society activists (RFI, 2015 cited in Vu, 2017, p.1191).   
The TM helped awake civil society in Vietnam as Dr Nguyen pinpointed. So, what 
made people come together to join the TM? More precisely, what provoked them 
to decide to act? A conventional wisdom in the dominant social movement theories 
is that ‘opposition to the government/state’, a key characteristic in any social 
movement, cannot be missing (McAdam et al., 2003 cited in Chabanet and Royall, 
2014, p.5). In the TM, this type of opposition does exist. Nevertheless, ‘opposition’ 
here needs to be treated with care, because the government can easily manipulate 
this term to isolate critics and label them ‘regime opponents’. From silence to taking 
to the streets, this process needs some catalysts to induce change. Most of my 
respondent accounts indicated that there were numerous instances in Hanoi, where 




concerns. Yet, people’s habitual response was either to lament to themselves or 
remain muted, irrespective of the consequence of that decision or policy that could 
negatively affect their everyday lives (for instance, escalating price of petroleum 
and electricity, rampant red tape in public administration offices, or widespread 
selling of fake medicines). So, why did the city citizens choose to respond differently 
in the TM, i.e. speaking out and taking to the streets?  
Hanoians are proud of their city green heritage, along with its intensity of historical 
and cultural values. Many of the green campaigners grew up in Hanoi and fought for 
the city, throughout time the old trees have become their companions. Emotional 
bonds have been entrenchedly established between trees and Hanoians. The charm 
of Hanoi is laid to the old trees and they make the city boulevards come alive. 
Hanoians love them in many respects (Vu, 2017).  




The government’s tree-felling project sparked public outcry. Only within a few days, 
the campaign momentum increased through Facebook, an alternative platform that 
allowed people to share freely their sentiments of sorrow, disenchantment, wrath, 




Nevertheless, these sentiments simply constituted a runway for collective action to 
take off. A dramatic or transformative event is needed to liberate cognition, trigger 
contention, and provoke action. Social movements, elsewhere, were often seen to 
be sparked by the sacrifice of someone, whom Castells (2012) refers to as a rebel 
hero, either it be immolation or martyrdom, for example. The image of a street 
vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire, which gave rise to the revolt 
that finally transformed the institutions of governance in Tunisia still shocks today. 
Humiliation provoked by the cynicism and arrogance of those in power was the 
prime cause of public protests, Castells argues. In the TM, there was neither 
immolation, nor martyrdom, nor a rebel hero of any type, but humiliation emerged 
as a decisive factor that climaxed the momentum of contention and transformed 
the emotion of fear. People felt disgraced and humiliated by the cynical and 
arrogant statement of Mr. Phan Dang Long, the Deputy Head of the Hanoi Party 
Committee’s Propaganda Department. On 17 March 2015, when asked by a 
reporter of a local media about whether it was necessary to consult the public in 
replacing trees, he replied as follows: 
“Do you mean that the government has to consult the citizenry on 
everything?  It is just only about felling a tree. There is no need to ask for 
public opinions. I am asking you: if everything needs to be consulted by the 
people, what is the point of electing the government?  (Vietnamnet, 2015 a, 
b) 
“There is no need to ask for public opinions”, Mr Long’s announcement, likened to a 
bullet fired at people’s trust (Le et al., 2016), emerged as a transformative event. 
Humiliation ably transformed the emotion of fear (Vu, 2017). This transformative 
event, according to Johnston and Carnesecca (2014), marks a turning point in the 
social construction of consciousness and quickly triggers the momentum of 
contestation, whereby it manages, mitigates, and/or transcends fear, a principal 
deterrent to collective action in the authoritarian state, into several innovative 
oppositional repertoires. These repertoires, Johnston and Carnesecca explain, draw 
in larger segments of the society to take part in the movement, which is 
instrumental in intensifying the momentum for collective mobilisation. Under the 
dominant social movement theory (Tarrow, 1994), this event can be understood as 
a political opportunity structure that requires collective mobilisers to take 
advantage of and quickly convert into the mobilising strategies and repertoires of 
actions conducive to achieving the collective goals. The trees campaigners in the TM 




2.3. The TM: emergence, structure and organisation 
 
The TM is a glaring example of how the use of modern digital and technological 
tools (e.g. social media sites) opens up an alternative public sphere for civilians to 
exhibit contention. Mobilising support, calling for action, petition signing, 
coordinating and organising rallies, were orchestrated on social media sites (mostly 
Facebook in this case). A large scholarship recently depicts how social media 
changes state-society relations and provides an alternative platform for social and 
political activism in authoritarian regimes (see Castell, 2012; Hoffman, 2011; Lotan 
et al., 2011; Smith, 2011). Smith (2011), for example, even goes so far as to coin the 
term ‘Facebook revolution’ to emphasise the importance of Facebook in the 
downfall of the Mubarack regime in Egypt. In Vietnam, independent press is not 
allowed, hundreds of local newspapers and over 60 TV and radio stations are under 
the absolute control of the party state. However, unlike China, Vietnam fails to 
block social media, such as Facebook or Twitter. Facebook, now used by over 22 
million people (making up one fourths of the whole population), is among the most 
popular (Gray, 2015). Thuy Minh, a blogger and a member of Green Hanoi Group 
explained: 
“Facebook offers us a space for unrestrained deliberation and actions. In 
this movement, let’s assume, if there were no Facebook, they might have 
finished the felling of trees long before people could react.” (Interview, 20th 
May 2015, Hanoi cited in VU, 2017, p.1193) 
The TM membership was heterogeneous, unrestricted to any specific 
disadvantaged group. It attracted a wide range of participation cutting across the 
social spectrum including women, men, the old, the young, the rich, the poor, 
intellectuals, artists, scientists, business, academics, lawyers, students, journalists, 
registered local NGO staff, bloggers, rights activists, housewives, etc. Importantly 
the movement is completely localised with no support from international donors 
and INGOs in terms of resources. Some staff of embassies and INGOs participated in 
the peaceful demonstrations not on behalf of their organisation, but as individuals. 
Many interview respondents from the mobilising groups revealed that they did not 
feel convinced about the need to involve external actors, for they thought that 
Vietnamese people could handle this issue by themselves. This suggests that they 




having links overseas. An international expert working in Vietnam for over 10 years 
stated as follows: 
“If there were some emergent overseas-associated elements, it could make 
the state speculate that the tree campaigners were receiving money from 
overseas organisations to agitate ordinary people to oppose the government 
or overthrow the regime. This is also what I suppose the groups understood 
and wanted to avoid. Moreover, the campaigning groups, I think, don’t really 
need money. Online activism and taking to the streets actually don’t need 
much money.” (Interview, 23 April 2015 Hanoi) 
Another important aspect of the TM was its spontaneous and impromptu nature. 
This contrasts with the project or programme driven framework under which 
international organisations and INGOs work in Vietnam. These institutions rarely 
put themselves in direct opposition to the local government because of the risk to 
their programmes.  
To facilitate the reading of the analysis of the TM, in what follows I offer a summary 
timeline of critical events.  
Table 3. Chronology of the critical events in the Trees Movement in Hanoi 




Hundreds of large trees in Nguyen Chi Thanh 
street acclaimed as the most beautiful 
boulevard in Vietnam were cut down 
(estimated 400 trees). After Nguyen Chi Thanh, 
large old trees in many other streets in the old 
quarters were cut down. Within a few days the 
whole city looked like a construction site 




16 March 2015 An open letter filed by a reputable journalist Mr 
Tran Dang Tuan, a former deputy general 
director of the Vietnam National Television 
Station to the Chairman of the Hanoi People’s 
Committee (i.e. the city government) requested 
the suspension to the tree felling project.  
This event kicked-off the TM. 




16 March 2015 The Facebook page “6,700 People for 6,700 
trees” was established, with the initial aim to 
seek 6,700 Likes to pay tribute to the felled 
trees.  
The page was shared on a grand scale and 
received 10,000 Likes within 24 hours. 
The page was set up 
by a housewife who 
lived in Hanoi and 
loved the city. 
17 March 2015 A closed Facebook Group 6,700 People, the 
pioneering group, was established and took on 
the role of managing the Facebook page “6,700 
People for 6,700 Trees”.   
Group 6,700 People 
17 March 2015 The first meeting of the pioneering Group 6,700 
People was quickly organised to develop the 
action plan with clear steps and achievable 
objectives 
Group 6,700 People 
17 March 2015 Mr Phan Dang Long, the Deputy Head of the 
Hanoi Party Committee’s Propaganda 
Department, stated on the mainstream media 
that “There is no need to ask for public 
opinions in the tree project”. Mr Long’s saying 
went viral on social media and sparked public 
outcry. 
Mr Phan Dang Long 
18 March 2015 The Facebook Group 6700 Trees was 
established by two local architects to collect 
information and data for making a one-hour 
documentary about the love and response of 
Hanoians to the loss of their trees.  
 
In the morning 
of the 20th 
March 2015 
City citizens’ petition was addressed to the 
related government agencies: People’s 
Committee, People’s Council and Department 
of Construction  
Group 6,700 People 
In the afternoon 
of the 20th 
March 2015 
The Hanoi People’s Committee (city 
government) hold a press conference on the 
tree felling project.  
The President of the People’s Committee 
decided to suspend the project. 
Hanoi People’s 
Committee 
22 March 2015 Tree Hugs Picnic (aka. Public protest) was 
organised. This was considered the first public 
demonstration of the TM. 
Group 6,700 People 
 
23 March 2015 A seminar “From the Project 6,700 Trees to 
Hanoi planning issues” co-organised by two 
local NGOs, the leaders of these NGOs were 
members of Group 6,700 People 
 
29 March 2015 Green Walk (aka. public protest) was organised 
with the participation of about 1,000 people  




31 March 2015 Some parts of Group 6,700 Trees divorced from 
the group after sensing the intervention of the 
police into the group (e.g. under the security 
harassment and intimidation, the group 
administrators were prevented from posting 
any call for further demonstrations). Those who 
left the group (mostly radical activists) 
established the new group called “For A Green 
Hanoi” (which is referred to as Green Hanoi 
hereinafter) 
Group Green Hanoi 
established 
05 April 2015 Biking for Trees was held, but the participants 
were obstructed and split by the police and 
security before reaching the final destination. 
The event encountered the state 
aggressiveness. 
Group Green Hanoi 
12 April 2015 A public demonstration was organised by the 
Group Green Hanoi 
Group Green Hanoi  
19 April 2015 Another public demonstration was waged by 
the Group Green Hanoi 
Group Green Hanoi 
22 April 2015 An administrator of the Group Green Hanoi was 
heavily assaulted by plain-clothes police. 
Despite the escalating state harassment and 
intimidation, the group called for the next 
street protest, which not only focused on the 
environmental issues, but also criticized the 
security violence and harassment   
Group Green Hanoi 
26 April 2015 The final demonstration of the Group Green 
Hanoi was heavily repressed by hundreds of 
police and civic order defenders 
Group Green Hanoi 
06 May 2015 After being heavily repressed, Group Green 
Hanoi filed an open letter to the National 
Assembly deputies. The group representatives 
convened at the constituency of the Hanoi 
National Assembly Delegation to address the 
letter. Nevertheless, they were prevented from 
outside the meeting hall and were not able to 
get inside to meet the deputies.  





How were the TM groups organised and structured? By virtue of the TM’s activism 
being staged mainly via Facebook groups, it was crucial for me to be involved in 
these groups as a member and I managed to do so (see Chapter 3 for how I 
managed to enter the TM’s ‘closed’ platforms). Being an insider to these groups 
allowed me to gain greater insights into how they were organised and structured, 
and how they communicated internally and externally. In trying to map out the 
leading TM Facebook groups, it is useful to think of concentric circles, whereby the 
core position of each group was inhabited by administrators and task force teams. 
These are surrounded by participants who simply exhibited their interests by 
clicking ‘Like’, ‘Share’, or leaving comments, as well as by observers. The diagram 
below visualises the different levels of participation and commitment of members. 
There were several groups participating in the TM with different scales and sizes, 
but I focused on three main groups, which stood out in terms of their significance, 
distinctive mobilising structures, objectives and memberships. These were Group 
6,700 People (the pioneering group and also managing the Fanpage 6,700 people 
for 6,700 trees), Group 6700 Trees, and Group Green Hanoi.  
Diagram 1. Concentric circles of TM participation 
 
(Source: the Researcher) 
 
However, the launch of the TM needs to be traced back not to these groups but to 
an open letter written by Mr Tran Dang Tuan, a reputable journalist, former deputy 




March 16th 2015, he filed a letter to the president of the city government, Nguyen 
The Thao, in which he requested an immediate suspension to the tree felling. Mr 
Tuan’s letter went viral on both Facebook and mainstream media. This letter was 
followed by the initiatives and actions of the Group 6,700 People, the path-breaking 
group of the movement. 
 
 
2.3.1. Group 6,700 People 
 
Following Mr. Tuan’s letter was the prompt emergence of the Facebook page 
“6,700 people for 6,700 trees”, established on the 16th March 2015 by a housewife 
with first-hand experience in social activism (Vu, 2017). She was not born in Hanoi, 
but had lived in it for a long period and had a great love for it. Devoted to her family 
and her own bakery, she had never been involved in any social campaign before. 
Setting up the page, she simply wanted to seek 6,700 LIKES to pay tribute to the 
felled and going-to-be-felled trees. In the morning, she set up the page, in the 
afternoon she made some posters written with “I am a healthy tree, please don’t 
cut me down”, and drove her scooter to some inner streets to stick them to the old 
trees. It was beyond her expectation that the page was shared on a grand scale and 
received 10,000 LIKES just within 24 hours and over 60,000 LIKES within less than 
two weeks (Vu, 2017). She was contacted by a local independent human rights 
expert on the day she wrote the page, and together they took on the administration 
of Group 6,700 People. She was invited to participate in a meeting with some other 
campaigners, who were then the first members of Group 6,700 People. This first 
meeting was a critical milestone for the movement, which will be discussed in detail 
after I bring insight into the composition of this group.    
 
The group emerged as a pioneering one of the TM and took on the role of managing 
the page “6,700 People for 6,700 Trees”. This Facebook group was set on ‘closed 
status’ for safety reasons, and included roughly 100 members coming from diverse 
backgrounds such as NGO staff members, rights experts, journalists, IT specialists, 
scientists, researchers, lawyers, architectures, lecturers, artists, and so forth. It was 
a closed group, so anyone who wanted to join needed to be introduced by a 




no single, identifiable leader. Communication and discussion within the group 
members was mainly via this Facebook group, but the group used the fanpage 
“6,700 People for 6,700 Trees” to communicate with the public, mobilise wider 
support, and call for collective action (Vu, 2017).  
 
The group had a core team of about ten members, many of whom are leaders of 
local registered NGOs and had previously worked together in several projects and 
social campaigns. There was therefore a certain degree of trust and mutual 
understanding between them.  They are all professional, knowledgeable, dedicated, 
developmental-minded, and especially, activist-oriented. Seeing the old trees being 
cut down, they decided to come together in a voluntary manner to protest and to 
save the trees. Their unity was therefore based on their shared concerns and 
objectives towards saving the trees. The role of this core team was pivotal, because 
they functioned as the steering committee which designed and decided mobilising 
tactics and aims. One NGO leader, a member of the core team, explained: 
“How a page works depends heavily on the core team. They shape the 
culture of deliberation on the page and influence the attitudes of the 
participants. This can be seen in the content, language, tone, spirit and 
attitude reflected on the page. […] We endeavoured to maintain a 
deliberative space in a democratic and open manner in order to maintain 
dialogue between us and the people who followed the page, and also 
between the tree campaigners and the authorities.” (Interview, 14 April 
2015, Hanoi, cited in Vu, 2017, p. 1193) 
 
Equally notable about Group 6,700 People was the number of members from local 
registered NGOs who offered knowledge and time of the campaign, as well as 
material resources such as infrastructure, financial support for printing T-shirts and 
stationery for the volunteers participating in the tree status survey. Their activism 
was based on nonviolence and collaboration. One of the group’s administrators   
explained:  
“We were not agitators, we only strived to show to the government our 
good will to cooperate, not to confront. We wanted to save our old trees, 




Since local NGOs are tightly regulated in Vietnam, they are forced to exercise self-
censorship and operate in non-confrontational ways. However, as we will see later 
in this chapter, this does not mean that their activism lacks dynamism and strategy. 
For example, they drafted the influential petition that attracted many supporters, 
they helped set up direct meetings with formal representatives within the city 
government, they framed the movement in a way which broader mass appealed, 
they also called on formal channels (i.e. the Constitution, the relevant state legal 
documents, etc.) to legitimise the movement.  
The first collective effort of the path-breaking Group 6,700 People was to set up a 
dialogue between the city citizens and the authorities and to request transparency 
be put in place. The first group meeting was initiated by a local independent expert 
on human rights and took place on the 17th March 2015 at the office of a local NGO 
one day after the fanpage was established. This meeting played a crucial role in 
setting the course of the group actions, as well as strategising actions for the 
movement during the early stage. Around twenty people attended this meeting 
including the core team of 10 people and around 10 others who did not know each 
other (Vu, 2017). Phan Lam, a member of the core team, observed: 
“In this meeting, despite the majority having not known each other before, 
the discussion was smooth and no conflict occurred. Perhaps, it is because 
the trees issue was so urgent that no one wanted to take it personally. […] If 
you look at the movement as a whole, it is a loosely organised movement. 
Its structure looks like a school of fish when there is no single leader taking a 
lead.” (Interview, 07 April 2015, Hanoi cited in Vu, 2017, p.1195) 
Although there was no leader, the first meeting was facilitated by a leader of a local 
NGO, and this helped ensure the flow of the meeting. Labour division was based on 
individuals’ voluntariness and expertise, with no one giving command or order. Five 
themes of action were quickly agreed on: (1) Information gathering: data, evidence 
from all sources; (2) Communication: working closely with mainstream media as 
long as they were still allowed to, liaising with scientists and experts to collect 
scientific evidence, working with lawyers to mobilise legal support; (3) Advocacy: 
searching for any influential contact within the state who could help set up a 
meeting with Hanoi authorities if possible; (4) Petition signing: collecting public 
signatures for the petition and addressing it to the city government; (5) Event 





Figure 12. The front and the back side of the Advocacy T-shirt of Group 6,700 
People (the logo of the back side is the official advocacy logo of the group) 
 
 (Source: Fanpage 6700 people for 6700 trees 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
The sequence of actions in their mobilising structure above is noticeable, because 
this is indicative of the overall strategy. Specifically, public protest (i.e. Tree Hugs 
Picnic) was not the first action that they mobilised collectively to undertake. 
Instead, this action came after efforts to establishing dialogue and increase support 
(petition signing). Whilst they constantly received numerous comments on the 
fanpage urging them to wage a protest, they were resolute and persistent with their 
agenda. Not being provoked by the radical ideas to take to the streets too soon, 
they strived to set up a dialogue with city authorities in the first place (Vu, 2017). As 




“We wanted to set up dialogue with the government first, we wanted to 
meet up with them. We wanted to make use of that channel before taking 
to the streets. If we took to the streets too soon, we could have invited early 
state repression. As a consequence, we couldn’t have saved the trees. They 
would have continued cutting down trees.” (Interview, 14 April 2015, 
Hanoi).     
Given the repertoire of actions, the group identified which activities were to be 
directly undertaken by the closed group members and which activities were to be 
posted on the fanpage to mobilise wider support and participation. In doing so, they 
attempted to avoid or at least to minimise risks. Once the consensus on labour 
divisions was reached behind the scenes (i.e. using a closed platform), they 
circulated the action agenda more publicly (i.e. on the fanpage which was an open 
forum) to mobilise participation. During the early days, Group 6700 People was 
central to the movement, tens of thousands of people followed their fanpage. The 
first important action they focused on was to organise petition signing. 
On their ‘closed’ platform, the group members focused on searching for a 
prestigious contact in the state apparatus (i.e. a formal structure), which could help 
them set up a direct meeting with the city leaders, as well as maintaining close 
engagement with some reliable mainstream media. Meanwhile, the mobilisation on 
the open page focused on direct actions engaged by the community, which looked 
to halt the tree felling quickly. In this people adopted a number of creative actions 
including inserting the movement logo into facebook profile pictures, sharing 
photos and videos concerning the felled trees on facebook, decorating targeted 
trees with ribbons and posters like “I am a healthy tree. Don’t cut me down”, 
collecting signatures and so forth.        
The urgency, professionalism, and efficacy in their mobilising structure were 
discernible. Whilst tree after tree was cut down without hesitation by the 
authorities, the course of actions was calculated carefully to attain maximum 
impact in the shorted period of time. Shortly after the first group meeting on the 
17th March, the citizens’ petition was thoughtfully drafted in both English and 
Vietnamese and posted on the Fanpage to collect signatures. On 19 March 2015, 
within less than twenty four hours, they collected 22,000 signatures. On the 
morning of the 20th March 2015, three small groups of 5-7 people together with 
closed group members  turned up at the related city government offices including 




body) and the Department of Construction (i.e. the producer of the tree felling 
project). Despite of receiving a reluctant welcome by the authorities, the group 
eventually managed to submit the petition to the representatives of these agencies. 
This was the first time a civic and public action of this kind had emerged. The 
decision to take the petition to the authorities and submit it in person as opposed 
to sending it by post was indicative of the group’s determination to set up a 
collaborative dialogue with the government (Vu, 2017).  
Three succinct demands were put forward in the Petition, including, (1) suspend the 
felling; (2) disclose all information related to the project; (3) open dialogue with 
citizens to respond to their concerns regarding the project. These goals were set out 
in a context that highlighted both environmental concerns as well as emotional cum 
public ones. Not only were the trees good for the environment, people liked them.  
The group efforts in putting initial pressure on the government somewhat bore 
fruit, which could be seen in the government decision to put the tree-cutting 
project on hold. In coping with the public pressure, the city president finally decided 
to temporarily suspend the contentious project on the afternoon of the 20th March 
2015, after the Group submitted and addressed the Petition on the morning of the 
same day. However, the response was a cosmetic tactic of the city administration 
and did not answer key citizens’ questions such as the overall budget for the 
project, what was to happen to the timber, who had responsibility for the project 
and so forth. In particular, halting the tree cutting was only the first of the three 
objectives stated in the Petition to Hanoi authorities. The other two objectives 
focused on ‘openness’ and ‘accountability’, and these had not been addressed. 
Against this backdrop, Group 6700 People decided to move to the next step of its 
campaign, i.e. take the debate to the streets. This took the form of a “Tree Hugs 
Picnic”.  
 
The picnic was staged on 22nd March 2015, two days after the Hanoi government’s 
decision. The event was widely covered on mainstream and social media and drew 
in participants from all walks of life. Around 600 people came from diverse 
segments of society joined the picnic, many of whom wore advocacy T-shirts 
(sponsored by a local NGO) and carried Tree Hugs Hanoi banners, holding hands 
outside the park and displaying their love for Hanoi, love for environment, and love 
for trees. They sang, played music, hugged trees, and marched around the lake, 
calling for the project to be stopped and for the environment to be protected. The 




leading message that the Group 6700 People strived to spread to the wider 
community.  
“It is not our hatred but our love which can save our city. Instead of sitting 
still and showing our resentment to the city government, let’s take action to 
save our city.” 
(Quoted from on fanpage 6700 people for 6,700 trees, dated 18 March 2015) 
 
The event happened with no excessive behaviour from the security forces. Many of 
the participants were young people, who had cooperated with local NGOs in several 
events before, either as volunteers or affiliated groups. The activism by the 
pioneering Group 6,700 People, as one of my respondents, an active activist of the 
Green Hanoi Group revealed, played an important role in helping the movement 
avoid state crackdown from the start. 
 
Figure 13. Tree Hugs Picnic 
 




Although the group was orchestrating by registered local NGO participation, the 
NGO members participated in the movement not as representatives of their 
organisations but as private citizens who wanted to be activists. However, the 




Vietnam, local NGOs’ activities are under constant surveillance by security forces. 
Those taking part in the TM would have known this and therefore took calculated 
risks. They calculated the political opportunity structures and devised strategies to 
mobilise accordingly, so that their organisations would not face unnecessary risks.  
 
In the aftermath of the Tree Hugs Picnic, state intolerance started to accelerate, i.e. 
several members of the closed group received the warnings from the police, many 
students who participated in the picnic or simply stuck posters or ribbons to the 
trees were asked to go the police station for interrogation, the mainstream media 
was asked to stop writings on the tree project, and the propagation brigades were 
mobilised in all neighbourhoods to prevent people from taking to the streets (state 
response to the TM is discussed in more detail in section 2.5 below). Given this, 
Group 6,700 People gradually diminished its activism, moving from the forefront of 
the movement to the margin. After the Picnic (also considered the first street 
protest of the movement), the group decided not to hold more public 
demonstrations, and to seek opportunities to work with the state structures. 
However, the authorities had become more intolerant and the Group 6,700 
People’s efforts were unsuccessful (Vu, 2017).  
Since all efforts to engage with the government failed, they turned their attention 
to surveying and developing the trees map, with an aim to protect the remaining 
number of green trees in the inner city.  
 
 
2.3.2. Group 6700 Trees 
 
Entering the fray a bit later than the Group 6700 People was Group 6700 Trees. The 
latter was established by two architects, who had first-hand social activist 
experience, on 18th March 2015. This new group did not have a Fanpage and was 
set up as a ‘Public Group’, which meant that there was direct communication 
between group members, group administrators were ‘visible’, and people could 
join. This contrasted with the “6700 people for 6700 trees” Fanpage which was a 
closed group, and the identity of the administrators was not revealed.  
The emergence of the Group 6700 Trees had the same repercussion as its 




regarding tree felling were updated every second. The page was shared at an 
unexpectedly grand scale, especially after the two group founders were interviewed 
by a local media about their idea of making a documentary on Hanoi’s old trees. The 
two architects initially set up the Group in order to mobilise public contribution of 
images and video clips of Hanoi trees, which would be used as invaluable inputs for 
the development of a one-hour documentary about the love and response of 
Hanoians to the loss of their trees. The purpose of the movie was to reflect the 
impacts of the tree-felling project upon the city residents, and the need of 
community participation in the urban development management. The intended 
core message of the movie was “City for People” (“Do Thi Vi Nhan Sinh”), which 
emphasised human values in architectural and urban spaces (Vietnamnews, 2015). 
The specific objectives of the Group 6700 Trees were, (i) request the city 
government to halt the tree felling, disclose information regarding the project and 
responsibilities of each related individual, and disclose the plan on how to preserve 
and develop the urban greenery of Hanoi; and (ii) gather information for the 
documentary.  
Due to the unexpected proliferation of members in a very short period of time, the 
two founders had to convince others to become administrators together with them 
to manage the massive flow of new information and photos. The group finally had 
twenty two administrators and no one knew each other before except for the 
founders.    
On 29 March 2015 (one week after the Tree Hugs Picnic), the “Green Walk for 
Trees”, another unique street protest, was orchestrated by this group. The event 
attracted around 800-1000 participants, and resulted in further evidence of an 
increasingly intolerant state. After the Green Walk, group administrators came 
under the surveillance of the security forces. Specifically, two group founders were 
asked to show up at one of the high-level security agencies of the Ministry of Public 
Security for interrogation, whilst other administrators received unexpected visits by 
security officers at their private residences. With such high intimidation, the 
Facebook group was set from public to closed status, all the notes related to the 
Green Walk and mobilising messages for subsequent public protests were deleted, 
some administrators quit and others announced on the page that there would be 
no further calls for public demonstration. This declaration disappointed radical 
elements in the group, who sensed that the group had been influenced by the 
security forces, and hence, they decided to divorce from Group 6,700 Trees and set 




on the 31st March 2015. The Group 6700 Trees gradually demobilised after the 
Green Walk and restricted its activities to the investigation of legal documents 
concerning the tree felling project (Vu, 2017).  
 
 
2.3.3. Group Green Hanoi 
 
Since its emergence, Group for a Green Hanoi (called Green Hanoi hereinafter) 
reenergised TM activism. This again was a facebook group, set up as a ‘public’ one, 
so anyone could enroll. They pursued various acts of civic resistance, including 
public demonstrations, civil disobedience, and legal. Their activism was aimed at 
demanding that the municipal government be accountable and that those 
individuals who committed wrongdoings should be sanctioned. The group attracted 
more than 9,000 members coming from most societal segments. Like the 
organisational structure of the two preceding groups, the role of a single leader was 
absent and instead, the key members who made up the core team of the group 
decided what direction to go. Hence the role of these members and administrators 
became salient (Vu, 2017).  
The distinctive feature of this group was the involvement of independent activists, 
labelled as ‘reactionary forces’ by the ruling communist leaders. These members 
had street protest experience from their participation in anti-China demonstrations. 
As such they were more prepared and experienced to push the boundaries of what 
might be considered legal or acceptable to the authorities. These independent 
activists are critical of the regime and exercised their contention through blogs, 
Facebook page messages, and by taking to the streets. Their activist experience 
helped them transcend fear and placed them in front positions in a series of public 
protests staged by the Group Green Hanoi. The group’s core team included not only 
experienced activists, but also new comers (i.e. inexperienced and young activists). 
One of the group administrators explained as follows: 
 “A key reason for our persistent efforts to sustain the campaign despite the 
increasing repression is to empower people, to familiarise them with 
resisting or opposing inappropriate state policies and decisions, rather than 
seeking refuge in silence and passiveness. This may be considered a small 




indifferent to politics for fear or a lack of confidence.” (Interview, 30 April, 
2015, Hanoi cited in Vu, 2017, p.1189) 
Since its emergence, the group continued to wage public protests and events, 
including marching, biking, filing open letters and complaining to the city 
government. They also shifted to using legal means to channel their opposition. 
Being aware of the risk that the group faced, because of their vulnerability to the 
regime reacting against them, they consistently highlighted the principle of 
nonviolence and law compliance: 
“We take to the streets with peaceful spirit and polite attitude, in respect of 
the law enforcement officers who are doing their jobs; we absolutely say no 
to violence, oppose and prevent violence. We will altogether establish a 
courteous and civil image for our actions.” (Excerpt from Group Green 
Hanoi)  
 
A rights activist and group member stated that: 
“We believe in the rightfulness and civility of peaceful demonstrations. We 
believe that it is the most effective way to incorporate civilians in the 
resolution of social conflicts that are pervasive in our society. Thus, we want 
to show our determination to persevere with the Trees Movement in the 
hope that we can establish a civic-led resistance model for the Vietnamese 
throughout the country.” (Interview, 13 May 2015, Hanoi) 
 
There was a critical difference in the objectives of activism between Group Green 
Hanoi and its two predecessors (Group 6700 People and Group 6700 Trees). While 
asking for sanction and prosecution of those who committed wrongdoings was 
absent in the set of goals to be achieved by the latter, it was brought onto the 
former’s action agenda. With historical activist experience, the concerted efforts of 
the Group Green Hanoi were targeted at reaching more ambitious goals that 
explicitly challenged the state legitimacy. They strategically adjusted their methods 









Figure 14. Peaceful demonstration mobilised by Group Green Hanoi 
 
(Source: Facebook page of Group Green Hanoi 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/vimothanoixanh/) 
 
A series of public demonstrations were orchestrated by Group Green Hanoi on four 
consecutive Sundays, which were accompanied with varying degrees of state 
interventions, ranging from house watch, harassment, detainment, violent assault, 
and stigmatisation of the private lives of a number of group members. The 
appearance of five to seven plain-clothes security officers from the early morning in 
front of the group activists’ houses to intimidate and prevent them from attending 
the rallies was common. Because of this, many of them had to sneak out from their 
homes on the night before or days in advance to avoid security detection. In 
particular, one of the group administrators, also a blogger, was violently assaulted 
by plain-clothes police on 22 April 2015, which caused the group to add issues of 
violence and police harassment to the struggle’s objectives on top of tree saving 
and government accountability. The assault was aimed at threatening the group 
and the public as a whole from staging more protests. The Group Green Hanoi took 
to the streets on 26 April 2015, which was the final street protest of the group and 
indeed of the TM. Participants were heavily suppressed by hundreds of police 
officers and civic order defenders (Vu, 2017). 
 
There are some salient points pertaining to the group’s final protest that need to be 




state repression in the coming demonstration, the Group strategically mobilised 
new members. It targeted the recruitment of young females and encouraged them 
to wear traditional long dress ‘AO DAI’ and stand in the front line of the march (see 
Figure 15). The image of young women in traditional long dresses contrasted with 
the aggression of the security forces, and the Group hoped it would deter state 
violence. Yet, things did not happen in this way. These female protesters, together 
with others, were suppressed by hundreds of police and civic order defenders. 
Twenty two people were arrested in total in the street demonstration of the 26 
April 2015 and were accused of causing public disorder. More experienced activists 
accompanied the newcomers to the police station, even though they had not been 
arrested (Vu, 2017).  
The detainees were released on the same day after long hours of being interrogated 
separately. During the interrogation, the inexperienced activists had to face 
degrading comments and intimidation by the security officers. Most of the 
interrogative questions centred on whether there was any connection between the 
protesters and the Viet Tan (Vietnam Reform) Party, which for the CPV is an exiled 
reactionary organisation that wants to overthrow the socialist state. Thu Huong, 
one of the detainees, disclosed that in the interview that: 
“The police aggressively took my mobile and kept searching for information 
in it without my consent. They asked me whether I belonged to any 
reactionary forces; how much money I received from Viet Tan to participate 
in the protests and since when had I joined Viet Tan. Apart from that, they 
treated me with disrespect and used degrading words to talk to me”.  
In the aftermath of the arrest, police harassment and intimidation escalated 
further. Another active member of Group Green Hanoi was severely attacked by 
five plainclothes security officers who hit him on his head with iron bars (Figure 16). 
He was beaten unconscious at the scene. He was an influential blogger, who was 
always on the frontline of street demonstrations of the TM. He was also an active 
member on several anti-China rallies opposing Beijing’s claims to the disputed 
waters. A number of Western diplomats came to visit him and expressed their 
concerns about the state sponsored violence. When asked “What made you decide 







Figure 15. Female protesters in traditional long dress before the repression 
 
Source: facebook page of Group Green Hanoi 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/vimothanoixanh/ 
 
Figure 16. Two activists of Group Green Hanoi were violently assaulted and other 
female protesters were supressed in the 26 April protest 
 





With increased state supported violence, Group Green Hanoi shifted its strategy 
and began using legal channels to express its opposition. They filed two open letters 
and submitted them to the city authority in person to show their determination to 
make the government accountable for their unusual decisions. Apart from these 
letters, the group representatives also convened at one of the district halls, where 
the Party General Secretary had a meeting with constituents, to present a list of 
queries related to the 6700-tree project. However they were prevented from 
entering the hall by dozens of police and plain-clothes agents. Moreover, the group 
embarked on an unprecedented civic legal action, i.e. those who were arrested in 
the peaceful demonstration on 26 April lodged a complaint to the Hanoi public 
security department, with the aim of denouncing the police and civic order defence 
forces for their arbitrary detention of peaceful marchers. A key group member 
stated, this was the first time the protesters had taken legal action against those 
who repressed them, but she admitted that she was not optimistic the authorities 
would deal with the complaint effectively. However, she also said: 
“This does not mean we will not do anything about that. People should not 
be discouraged from taking action by the mindset that ‘nothing can change’. 
Our small action might set a little brick on the way, but it will make a 
difference in the long run, if we persist” (Interview, 17 May 2015, Hanoi) 
 
So far, I have provided an account of each TM group and examined how they 
emerged, how they were structured and organised, as well as how and why they 
embarked on certain repertoires of actions during specific stages of the TM. The 
advancement and demobilisation of each group was contingent on its degree of 
autonomy in relation to the state and its position of legitimacy. The efforts of 
independent activists and registered NGOs were, however, complementary and 
conducive to building a model of how civilians could converge and oppose the 
government’s unpopular decisions, and make change happen. In what follows, I 
bring more insight into the mobilisation process of the TM, specifically how the TM 
mobilised people and facilitated civil action. I shed light on how the Group 6700 
People (i.e. registered NGO-based) and Green Hanoi Group (i.e. independent 
activist-based) engaged in a type of collaboration, which I referred to as 
“surreptitious symbiosis” (Glasius and Ishkanian, 2014, p.3) at the early period of 
the TM. Underscoring this analysis is an attempt to show how environmental 
concerns were used by the tree campaigners to influence political activism, and 




2.4. The TM: Mobilisation process and dynamics of 
activism 
 
Under the unexpected pressures of public opposition, on 20 March 2015 the city 
government suspended the project and promised a full review. This U-turn state 
response to public criticism is still rare in Vietnam, even if there are signs of 
increasing openness in recent times. Political criticism is treated as a sensitive or 
‘forbidden’ terrain and the state uses its power to respond with a range of tactics 
including the arrest and jailing of some critics. However, trees or environmental 
issues in the broader sense, are often seen as apolitical issues and have opened up 
new avenues for civilians in authoritarian regimes like Vietnam. In Vietnam, politics 
is often treated not as ‘everyday’ or ‘petty’ politics (i.e. politics with a small p, such 
as everyday choices and decisions that make people who they are), but instead as 
anything that the CPV thinks might challenge its monopoly of power (politics with 
big P), such as regime change, calling for multi-partyism or independent labour 
unions (Vu, 2017).  
In the following analysis of the citizen-led movement, I argue that the TM was not 
only an ‘environmental issue’, but that the TM campaigners successfully combined 
environment and political issues, such as participatory governance and government 
accountability in their mobilisations. This was evidenced in the fact that although a 
decision had been taken to halt the tree cutting, it was not enough to stop Hanoians 
asking questions concerning the transparency of the project and the accountability 
of the city administration. As a result, the campaign proceeded with even stronger 
actions.  
As stated on the Facebook page of the Group Green Hanoi: 
“[…] and our actions are not only limited to calling for the halt of tree cutting 
and requesting government transparency in very general terms. We need to 
create a precedent, i.e. the government must be accountable for its 
wrongdoings. Those who commit misconduct must be sanctioned. Public 
property has been destroyed and the community must be compensated. 
We, citizens, are entitled to demand a transparent and accountable 
government, and we can do it. Demonstrations or green biking are only one 
component of our repertoire of actions that, step by step, are aimed at 




Facebook page Green Hanoi dated 16th April, 2015 cited in Vu, 2017, 
p.1201). 
The dynamics of the TM rests on the fact that on the face of it, it seemed loosely 
structured, clandestine, and non-hierarchical however beneath the scenes, it was 
well-organised and professionally-led. A repertoire of non-violent actions appealing 
to both formal and informal channels was mobilised to demand an immediate halt 
to the tree felling, ranging from changing profile pictures, sharing photos and videos 
on Facebook, signing petitions, setting up official meetings with the city 
government, beautifying trees with ribbons, surveying trees, organising workshops, 
and in particular taking to the streets.  
To generate legitimacy for their rightful resistance, the tree campaigners appealed 
to the fundamental citizenship rights stated in the Constitution and nested within 
the state agenda and discourse:  
 “We have formed our requests based on our good will to cooperate with 
the Hanoi authorities in the implementation of the 2013 Constitution, 
specifically regarding the right to access information, the right to participate 
into state and social management, as well as the corresponding obligation of 
the State (Chapter II, Article 25 and Article 28), the Environmental Protection 
Law and Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on the Implementation of 
Democracy in Wards, Communes, and Townships.”  
(Excerpt from the Petition of the Fanpage 6700 people for 6700 trees 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) (cited in Vu, 
2017, p.1201) 
 
By carefully appealing to the Constitution and other related legal documents (i.e. 
formal channels) in the petition, the first civic action of the TM staged by the Group 
6700 People demonstrated the campaigners’ professionalism, as well as their 
strategic thinking in seeking legitimation for their mobilisation. They signalled a 
clear message to the city administration with the statement: “we are aware of our 
constitutional rights, but importantly, we are not in a position of confrontation but 
rather, one of cooperation” (Interview, 25 March 2015, Hanoi). 
The TM groups were committed to nonviolence and in their endeavours, they 
established a civil resistance model through which civilians knew, spoke out and 
exercised their rights in a peaceful and rightful manner. In non-democratic regimes 




campaigners understood that this needed to be mitigated as a first step in the 
mobilisation process. Once fear was alleviated, it would attract more participation, 
which would provide potential protection for individual participants and then 
enhance legitimacy for the movement. 
Fear was tactically mitigated and transformed by the TM groups through a 
repertoire of strategic actions. First, the vocabulary they employed conveyed the 
severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety of the campaign. Their attempts were to 
break down a fine line between inside-outside participants of the movement. They 
understood that the movement had progressed to a great extent through the aid of 
the social network, and that the distinction between participants and non-
participants was weak because a simple click on the LIKE or SHARE button meant 
someone was ‘involved’. The way they addressed the public and the strategic 
messages they delivered focused on the fact that it was the people’s constitutional 
right to voice their concern. The Group 6700 People, for example, stated clearly on 
their page:  
“Our efforts are to set up a dialogue between the PEOPLE and the city 
government about the tree-felling project in an open, transparent and 
goodwill manner. The main actions that we emphasise on are promoting 
transparency and collaboration between citizens and the authorities. […] 
Positive and law-abiding activities are advocated and in particular, it is 
necessary to avoid acts that might endanger participants or might be abused 
or distorted.”  
(Excerpted from fanpage 6700 People for 6700 trees, 19 March 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
By addressing the “PEOPLE”, they emphasised that this movement would not 
exclude anyone and that anyone could be affected by environmental destruction, 
particularly stressing the fact that their attempts were not to establish a dialogue 
between the group itself and the city administration, but rather, it was for Hanoians 
as a whole. Also, by proclaiming clear objectives and specific actions, they sought to 
highlight that their motivations and actions were open and transparent and not 
related to what the state referred to as ‘being agitated by the conspiracy of evil 
forces’.  
They encouraged people not to be fearful by repeatedly reiterating that it was 




messages to spark people’s consciousness and conscience to accelerate collective 
mobilisation:  
“[…] we have to raise our voice so that there will be no more environmental 
destruction like this in the time to come. We are not those who try to hinder 
human advancement. What we all require is transparency, consultation and 
respect. Nature also needs to be respected. […]  
There are so many things that we have to do, and we have to do them 
without hesitation because they don’t give us even a minute to spare. Tree 
after tree is being chopped down. Please take a look around you, near your 
house, near your office, your school, or at the places that you often travel 
past to see whether there is any tree that is healthy. It will be felled. Please 
give a shout, please don’t cover your eyes or your ears anymore, please raise 
your voice, the voice of a citizen, so that the authorities will understand that 
we are not blind.”  
(Excerpted from Fanpage 6,700 people for 6,700 trees, 18 March 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
The second strategy the campaigners used to mitigate public fear so as to trigger 
collective mobilisation rested on their publicly well-stated determination to protect 
participants and their efforts to promote solidarity among them. As the TM 
momentum increased, harassment by the security forces also increased. Young 
students in particular were targeted because the CPV is traditionally suspicious of 
youth movements because of its recollection and interpretation of the Tiananmen 
Square uprising. The authorities therefore adopted many tactics to put pressure on 
students, their universities and their families.  
Amid the increasing complexity of the movement, the mobilising groups created a 
self-protection mechanism for participants by improving their legal awareness. They 
mobilised legal support from lawyers who were willing to help and become part of 
the movement. The guiding information regarding each specific harassment case 
was carefully explained on the TM groups’ pages so that people would know about 
their rights. Group 6700 People, for instance, posted on its page that:  
“[…] Citizens cannot be arrested or detained unless they are caught 
committing crimes or there is an arrest warrant. If invited to the police 
station, you have the right to refuse and this is your right. […] You have the 
right to refuse to answer questions and the right to ask for the protection of 
lawyers. If there is an illegal detainment deployed, you have the right to sue 




(Quoted from fanpage 6700 people for 6700 trees, 21 March 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
Vietnam is not a rule of law state, the campaigners understood that. This is not, 
however, to say that they did not bother to improve public awareness of legitimate 
rights that they were entitled to, for they believed that when people were informed 
they would act differently.  
Group Green Hanoi, with the presence of several independent and experienced 
street activists designed a detailed but easy to understand handbook entitled “How 
to work with security forces and universities” for young participants in the TM. The 
guidance document provides basic and useful information to improve the 
awareness and capacities of the young people on how to behave and respond when 
being questioned by security officers or their universities. The document is also 
littered with suggested tactics, essential legal knowledge, and simulation scenarios 
which the youth might encounter. This document was very popular among the tree 
campaigners. 
Throughout the course of the TM, there was a phenomenon that was for the first 
time observed in civil society activism in Vietnam, i.e. the below-the-radar synergy 
between the registered NGO staff and independent activists, some of whom were 
labelled as dissidents. This was not a formal partnership between NGOs and 
activists but a case of people with similar personal interests coming together. An 
experienced independent activist explained it in this way: 
 
“It is difficult to get cooperation between the NGOs and independent 
activists, it is because trust matters. Activists are often given labels that 
seem to frighten the general public, such as hostile or reactionary forces. 
Whereas the registered NGOs, constrained by a legalistic framework and 
webs of bureaucratic practices, have to position themselves away from 
confrontational methods. Given their conditions and relations with the 
government and donors, being too close to the independent activists who 
are critical of the regime could put them at risk. It is also uneasy for them to 
establish a collaborative relationship with ‘reactionary forces’ since security 
agents will not leave them in peace.” (Interview, 10th June 2015, Hanoi cited 





However, despite these potential tensions, for the first time the registered NGOs 
and independent activists emerged with a sort of common voice over a common 
issue. The below-the-radar coalition between them was subtle but significant. What 
actually happened between the two groups? Why did the independent activists (the 
leading actors in the Green Hanoi Group), who were experienced street activists, 
not organise public protest from the start? Why was the first street demonstration 
(i.e. Tree Hugs Picnic) orchestrated by Group 6700 People (NGO-based) and not by 
independent activists? It was observed that when public rage reached a peak, the 
possibility of public protest was greater. However, if it had been driven by 
independent activists, efforts to set up dialogue with the government would have 
failed, and even worse the TM might have encountered a state crackdown from the 
start. The state never holds dialogue with independent activists, no matter their 
issue of cause for concern. Aware of this, Group 6700 People, through an 
intermediary who was an independent writer, sent an important message to the 
independent activists’ group in an attempt to explain the situation and seek their 
endorsement, and convince them not to take to the streets too soon, because they 
were trying to establish a relation with the city government. The independent 
activists endorsed the suggestion, and as a result, they did not push for public 
protest.  
 
The independent activists understand that any social campaign or movement needs 
broad participation. In relation to the Tree Hugs Picnic, some prominent 
independent activists turned up at the rally, but played a supportive rather than 
leading role. In essence, the two groups established a mutual respect and 
understanding of their own strategies, methods and positions. Throughout the 
movement, whenever possible, they shared information to find opportunities for 
collaboration. The mutual respect and surreptitious symbiosis, albeit subtle, 
between the groups, is an unprecedented phenomenon and signals a progressive 
sign for future citizen-led activism in Vietnam (Vu, 2017). 
 
If Group Green Hanoi (independent activists-based) showed their support to Group 
6700 People (i.e. NGO-based) by staying in the background at the beginning, the 
latter later reciprocated. A seminar (i.e. formal channel), entitled “From the Project 
6,700 trees to Hanoi planning issues” co-organised by two local NGOs on 23 March 
2015, was open to everyone, including independent activists. Attended by popular 
experts, lawyers, and scientists, the seminar aimed to muster scientific opinions and 




right at the beginning. Whilst there was no explanation by the venue provider about 
the power outage, the participants understood that it was a case of sabotage rather 
than an accident. In the end, the seminar took place without power. Most 
participants raised a concern that the project violated the 2012 Law on the capital 
city and the government’s Decree 64/2010/ND-CP on the management of urban 
trees, and demanded an intermediate investigation with the involvement of the 
Central Government Inspectorate. Explaining the significance of this seminar, an 
experienced pro-democracy activist of Group Green Hanoi indicated: 
 
“This was an important event since it was also open to reactionary forces 
like us. It provided us with plenty of valued information (e.g. the original 
proposal, the legal basis of this project, the government decisions and 
decrees and much other legal evidence of the law violation by authorities 
regarding this project). This information was useful for the legal struggles of 
our group in the subsequent stages.” (Interview, 27 May 2015, Hanoi) 
 
In addition, Group 6,700 People also raised their voice in a timely manner to show 
their solidarity with Group Green Hanoi when a human rights activist, also a 
prominent member of the latter, was allegedly assaulted by the plain-clothes 
security officers. The image of his face covered with blood (see Figure 16 above) 
went viral on social media sites exacerbating public indignation and haunting those 
with conscious minds. A nonviolent action of civil disobedience was undertaken, i.e. 
hundreds of Vietnamese facebookers inside and outside of the country changed 
their avatars to his bloody face to show their resentment of the authorities and 
their solidarity with the activist. At that time, the government’s public opinion 
shapers, a component of the regime propaganda brigade, tried to provoke Group 
6,700 People into suspecting the Group Green Hanoi of being driven by reactionary 
actors and hence, getting them to stay away from it. In response to this, the former 
showed its support to the independent activist group on its Facebook page by 
exposing the instrument effectively used by the pro-communist agenda to isolate 
the independent activists from the general populace (Vu, 2017). The following 
excerpt explains it well: 
 
“One of the most effective political strategies of the state apparatus is to 
arbitrarily label anyone who wants to be critical of the party state as a 
‘reactionary force’. The word ‘reactionary’ once assigned indiscriminately 




the state, organised deception and terrorism, with the support from the 
exile-based organisations such as Viet Tan (Vietnam Reform) Party or other 
powerful diaspora forces. Their propaganda is so effective that now, anyone 
who opens their mouth to mention words, such as democracy or human 
rights, will be labelled reactionary by many of the civilian population and 
consequently, be isolated from their communities. [….] And, especially, I 
realise how effective the propaganda machinery is, when a law-abiding 
citizen who was assaulted by five thugs in the street in the capital city was 
easily ignored by ordinary people, because they thought ‘this guy is a kind of 
reactionary’ or they quickly suspected his bloody face fake despite the fact 
that his injuries were proven with medical evidence. It is unbelievable. If, 
centuries ago, someone could easily be put onto the pyre for being labeled a 
‘counter-God’, nowadays in the 21st century right in the middle of the so-
called capital for peace, Hanoi, they could attack someone to death in the 
street for ‘he is reactionary’. If so, honestly human beings have not made 
significant progress in evolution, I reckon”.  
(Excerpt from Fanpage of group 6700 People, 12th May 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
The TM started out as an environmental campaign but evolved into a political 
campaign that provoked a government response. Each group participating in the 
TM had specific roles to play, none of which should be downplayed. The ebb and 
flow of each group was contingent on institutional characteristics. Specifically, 
Group 6700 People characterised by mainly registered NGO participation, was more 
embedded in the state via a web of legalistic requirements and bureaucratic 
practices. So, they took advantage of their connections with the government but 
had also to be careful because of the same connections. The room for manoeuvre 
that the connections facilitated could so easily be closed down at very short notice. 
After the Tree Hugs Picnic, it did not stage street protests, but limited its activism to 
examining the status of trees in the main streets and called on all Hanoians to 
become tree watchers. Group 6700 Trees remained in the spotlight for a short 
period of time and then retreated, because the founding members had never been 
social activists and could not cope with public security intimidation. Group Green 
Hanoi, which was characterised by independent activists’ autonomy and more 
critical engagement with the party state, took over the arena and brought the TM 
to a higher level of contention by overtly questioning the government’s 
accountability and asking for the sanctioning of officials who had committed 
wrongdoing. It continued to orchestrate more public protests for almost two 




street activism. Being at a distance from the state meant Group Green Hanoi could 
support activism with higher state antagonism – an antagonism NGOs could not 
support. This however meant its legitimacy was always under threat.  
 
 
2.5. State response to the TM 
 
The outcry of Hanoians caused the city government to reverse the 6700 trees 
project. Yet, the halt to the tree cutting was seen as a cosmetic tactic that the city 
leaders put in place to calm public rage. As a strategy exercised frequently by the 
authoritarian state in responding to continued public opposition, officials either 
delayed disclosing information as long as possible or issued superficial, ‘sham’ 
directives to pacify the public such as sanctioning some low-ranking officers or 
asking the City Inspectorate to carry out investigations. People were cynical because 
they knew the Hanoi Inspectorate, a subordinate agency, would not have enough 
authority to denounce the wrongdoings of its superior, top leaders. One of the core 
official responses during the protest was that the policy of replacing the trees was 
appropriate and correct, and that that tardiness of low level officials to actually 
implement the replacement had created uncertainty and misunderstanding among 
the public. They promised to conduct a thorough self-review and to take 
appropriate measures to address the shortcomings (Đời sống và Pháp luật, 2015).  
 
The tree felling project of the Hanoi authorities also signalled an upsetting practice 
of profiteering by local party officials, in other words, state corruption (The 
Economist, 2015). It illustrated the extent of law violation or fence-breaking carried 
out by local officials who did not follow directives from above. This project was 
initiated in Hanoi (i.e. at provincial level) and the city government violated the 
national Law on the Capital City. A well-articulated argument was that the Hanoi 
Department of Construction and the city top leaders made backdoor deals to seek 
to ‘earn something’ amid the tightened state budget. Appealing slogans like “People 
know, people do, people discuss, people monitor” advocated by the ruling 
Communists, are visible everywhere from government offices to public, but the tree 





In this section I directly address how the government responded to the TM, which 
included using coercion as direct state intervention, setting the agenda to prevent 
public criticism and using ‘labelling’ as a non-coercive instrument of the hegemonic 
state. The government responses strongly resonated with Lukes’s (1974) three 
dimensions of power.   
 
 
2.5.1. Using coercive power 
 
The first dimension of power, according to Lukes, implies that people change how 
they behave as a result of being exposed to direct coercive power. It is notable that 
all collective actions by the leading movement groups were lawful (e.g. petition 
signing, meetings with state officials, or peaceful demonstrations). Yet, in one party-
ruled Vietnam, this does mean that the peaceful campaigners are safe from state 
coercion.  
The tree felling plan was put on hold and a few officials were named and shamed 
for their wrongdoing, but that small victory came at a cost to many campaigners. 
Many young people put their future at risk by participating in the campaign to save 
the old trees of Hanoi. The TM yielded new faces and new energy for civil society 
activism in Vietnam. However in the process the green campaigners were harassed, 
humiliated, intimidated and at worst heavily assaulted in the streets. Moreover, not 
only were their own personal lives jeopardised, their families were also threatened. 
An independent activist, and one of leading members of Group Green Hanoi, 
claimed: 
“It seems to me that almost everyone who dares to stand out and 
participate in the tree saving campaign is targeted in one way or another by 
a sophisticated and well trained system of coercion”. (Interview, 20th May 
2015, Hanoi) 
In response to the nonviolent civil resistance of Hanoians, the city authorities 
appropriated a variety of coercive means such as harassment, humiliation, 
intimidations, assault, detainment, among others, in order to suppress the green 
campaigners.  
Many Facebook and email accounts of the campaigners were hacked, their internet 




members to move around was also violated. A new but an active campaigner of the 
Group Green Hanoi recalled: 
“The plain-clothes police and regime thugs were also mobilised by turning 
up in front of my house in a group of seven to ten and aggressively blocking 
me from joining the rally. They stayed there for hours and only left when 
they knew for sure that the demonstration was over.” (Interview, 22 May 
2015, Hanoi) 
Thus, in order to be able to join the rally, the prominent independent activists had 
to play a game of ‘hide and seek’, sneaking out of their houses the night before or 
even days in advance to avoid police detection. Another tactic public security used 
was to lock people in their houses or block their vehicles so as to confine them to 
their homes.  
For new campaigners, often students, intimidation was channelled through 
universities and families. A new activist taking part in the green campaign for the 
first time revealed how she was harassed and intimidated:  
“The security officers went to talk to my lecturers and the administrative 
staff at my university. They terrified them by telling them that I was meeting 
with terrorists. My university asked me to sign a pledge that I would not 
become involved in any further activities concerning the trees protests. But I 
refused to do so telling them I hadn’t done anything wrong.” (Interview, 23 
May 2015, 2015) 
An experienced activist who had been detained and physically abused revealed 
that: 
“Apart from putting pressure on families and universities, they also put 
pressure on the employers, business and landowners of the campaigners, in 
an attempt to cut off their livelihoods source and impoverish them. Security 
officers will quickly find out where you work and go talk to your employers. 
The same tactic is repeatedly used. They will tell the employer this staff is 
waging some activities to ruin the socialist state, and they pressure the 
employer into dismissing you.” (Interview, 13 May 2015, Hanoi) 
Last but not least, the campaigners were allegedly assaulted and the final 
demonstration on 26 April 2015 was heavily repressed with several participants 




Green Hanoi, a group administrator and a rights activist, were attacked by ‘regime 
thugs’ in the street, which raised the issue of the state’s abuse of violence.  
 
 
2.5.2. Setting the agenda to dictate the situation 
 
Lukes’s second dimension of power indicates that people have power if they can set 
the agenda by controlling what is discussed, said, or done. In this way they 
effectively control a situation without the need for coercion.  
With their large propaganda brigade, the authorities made the general population 
believe that the participants in the TM demonstrations were receiving money from 
overseas and were being agitated by evil forces to cause public disorder and destroy 
public safety. Many campaigners had to encounter suspicious attitudes from their 
neighbours and friends. A young campaigner recalled what he had experienced in 
his interview: 
“When I returned home from the rally on that Sunday morning, a couple of 
neighbours sitting outside asked me how much money I was paid for taking 
part in the protests. It was humiliating, but… […] all I can say is a large part of 
the populace still believe in almost everything the government infiltrates 
into their minds. This can be considered a success of the propaganda 
machinery.” (Interview, 19 May 2015 Hanoi) 
Notably the government mobilised an army of public opinion shapers (rumour-
mongers) who are paid by the state to shape public opinion online. It is estimated 
that there are thousands of rumour-mongers nationwide and 900 in Hanoi alone 
(Vietnam Right Now, 2015). These people also set up Facebook pages or blogs and 
browse the blogosphere and social media, rapidly producing postings to advocate 
the government’s agenda and to oppose any critic. Another task they have to 
accomplish is to trace pro-active bloggers, facebookers and other influential 
activists to shape public opinions against these people by using crude language to 
suppress dissent (Pham Doan Trang, 2014). In the TM, the troop of rumour-mongers 
was largely mobilised to attack the campaigners online by humiliating them. 
The city government also tried to silence scientists and academics who wanted to 
use their environmental expertise to provide the public with scientific evidence. For 




were using to replace the healthy old trees were totally inappropriate to be planted 
in the inner streets and their price was in fact much lower than that stated in the 
project document. When they realised that all the trees replanted in Nguyen Chi 
Thanh Street were in fact unvalued in terms of shade and timber, a lecturer from 
the Forestry University wanted to disseminate this information. However, he was 
censured by his employer for revealing it to the media without the university’s 
consent. After this incident, the Forestry University issued a formal notice to all of 
its staff and students warning them not to speak or to disclose information 
concerning the tree project without the university’s permission. The state media 
was also compelled to terminate all writings regarding the 6700 trees project. The 
youth and students were pressured by their universities not to become involved in 
street protests.  
In every neighbourhood across the capital city, the propagation brigades led by the 
mass organisations’ leaders such as the Fatherland Front, Women’s Union, 
Veterans’ Union, and so forth, were mobilised to visit local households to spread 
the state agenda that “[…] The evil forces are agitating ordinary people to 
participate in the illegal demonstrations to cause public disorder and insecurity in 
the city. […] In realising the directive of the Hanoi Party Committee’s Propaganda 
Department on securing social safety, all the local households are advised to be 
highly vigilant to avoid being agitated by evil forces to participate in illegal public 
demonstrations causing political instability and social insecurity, which adversely 
affect the image of our capital city […]” (Excerpted from the notice of a 
neighbourhood unit party committee) 
  
 
2.5.3. Manipulating through labelling 
 
During the course of the TM, the label ‘reactionary forces’ was strategically utilised 
by the hegemonic state to ascribe to the leading campaigners (e.g. independent 
activists and dissidents), so as to isolate them from the general population. With no 
need to resort to coercive measures, through this ‘labelling’ technique the 
government managed to manipulate people’s consciousness. This resonates with 
the radical view of power by Lukes (1974), whereby he indicates that the ruling class 
transforms the ruled class in such a way that the latter behaves as the former 




beliefs, or false consciousness. The word ‘reactionary’ once translated into 
Vietnamese (phản động), entails innumerable wickednesses, dubious conspiracies, 
fears and threats. Given that a large part of the population still chooses to be 
immune from politics because of fear, the label ‘reactionary forces’ took effect.  
As Wood (1985) explains, de-linking and isolation is an inherent feature of labelling. 
The strategic state imposition of this label successfully scared ordinary people and 
fenced them off from linkages with independent activists and dissidents or anyone 
seeking to criticise the state. The whole propaganda machinery was mobilised at all 
levels including universities, residential clusters, districts-, ward level people’s 
committees, and of course families. The aim was to simply manipulate people to 
stay away from ‘reactionary forces’.    
The Party Secretary of Hanoi, Pham Quang Nghi, once stated clearly that “In terms 
of the mainstream media, the government can control it. Yet, there are numerous 
websites that the government finds hard to control. They are trying to take 
advantage of the trees issue to agitate the populace. It is imperative that people be 
vigilant of these hostile and reactionary forces, who are trying to call for public 
protests in the guise of trees saving, but are in fact, against the regime and the 
socialist state at all levels” (Hà Nội Mới, 2015). To reinforce the city leader’s 
message, a state newspaper added that “Clearly, Group Green Hanoi, which is 
orchestrating public protests, is de facto created by an exile reactionary group. 
Therefore it is absurd to think that they are merely spontaneous, innocent tree 
lovers. It is also unlikely to believe that there is no reactionary force standing behind 
to secretly manage this group without any wicked conspiracy.” (Tuần Báo Văn Nghệ 
TPHCM, 2015).  
However, labelling, a non-coercive means of power by the state officialdom might 
have its effects on the general population, but how independent activists respond 
to it varies from person to person. Being labelled ‘reactionary force’ seems not to 
be scary. Independent activists call themselves ‘reactionary forces of the CPV’, in 
other words, progressives. The following point raised by an independent activist 
highlights this: 
“The people in the ‘opposition’ camp (i.e. independent activists and 
dissidents) don’t care much about how they are or should be labelled. 
Democratic or human rights activists (nhà hoạt động dân chủ/nhân quyền) 
or dissidents (người bất đồng chính kiến, người hoạt động đối lập) does not 




recognised professionals who have official degrees. We are simply vocal and 
critical of the government’s wrongdoings and policies, then we are called by 
different labels. What matters more to us is how to exercise activism 
effectively to make the public aware of their rights and demand that these 





At first glance, the citizen-led TM came across as a localised issue: people liked the 
trees and were upset because the government decided to cut them down with no 
public consultation. Yet the TM, as I have argued, is far more political than meets 
the eye. What started out as a localised campaign evolved into a movement 
through which civilians made demands for a government that is accountable, 
deliberative and respectful of its citizens. The aim of concerted efforts of different 
informal civilian networks in the TM was to gradually create a habit of exercising 
democratic culture through advocacy and action as opposed to silence and 
passiveness. In a politically restricted environment where public disrespect by the 
authorities is prevalent and where fundamental human rights are routinely violated, 
TM activism signals that when people leave fear behind and stand up to the 
government, change is possible. That change might be just a small victory on the 
way, but over the long run with sustained efforts substantive change can emerge. 
As Goldfarb proclaimed “political change doesn’t always begin with a bang; it often 
starts with just a whisper” (Goldfarb, 2007 cited in Vu, 2017, p.1205). 
The chapter has argued from the beginning that grassroots citizen-led activism, an 
emerging form of civic engagement, is likely to play a critical role in (re)shaping 
state-society relations in Vietnam. Throughout the analysis, I have attempted to 
illustrate this argument. I have portrayed the detailed processes in which Hanoi’s 
citizens orchestrated rightful civic actions to oppose the unaccountable state’s 
decision to cut down thousands of healthy old trees. The TM accentuates the 
‘contested’ nature that has been long obscured by the rhetoric that civil society in 
authoritarian regimes like Vietnam is either co-opted or suppressed.   
I have used the TM as a case study of citizen-led form of activism under Vietnam’s 




or any other formally organised structure of civil society. NGOs’ members 
participated in the TM in a personal capacity, not as representatives of their 
organisations. The TM was de facto constituted by different informal civilian groups, 
which were unregistered, unregulated and drew forth broad-based participation 
cutting across societal spectrums. These grassroots networks were, by nature, 
loosely-structured groupings of like-minded civilians who came together to prevent 
ecological destruction and then to encroach on political issues, such as government 
accountability and democratic participation. They were loosely-structured because 
their degree of commitment was issue-based and sporadic, which resonates well 
with grassroots activism elsewhere in other authoritarian regimes (Cavatorta, 
2013). Nevertheless, it is notable that among the three groups discussed in this 
analysis, Group Green Hanoi (i.e. independent activist-based) is the only one which 
has continued to stick together to maintain its green activism. It has now enrolled 
new young activists who are environmentalist-oriented, critical of ecological crises 
caused by unselective economic decisions involving collusion between special 
interest groups and political elites. Many experienced and young independent 
activists now remain in this group and mobilise together around ecological issues. 
When the political opportunity occurs, they also engage in confrontational action 
over other issues such as the CPV’s weak stance towards China’s aggression in the 
disputed areas, and other socio-political issues. The group continues to exist with 
no demand to seek registration or co-optation into the state, which has been 
considered a challenge to the authorities for the past two years.  
In the light of the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2, legitimacy and 
(in)formality were the themes that occupied more analytical space in this chapter, 
whereby I discussed how the TM groups generated legitimacy for their actions as 
well as how they resorted to (in)formal channels to orchestrate their activism. It can 
be seen that formality and informality were well articulated by the TM groups. 
These groups, associated more with either registered NGOs or independent 
activists, all had to resort to the interplay of formal and informal activism in order to 
achieve collective goals. These themes will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
6, where I will engage directly in comparative analysis of different forms of activism 
guided by my analytical framework. The advancement and demobilisation of each 
group was reliant on how it was institutionally characterised. Greater 
embeddedness in the state helped Group 6700 People (NGO-based) become path-
breaking and carve out some guarded room to manoeuvre in critical actions. 




its activism. Not being regulated with the government enabled the Group Green 
Hanoi to support mobilisation with higher levels of antagonism towards this state. 
This however met with state resistance.   
The chapter has explored the rise to prominence of the citizen-led TM in Hanoi. This 
movement highlights five salient insights regarding citizen-led mobilisation that 
have been understudied in the existing literature on Vietnamese civil society.  
First, the evidence suggests that civil society groups, either embedded groups 
(NGOs) or independent groups (independent activists, dissidents), have to couch 
their activities within the state agenda and discourse (constitution, state law, state-
propagandised values, etc.) to generate legitimacy for their collective actions. 
Coupled with the state responses that I depicted above, this indicates that the 
authoritarian state in Vietnam remains dominant and the increasing civil society 
vibrancy is not indicative of declining state power. The CPV continues to maintain its 
stance as the vanguard of popular struggles and therefore, will not accept or 
welcome civic attempts to represent popular aspirations. In this ideology, any social 
mobilisation outside its officially approved channels even in the most mundane 
matters is still considered a threat to its monopoly of power and the status quo. The 
rise to pre-eminence of the TM is also reflexive of the extent to which the existing 
formal channels (e.g. visiting offices for petitioners established in government 
agencies) for citizen interaction with the state have failed.  
Second, environmental activism has opened up a new arena of contestation for civil 
society activism in Vietnam. Amid unpredicted and uncertain state intolerance, 
political criticism is repeatedly treated as a sensitive or ‘forbidden’ terrain under a 
lattice of deterring tactics employed by the state. Nonetheless trees, or 
environmental issues, apolitical from the façade, have opened up a new avenue for 
civilians in authoritarian Vietnam to exercise contestation, advocating their rights 
and demanding a more accountable government.  
Third, The TM was a broad- based coalition bringing together formally organised 
groups, such as NGOs with unorganised independent activist groups. This type of 
coalition is new in Vietnam and has triggered a more tolerant state response, as 
well as created opportunities for further civic actions. This was the first time where 
the registered (NGOs) and unregistered group (independent activists) reached a 
common voice about a single issue and importantly, they established some sort of a 
mutual arrangement or negotiation in sustaining activism. The surreptitious 




helped the movement circumvent early state intervention. As a result, the 
prolonged period of the movement created a good opportunity for enhanced 
contentious actions to challenge the state authority (Vu, 2017).  
Fourth, the TM has signalled to the political elites how people power can respond to 
arbitrary state decisions that directly affect their everyday lives. Specifically, it has 
informed the government how civilians can react and organise rightful civic actions 
to oppose unpopular state decisions and policies. In the era of digital technology, 
the single party-ruled state can control and silence the state-run media, but fails to 
do so with social media where citizen journalism is blooming with open criticism 
and dissent towards the government. Social media was used effectively by the TM 
groups to orchestrate collective actions and especially, to empower people and 
raise their awareness of their citizenship rights. Castells (2012) once argued that 
political change, in order to be in place, needs to come with change in the minds of 
the people. Castel’s argument rings true well with most of the respondent accounts 
from both the NGOs’ members and independent activists towards the TM. The 
mobilising groups incorporated constitutional rights in their mobilising structures, 
on the one hand, to generate legitimacy for their activism and to improve public 
awareness of their citizenship rights, on the other (Vu, 2017).  
In the view of many activists from local NGOs, creating a paradigm shift was beyond 
the ability of TM and acknowledging the movement as a glorious victory of civic 
resistance was misleading. They recognise the TM as a test for civil society capacity 
to stand up to the state, and thus, an incubator for more organised citizen-led 
activism. Meanwhile for the independent activists, the grassroots TM was a sign of 
people power that activated citizens to become aware of their agency in order to 
demand government accountability. This phenomenon is still seen rare under the 
authoritarian constraint in Vietnam.        
Fifth, state response to the TM is vividly expressive of how an authoritarian state 
responds to civil society activism in order to maintain its monopoly over power. 
How it responded resonates strongly with the strategies exercised by other 
authoritarian states elsewhere, where legitimation and repression are concurrently 
exercised. Legitimation, one of the pillars of stability in autocratic regimes, 
according to Gerschewski (2013), is aimed at guaranteeing active consent, 
compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the 
population. This strategy is resonant with Lukes’s (1974) second and third 




TM, the authorities exercised their authoritarian legitimation strategy by apparently 
responding to citizens when they temporarily stopped felling the trees. However 





Chapter 5: NGO-led activism 




The 1986 reform transformed Vietnam economically and socially and led inter alia 
to the emergence of new societal actors, including NGOs and other forms of civil 
society. Since then, these forms of civil society have been expanding and taking on 
new roles aimed at, for example, pro-poor policy, institutional reform, social 
mobilisation, or associational pluralism.   
 
Globally, the fascination with NGOs has yielded a large literature, much of which 
has focused on their socio-economic functions and the normative interpretation of 
NGOs’ role in democratisation. Since the early 1980s, NGOs have been conceived of 
as an important development actor with a number of comparative advantages that 
enable them to address development issues effectively and to build local capacities 
at different levels (Devine, 2006; Heyzer et al. 1995; Mercer, 2002). Articulating 
work by Fisher (1998), Fowler (1993) and Hulme and Edwards (1997), Devine (2006) 
identified the following comparative advantages: (a) efficiently providing welfare 
services to the poor; and (b) developing a political process grounded in principles of 
participation, empowerment and accountability. For the past decade, there has 
been, however, emerging scholarship on the political salience of NGOs in the global 
south (e.g. Devine, 2006; Walton, 2013, Ho, 2007; Gleiss, 2014; Wischermann, 2013; 
Wischerman et al., 2016; Angley, 2010). These accounts offer a more contextualised 
and nuanced understanding of the role of NGOs in the politics of development.  
 
The proliferation of local NGOs in the late 1990s in Vietnam prompted academics 
and practitioners to study how this new societal actor exists and operates in the 
one-party state. The existing studies predominantly focus on either the typology of 
organisations or their role in socio-economic development (Sinh, 2003; Nghiem and 
Laurenceson, 2006; Vinh, 2006; Taylor et al., 2012). The political significance of 




in global south, such as in Bangladesh, where NGOs have a high policy profile and 
are active in community mobilisation (Devine, 2006), VNGOs, albeit expansive in 
number and scale, have been grappling to work from within and enlarge a narrow 
margin shaped by the CPV. In Vietnam there is very little scholarship on how far 
VNGOs can play a role in social mobilisation to bring better policy outcomes for the 
local poor, as well as towards restructuring state-society relations. 
 
The chapter will fill this gap by providing an in-depth empirical account of the 
processes in which a local NGO orchestrates community mobilisation to improve 
the policy delivery response to the poor, and how its mobilisation is reflexive of an 
embedded form of civil society activism. Specifically, I will examine the detailed 
dynamics of the processes through which the NGO built loyalty among its clients, as 
well as wider local communities; established strategic coalitions with varied actors, 
both locally and beyond; and opened up structural links to claim land back for the 
local poor ethnic minorities. This detailed account will be attentive to the historical 
and local context within which the NGO emerged and has been operating.  
 
The Centre for Community Empowerment and Rural Development (CCERD), the 
second in-depth case study of my research, is indicative of a form of activism led by 
a local NGO. Despite being embedded in the state via a web of legalistic 
requirements and bureaucratic practices, it managed to mobilise local poor and 
other concerned actors to claim 3,700 hectares of forest land from the state forest 
company (SFC) to return to the commune government for later redistribution 
among the local landless. With this case study, I argue that NGO-led activism, by 
taking advantage of its embedded connections to the state, working within and 
through bureaucratic structures, manipulating the available structural links, as well 
as strategising the interplay of formality and informality of activism, carves out 
valuable room for itself to manoeuvre.  
 
While the Trees Movement analysed earlier has portrayed a transient, more 
antagonistic form of activism, where discrete informal civilian groups organised and 
stood up to the state and challenged the status quo, the NGO-led activism in this 
chapter will illustrate a more sustainable, collaborative, and embedded form. The 
two contrasting forms of activism characterised by different organisational 




slants of civil society activism and reflect different episodes of contentious politics 
in Vietnam ranging from dialogue to advocacy through to contention. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part will shed light on the setting of 
the case study NGO and explain, historically, how and why it emerged. The second 
part contains discussion on the local context of mobilisation within which CCERD is 
embedded. The chapter closes by exploring, in depth, the mobilisation processes 
orchestrated by the NGO and illustrating how this form may actually be an effective 
form of social action in the politically restrictive setting of Vietnam. Its collective 
action, consequently, put the local power structure in the position where the latter 
was compelled to make the decision to return land to the landless farmers.   
 
 
2. The setting and emergence of the NGO case study: 
CCERD  
 
In the aftermath of doi moi, the advent of multiple donors and international NGOs, 
coupled with the needed changes in regulations and legislations to respond to the 
newly adapted market-based economy as well as the increasing challenges in socio-
economic development, all in all, contributed to the emergence and proliferation of 
Vietnam NGOs from the mid-1990s onwards. There are increasing signs that the 
space for civil society actions is slowly opening up in Vietnam. However, the 
paradox where the CPV selectively embraces capitalism and persistently maintains 
its commitments to the socialist ideology generates a wide array of tensions, which 
complicates state-society relations. It continues to preserve its grips on the 
associationalism and arbitrarily takes coercive measures. This also places CSOs 
including VNGOs in everyday struggle in which they are required to perform a 
“complex dance between domestic and international ideas of development and civil 
society” (Hannah, 2007, p.124). As demonstrated by one of my respondents, an 
NGO leader:  
“You know … it (i.e. the institutional preconditions for civil society) is like 
twilight…between daylight and darkness… it is the state of obscurity and 
ambiguity. That is the context in which VNGOs are working. In this context 




doesn’t work, we will try another way, and we don’t give up. Things are like 
that.” (Interview, Hanoi, 15 April 2015) 
The root cause of state ambivalence towards the development of civil society in 
general and VNGOs in particular can be traced to its unwavering commitments to 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Advocating this ideology, the CPV continues to 
categorise society into social classes. Through its large-scale propaganda machinery, 
the state disseminates the message that its core mandate is to protect the 
proletariat’s interests by insisting that this class can only obtain revolutionary 
awareness when it is under the sustained leadership of the vanguard communist 
party. Hence, for the proletariat’s own sake, the party has to perpetuate its 
absolute leadership in order to drive the revolution to success and uphold the 
socialist path (Thayer, 1992; Hannah, 2007). Before 1986, the CPV denied any form 
of actor outside the state’s auspices, whilst nowadays it downplays any such 
institutions, for their involvement could potentially derail the proletariat from their 
noble revolutionary course and create an avenue for counter-revolutionary forces 
to emerge and ruin the national revolution.  
 
Salient evidence of state ambivalence to the NGO sector can be observed in its 
continuing delay in putting in place an enabling legal framework for civic 
associations. The Law on Association has yet to be approved despite having been 
discussed for over twenty years. As a consequence, VNGOs have to grapple within a 
matrix of intertwined legalistic requirements and bureaucratic practices for 
registration and operation (see Chapter 1). In essence, registration is utilised as a 
powerful tool by the ruling communists to rein in these organisations. 
 
The institutional preconditions for local NGOs to exist and thrive are still lacking. 
However, a well-known Vietnamese proverb helps understand the dynamics of 
VNGOs ‘Live in a gourd, you grow round. Live in a tube, you grow long’ (Ở bầu thì 
tròn, ở ống thì dài). In practice, each VNGO acquires for itself needed institutional 
experiences to deal with the existing structural obstacles and manages to find its 
own way through the registration process. They acquire their legal status in 
different forms including as research centres, scientific and technological 
organisations, foundations, funds, or sub-associations of larger associations. 
Apparently, the absence of an enabling legal framework does not impede VNGOs 




discourse. So VNGOs take various shapes (gourd or tube) depending on how they 
negotiate their registration and identity. 
 
Emerging as early as in 2003, which makes it one of the earliest NGOs in Quang 
Binh, a poor province along the north-central coast of Vietnam, the rural-based 
Centre for Community Empowerment and Rural Development (CCERD) was 
established as a continuation of a large, long-standing Dutch INGO-funded poverty 
reduction project in the locality. It carried on the work after the INGO project was 
completed. This rural based formation stands in quite stark contrast with the NGO 
trend of that time, which tended to be urban-based and managed by retired 
government officials with close links to the state apparatus (Gray, 1999).  
 
CCERD is reflexive of a VNGO that is based on the INGO model. Its working areas 
encompass agriculture-forestry development, rural infrastructure development, 
micro finance, health care and education, environmental protection and natural 
resource management, as well as cultural and indigenous knowledge preservation. 
It is committed to combatting local poverty and empowering the poorest and most 
marginalised groups, especially ethnic minority women, in Quang Ninh, a rural 
district of Quang Binh province. It has an annual budget of approximately EURO 
100,000 derived from various donors including the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, 
Oxfam, Ford USA). Its first initial fund was EURO 20,000 provided by the 
Netherlands. It has expanded its support base over the years and has about 10 core 
staff. It is now considered a medium sized VNGO.  
 
Born and raised in Quang Binh, the director, Mr. Linh Phan, established CCERD with 
a conviction that positive changes would happen in his hometown. He is a vibrant 
and engaging man in his forties. Mr. Linh and I had become friends and hence, our 
discussions were professional and mannerly, but also quiet and open at the same 
time. He used to work as a senior staff member at the Dutch INGO project and 
wanted to prolong the project in order to bring change to the local communities.  
 
The organisation distances itself from a radical or confrontational ideology and 
advocates the idea of incremental and sustainable change. Adversity, Mr Linh 




nurturing good relationships with state institutions, he explains, in fact is the key to 
securing organisational viability and a needed level of autonomy to access target 
groups, to seek donor funding and to implement activities. In his own words: 
“We never put ourselves in confrontation with the state. This is not what we 
would like to do or to advocate. The state has immense power to constrain 
us. They can block us from all pathways to reach our target populations, 
prevent us from raising funds or organising our activities. State constraints 
could however be worked out, by which I mean that they can be loosened or 
tightened based on the quality of the connection or relationship we 
establish with them. If we want to get things done, scale up our impacts, we 
must work through state institutions. For example, several of our 
sustainable livelihoods models were copied and promoted by the local 
government. This is a good effect, isn’t it?” (Interview, 27th December 2015, 
Quang Binh) 
Mr Linh’s revelation gives much insight into the state-NGOs relationship in Vietnam 
at present.  Working through competing state power structures and channels is the 
key strategy exercised well by VNGOs in order to ‘get things done’. I was told by 
another NGO interviewee that “if they (the authorities) want us to report, we 
report; if they want us to approach three, four, five ministries to procure whole 
permission to organise certain activities, we do so; if they want X, Y, Z, we give them 
X, Y, Z. We learn and try to work around them. After all these, we can be free to do 
what we want”. Mr Linh, as well as other NGOs signalled something important 
about the nature of the state in Vietnam, i.e. it is an aggregation of competing 
actors and institutions. The state may be authoritarian but it is certainly not 
monolithic.  
 
Mr Linh pictures himself as a professional and facilitator who engages with all 
parties through a collaborative professionalised approach. He has an entrenched 
belief that despite encountering a wall of state restrictions, NGOs are destined for 
an enabling position, as opposed to the state, to reach the poorest of the poor. He 
tried to visualise what he meant by relating it to an image of a large ship (i.e. the 
state with governing power) juxtaposed with small boats (i.e. CSOs with community 
power). The former cannot travel through small streams and reach difficult places 




CCERD registered directly with the district-level6 people’s committee (i.e. district 
government) in the form of a fund, but this government body played a minimal role 
in its organisational development and decision-making. It started its operation quite 
early, as opposed to its counterparts elsewhere and its emergence occurred when 
the notion of an organisation outside the state auspice was something that the local 
governments found uneasy to understand and accept, especially local governments 
in rural area. Hence, it is not too difficult to understand why the local authorities 
remained suspicious about its presence. Registering with the local government to 
attain a legal standing, the organisation has had to confine itself to and comply with 
the terms and conditions stated in the registration. Unlike many of its counterparts 
which can wait years to secure registration, CCERD waited only a few months. In 
part it secured registration quickly because it was the continuation of the INGO 
development project that had been implemented in the district for several years. In 
addition, Mr Linh used to work for this project and so he had been able to set up 
some level of mutual understanding with local communities and the local 
authorities.  
 
The common trend for VNGOs’ engagement during 1990s and early 2000s was 
welfare service provision (see Chapter 1), and CCERD followed that pattern. The 
organisational activities were funded by various donors, including ICCO, GIZ, SEF, 
GGF, along with Oxfam. Its main office is located in the township of the district that 
has approximately 90,000 inhabitants. It is a rather simple one-storey workplace 
with three rooms, one of which is reserved for the director and also, the meeting 
room of the organisation, while the other two are for the staff members. It also has 
a working station in a far remote commune, one of its project sites. It has roughly 
ten core staff all holding bachelor degrees in areas such as the Environment, 
Forestry, Social Work, Economics, and Community Development. The director has a 
masters’ degree in Economics, which indicates that the staff are all professional and 
well educated. The NGO allowed me to base myself at its office, thus I could spend 
time in the workspace to observe and engage in activities. I was able to observe its 
operational dynamics as well as interact with its clients. Working with them gave 
me the impression that these people were compassionate, professional, and 
development-oriented.  
                                                          
6 District level government is sub-provincial level government. Vietnam generally has four 




Its main project sites are the two mountainous borderland communes of the 
district, which is home to the ethnic minority group called Bru-Van Kieu and forest 
land conflicts between local communities and the state forestry company prevail. 
After long-standing development engagement efforts with grassroots communities 
and the local government, CCERD decided to integrate land issues into its activities. 
The director explained as follows: 
“Lack of or no access to arable land makes poor people unable to escape 
from poverty, and combatting poverty without addressing its root cause (i.e. 
land entitlement) seems to be barking up the wrong tree. The ethnic 
minority Bru-Van Kieu is in severe shortage of land and they have long been 
trapped in chronic poverty. Hence, it is pertinent to focus our intervention 
on this group. Our prime goal is to help them understand their rights to land 
and then help them acquire land use certificates.” (Interview, 10th February 
2015, Quang Binh) 
 
Map 2. Quang Binh province, Vietnam 






3. Context of mobilisation 
 
3.1. Land conflicts in Vietnam in brief 
 
“We, farmers, used to be considered the vanguard force in the cause of 
national liberation and defence. We were enthusiastic to dedicate ourselves 
and give up our land for the national struggles. But now they are trying to 
impoverish us by confiscating our land. We are falling into destitution. […] 
Hopeless, powerless, and betrayed, if you ask me how I feel. Famers’ 
interests are betrayed in peace time.”  
(Interview with a landless petitioner/victim of injustice on March 29th, 2015 
in Hanoi)     
 
“A piece of land is worth a piece of gold” (Tấc đất tấc vàng), the Vietnamese 
proverb captures the ultimate importance of land in the Vietnamese people’s 
tradition. Since the opening of the economy in 1986, land has embodied a notion of 
wealth and aggressively drives people of all kinds to pursue it. Pressure on land 
expansion for industrialisation and modernisation has skyrocketed, which has 
consequently crowded out agricultural production and exposed a large part of rural 
populations to livelihoods insecurity and impoverishment. While the country is 
known as a good example of poverty reduction (poverty headcount fell from 58 
percent in the early 1990s to roughly 10 percent in 2010), most of the gains from 
economic growth have gone to the urban rich who only make up roughly 10% of the 
whole populace (Wells-Dang, 2013). Meanwhile, 90% of those trapped in poverty 
are living in rural areas and their livelihoods are highly dependent on agricultural 
and forest land. Currently, as aforementioned, 70% of the country’s population 
inhabits rural areas and the Vietnamese are known to have among the lowest land 
endowments per capita in the world, i.e. each agricultural household possesses less 
than 0.5 hectare on average according to Oxfam (2012).  
Paradoxically, private ownership of land is not permitted in Vietnam, and people 
can only acquire land use rights. Article 53 and 54 of the Vietnam Constitution 
stipulate that land is owned by the entire people and that the state, on behalf of the 
entire people, administers the land for the people. In its exercise of the people’s 
ownership rights, the state allocates and leases land to organisations, households 
and individuals to use. The revised Land Law 2013 gave the state authority to 




withdrawn for private interests such as the construction of private estate, industrial 
zones, golf courses, or beach resorts. The existing research (e.g. Hiebert and 
Nguyen, 2012; Hansen, 2013) highlights that the persistent denial of private land 
ownership and the use of ambiguous concepts in the handicapped land-related 
legislations constitute the root cause of land conflicts. This is the crux of the matter 
and inhabits the heart of debates on land conflicts in Vietnam nowadays. This 
ambiguity and vagueness has paved the way for high-profile contentious land 
acquisitions across the country. It is a fertile ground for conspiracies and decisions 
overlooking needs and interests of the affected communities, who are often thrown 
into destitution and become impoverished after forced displacements and land 
dispossession. Labbé (2015) writes that, the socialist land regime fails to protect 
peasants from state-backed land seizures because the CPV modifies the socialist 
land regime to nurture land-grabbing practice through collusion of the state and 
corporates. Once land is withdrawn, farmers become landless, powerless and 
voiceless. Compensation is low and unfair, which means farmers have to flee their 
villages to the urban cities to seek security. However, reports of many types have 
shown that they end up with low paid jobs in urban locations (Phuc et al., 2015).  
 
Land conflicts have been bursting out across the country since the late 2000s (Dang, 
2009; Labbé, 2015). This worsening social tension can be evidenced in the large 
volume of petitions and complaints lodged to corresponding state agencies 
regarding land loss. As the Vietnam Development Report 2010 noticed, the 
complaints lodged over land disputes have surged considerably over the past ten 
years, making up to about 70-90% of all petitions and complaints (VDR, 2010). In 
the period 2008-2011, for example, the Communist government received 1.6 
million written petitions, accusations and other complaints concerning land 
disputes (e.g. complaints over compensation, denunciations of violations of the land 
law, land access conflicts or demands for the return of land) (Kerkvliet, 2014). 
 
Land loss has led powerless peasants to take to the streets in hundreds of small-
scale protests across cities and towns in Vietnam. Notable in land struggles by 
powerless peasants, is the absence of the Farmers’ Association (Hội Nông Dân), the 
party-owned mass organisation that claims to represent farmers’ rights and 
interests. Despite its declared mandate, it rarely helps its ‘represented’ group, and 




CCERD-led mobilisation, as we will later see, the NGO, however, did not bypass 
mass organisations, rather it co-opted them into its mobilising structure and took 
advantage of the MOs’ structural links with local government structures to make 
them work for its mobilisation. 
 
In brief, land protests, as Ben Kerkvliet states, have been widening the arena for 
public discourse and criticism in Vietnam. The fights of peasants in protecting their 
land and against state-backed corporate interests since the early 1990s “have 
helped make way for workers, market vendors, urban residents, and others to 
publicly air their grievances as well” and while “officials’ tolerance is not boundless, 
but it is far greater now than before” (Kerkvliet, 2014, p.38)          
 
 
3.2. Forest land conflicts and state forest companies 
 
The main clients of the case study NGO were ethnic minorities living in two 
mountainous communes of Quang Binh province, among the hotspots for 
forestland conflicts. This section introduces briefly why and how forestland conflict 
has broken out in recent years between local poor and state forest companies 
(SFCs).   
 
Whilst conflict over agricultural land continues unabated by virtue of the ongoing 
mushrooming of industrial and urbanised expansion projects, conflict over 
forestland displays similar resonance. If the affected subjects of the former are 
mainly living in peri-urban cities, those of the latter are from ethnic minority groups 
dwelling in mountainous areas, whose traditional way of life and customs are 
closely bonded with forest and forestlands and whose livelihoods are also heavily 
reliant on the forests.  
 
The country is home to fifty-three ethnic minorities that comprise 14 percent of the 
national population, but account for as many as 70 percent of the extremely poor 
population (measured by the standardised national poverty line) (World Bank, 
2010). Since doi moi, the government has launched a matrix of development 




the socio-economic conditions in upland regions. Such far-reaching reforms have 
been, however, controversial for their fragmentation, mismanagement, lack of 
sustainability as well as for obscuring diversity and difference of ethnic identities 
(Taylor, 2008). Deep-rooted poverty within ethnic minorities has failed to be 
tackled, because its root cause, i.e. lack of land for cultivation, has not been 
effectively dealt with (SPERI, 2012; To et al., 2014). At the same time, forestland 
mismanagement by SFCs is rampant and the continued allocation of land to these 
institutions remains an upsetting practice against the impoverishment facing local 
ethnic minorities. According to SPERI (2012, 2014), almost 65 percent of all upland 
ethnic minority households nationwide lack access to forestland.  
 
To address forestland conflicts, the national government has issued forest land 
reform policies since the 1990s, under which SFCs are required to transform from 
state-run businesses into hybrid state-private entities. Through this process, the 
state’s control is supposed to diminish in favour of space for communities, 
households and individuals to participate in the use and management of forestland. 
Also, under these policies, the state institutions that are performing ineffectively 
are required to return disputed land to local communities. A number of government 
decrees were put in place so as to accelerate this process. Yet, the privatization 
process in reality is lagging far behind and their ties to the state have remained 
relatively unchanged. In terms of management, the SFCs are nominally controlled 
by the provincial people’s committees or the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD). Due to their connections with the state, the SFCs in many 
instances have resisted enforcing the state policies that request them to return 
some part of their land to local communities. Critically, the recurring practices of 
the SFCs undermine the state legitimacy in the eyes of local communities, since 
villagers conceive them as representative agents of the state in their locality. As a 
result, the state’s efforts to address poverty and inequality have been impaired by 
the SFCs (To et al., 2014).  
 
As a matter of fact, the central policies regarding forest land reform are bypassed or 
ineffectively enforced at local levels. The evidence shows that much of the disputed 
forest land area that should have been returned to the local poor has remained 
under the management of the state institutions (To et al., 2014). Under the socialist 
land regime, forestland and natural forests are owned by the state. Vietnam is 
covered with roughly 13.8 million hectares of forestland, yet most of them are 




land for cultivation, local livelihoods are negatively affected and thus the local poor 
have to encroach onto state-managed forest land areas to cultivate or seek timber 
for daily subsistence.  
 
Existing studies on forest land conflicts in Vietnam also demonstrate that the 
dispute resolution mechanism between SFCs and villagers often reaches deadlock 
on account of a weak legal framework and lack of manpower (To et al., 2013). The 
available legal framework, for example, impedes the commune government from 
resolving disputes effectively. Whilst this government level is closest to and has 
everyday interactions with local communities, its function, according to the Land 
Law, is only limited to mediation. This means that once mediation falls into an 
impasse, the role of this local power structure is accordingly over, since they are not 
authorised to make a decision that goes beyond the mediation role. Moreover, 
most SFCs are managed by provincial governments or the Vietnam Forest 
Corporation (VINAFOR) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
which has higher authority than commune and district governments. CCERD, as we 
will later see, identified the huge potentials of commune leaders given their close 
relationship with local communities.  
 
In the context of the forestland conflicts above depicted, I will now explore the local 
forestland conflict in my research site, where CCERD orchestrated mobilisation to 




3.3. Forest land conflict at the research site 
 
“Forest land is not only our life, for it is also our tears, our sweat and our 
happiness. Right behind me is the forest of massive hectares, but it does not 
belong to us. It has been controlled by the state-owned forest company. 
Living next to the forest for decades, my family can’t even have an inch of 
land for cultivation. Much of the area of these forests has been subject to 
dispute for years, those having too much land fail to manage it, whilst those 
with too little or almost none are chronically poor and can’t get access to it.” 
(Interview, 24 December 2014, Quang Binh) 
The revelation above by a Van Kieu ethnic minority poor female, who had been 




forestland conflict in my research site. Truong Son, among the poorest communes 
of Quang Binh province and once the most fiercely devastated area during the 
American war, is CCERD’s main project site. This mountainous commune covers a 
quite large area of 77,534 hectares taking up 65% of the total area of Quang Ninh 
district, and being home to 4,400 people. 60% of the population belongs to the 
ethnic minority group called the Bru-Van Kieu7. The commune, compared with 
other localities, has the largest coverage of forest land that occupies 95% of the 
total commune area. Most of it is managed by state entities. Specifically, these state 
institutions manage the total area of 70,000 hectares (nearly 90%) whilst the 
commune government controls 6,121 hectares (8.3%) and local people as little as 
1,413 hectares (1.9%). 
 
Table 4. Forest management structure by forest user group in Truong Son 
commune 











                                                          
7 The Bru-Van Kieu ethnic minority were originally very reserved, and tended to live in isolation from 
other ethnic groups. I was told that if one has a quarrel with his neighbour, he often chooses to leave 
his home village for a while to avoid conflict. 
Forest user group Area (ha) % 
State entities 70,000 89.8 
Commune people’s committee (i.e. 
commune government) 
6,121 8.3 
Villagers 1,413 1.9 




Figure 17. Bru-Van Kieu ethnic minority females and their children 
 
 (Source: Researcher) 
 
According to the commune government report of 2013, the number of poor8 
households in the commune stands at 52%, whilst that of the Van Kieu group stands 
at over 80%. Local poverty is more exacerbated by virtue of the disadvantaged 
geographical location and underdeveloped traffic system and infrastructures, the 
lack of access to electricity and clean water. However, the main issue is related to 
the severe lack of available productive land.  
 
Formerly, Van Kieu’s livelihoods relied on traditional slash-and-burn agricultural 
practices, forest production and petty agricultural cultivation. Originally, the first 
households that settled down in the villages cleared the waste land, grew cassava 
and swiddened rice near river or streams. The traditional cultivation method was 
considered harmful to the environment, so the state mobilised ethnic minorities to 
terminate this practice and shift to sedentary methods. The Van Kieu people 
complied. Nonetheless, the government was unable to redistribute adequate 
productive and forest land to them, for most of the quality land had already been 
allocated to forest management boards and SFCs (To et al., 2013).  
 
                                                          
8 A new poverty line was announced for the period 2011-2015 by the Vietnamese 
government, whereby it is VND750,000/person/month in urban areas and 





The Long Dai Forest Enterprise, one of the prime players in the forest land conflict 
in Truong Son commune, was established in 1981 and changed into Long Dai Forest 
Company in 2010 to correspond to the Decree 200/2004 ND-CP, which provided for 
the reorganisation, innovation and development of state forest enterprises. Its main 
functions focus on forest management, protection, and forest products processing 
and services. The company is under the official control of the Quang Binh provincial 
people’s committee. When established, it was given an extensive forest land area to 
manage, including that which villagers had put great efforts into clearing and also, 
where they used to swidden rice and grow cassava. Once the company obtained its 
land use certificate, it prevented the villagers from accessing their former land, 
claiming that it had exclusive rights to the timber and land and declared villagers’ 
logging and cultivation illegal. Because of a lack of labour, the SFC decided to hire 
local villagers to plant forests for it and promised that once the trees were mature 
to harvest, the villagers would receive a proper share. However, when the timber 
was mature enough to be harvested, the labourers did not receive their share as the 
company did not want to pay them. Under the forestland reform policy, the 
company had to establish contractual arrangements with households for forest 
plantation (which means that households would be able to increase income if they 
were integrated into these contracts). However, instead of signing contracts with 
local villagers to help them reduce poverty, the company in many cases decided to 
make arrangements with people from outside the village. This exacerbated local 
tensions. Without having land, the local villagers had to ‘break the fence’ (see 
Chapter 1 for fence breaking practice) for their daily subsistence through a number 
of contentious actions, such as encroaching upon the company’s land to cultivate, 
engaging in clandestine logging on company land, and deforestation (according to 
CCERD’s report).  
 
The local villagers repeatedly sent petitions to the commune and upper-level 
governments and met with the local people’s elected representatives. Nevertheless, 
there was no effective response from the government officials. In practice, the 
villagers’ acts of defiance were not only limited to encroaching or logging, for they 
also orchestrated other overt offensive acts, for example by collectively preventing 
the company from continuing with plantation after it harvested the timber or by 






The SFC’s vast forest land surrounding the villages and homes of ethnic groups 
contrasted. In the subsequent period, when landless farmers were mobilised to 
participate in organised action with various stakeholders, they began to raise their 
collective concerns about the SFC and the possession of land. 
 
In brief, there were two reasons underlying land conflicts in Truong Son commune. 
First, the unfair land allocation worsened social tensions locally. Faced with no 
livelihood option, local households had no choice but to encroach onto the 
company’s land in order to grow crops. Moreover, the SFC excluded the village 
inhabitants from its labour contracts and offered employment instead to outsiders. 
The absence of effective conflict resolution mechanisms constitutes the second 
reason. As aforementioned, according to the existing land law, while the commune 
government has potential to foster social cohesion at the grassroots level by 
addressing land conflict, its real power is actually significantly less and restricted to 
mediation. Hence, once the mediation becomes deadlocked, this government level 




4. NGO-led activism: embedded activism 
 
 
This section details the processes through which CCERD orchestrated its embedded 
activism to ensure better redistribution of resources for the local poor. Embedded 
activism, as indicated in Chapter 2, refers to a form of activism defined by Ho (2007) 
that is led by a formally organised structure or engages with authorities. That is, it 
uses institutionalised structures along with formal channels such as state laws, 
policies, officially promoted values, or state-propagandised agenda as well as 
mainstream media to frame mobilising structures around controversial issues in a 
non-adversarial manner. The NGO-led activism in this research can be considered 
an embedded form of activism because it is led by CCERD, a formally organised 
structure; and is controlled by the state via a web of legalistic requirements and 
bureaucratic practices. Although its mobilisation took place at the implementation 
stage of the policy process, it represents an important form of activism in a political 
context still dominated by a top-down policy making process. Being embedded in 
this way, the NGO is able to carve out more room for manoeuvre to support the 





The success of CCERD-led activism in this research suggests that the NGO’s ability to 
influence the redistribution of forest land was based on three intertwined factors. 
First, it built loyalty among its clients owing to its development roots, which helped 
it increase participation and legitimise its position locally. Second, it worked with 
and through the bureaucratic structures of the state, as well as taking advantage of 
the available structural links pertinent to the institutions that it allied with. 
According to Houtzager (2003), structural links that bind state and society together 
are what collective actors representing subordinated social groups tend to 
crystallise around to mobilise activities and seek political opportunities. CCERD, in 
this research, strategically connected itself to wider coalitions to manipulate these 
structural links to make them work for its collective goal. Third, it articulated 
strategically the interplay of both formal and informal activism.  
 
 
4.1. CCERD: from development roots to community 
mobilisation 
 




Emerging in 2003, CCERD began its life by implementing  a number of humanitarian 
activities and livelihood development initiatives such as innovative livestock models, 
micro credit for poor women, building technical and political capacities of both local 
communities and local governments, promoting indigenous culture of Bru-Van Kieu 
people, and supporting village infrastructural development, and so forth. VNGOs, 
Hannah (2007, p.243) indicates, are “rational, law-abiding, constructive, and 
working for the betterment of their nation”, and CCERD has similar traits. The NGO 
has strong development roots, and a strong focus in the communes on land 
struggles. CCERD initiated a wide array of pragmatic livelihood models to help local 
villagers raise income including the introduction of innovative models to raise 
cattle, pigs, chicken, growing cassava, and planting forest. These successful models 
were eventually adopted into the official agricultural development policies by the 




UBND. All these efforts contributed to enhance CCERD’s legitimacy at the local 
level.  
The local development engagement efforts of the NGO are in fact the process 
through which it has been building legitimacy as a locally-based social organisation 
working side by side with local communities and local government.   
 
Being a local NGO means that CCERD has to live up to expected standards and 
expectations. In other words, the NGO has to gain and enhance its legitimacy in the 
eyes of local communities and local authorities through its performance. According 
to Suchman’s (1995) framework, implementing development efforts locally is 
actually the process through which CCERD builds pragmatic and cognitive 
legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy, according to the author, derives from getting 
things done effectively for clients or the audience (i.e. addressing social needs). This 
kind of legitimacy is relatively straightforward in that it is a direct exchange 
between the NGO and its specific constituents involving the delivery of social 
services on the one hand and gaining client or customer loyalty on the other. 
Cognitive legitimacy relates to conformity to established cognitive structures in 
society, what is often described as having a ‘taken-for-granted’ status (Suchman, 
1995). The latter is strongly resonant with the role of NGOs in development 
promoted by the academic and practitioner worlds for over twenty years, where 
they are believed to be pro-poor, efficient, participatory and committed to 
empower the local poor.  
 
A classic development intervention by NGOs in Vietnam is to provide micro finance 
for the local poor. Compared with other developing countries, for example 
Bangladesh, micro finance NGOs in Vietnam are much smaller in terms of scale and 
size. Micro credit for the Van Kieu female poor has been implemented since the 
early days of the NGO operation. Currently, CCERD has about 500 regular customers 
structured into 30 credit and saving groups in its project sites. Each loan is worth 
VND 1,500,000 (equivalent to £55). It is worth noting that in Vietnam, even if a NGO 
like CCERD works with the female poor, it is not allowed to represent them by law 
and it cannot claim to be membership-based. Instead the NGO has regular clients or 
beneficiaries. The organisation in Vietnam that ‘officially represents’ women is the 
mass organisation Women’s Union.  
 
Elsewhere Karim (2001) has argued that the provision of credit has been used to 




of the NGO over its clients. This leads to a conclusion that the debt relation oils 
strong patron-client relationships. This however is not the case for CCERD. CCERD is 
not a powerful patron to its clients because it has to work with and through the 
Women’s Union to deliver credit to the female local poor. If a client is unable to 
repay a loan, they are not excluded from other goods and services provided by the 
organisation. The level of dependency between clients and the NGO is therefore not 
intense. However, this is not to say that loyalty between the clients and the NGO is 
not strong. The implication of this reflection is that being a client of CCERD or not 
makes little difference in terms of fighting for land. CCERD itself is not a member of 
the land redistribution committee, and so has no power in deciding ‘who gets 
what’. Therefore the argument that “credit subjects the poor to the mandates of 
the NGO” (Karim, 2001, p.93) does not resonate with the reality in my research site. 
Community mobilisation led by CCERD aimed at helping the local poor (both clients 
and non-clients) to claim land, is considered a social mandate. If the NGO performs 
its mandate effectively, it can expect to receive organisational legitimacy and 
prestige. 
 
There are two reasons why the NGO’s micro finance work was successful. First, it 
works through the existing formal structure of the state, i.e. the Women’s Union 
(WU), the party-owned mass organisation (MO), which is structured at all levels of 
society and currently has more than 15 million members. This institution has credit 
officers based in villages and is strongly linked with grassroots communities. CCERD 
sought to appropriate the large-membership base of this structure to publicise and 
promote its activities. The WU, at the grassroots level, lacks resource and wants to 
strengthen its capacities. Embarking on a partnership with CCERD would therefore 
help it partly address these limitations. Second, when the local poor participate in 
the NGO projects, they are not perceived as passive beneficiaries, but rather CCERD 
approaches them as the subjects of their own development. This is in line with the 
organisation’s commitment to participation and self-development – a commitment 
that is favoured by NGOs globally (White, 1999). When women enroll in a micro 
finance project for instance, they will not only have access to a proper loan but they 
will also be empowered through skills training on financial management and 
planning. In particular being given opportunities for networking and sharing, they 
will have additional access to a number of innovative income raising opportunities. 





“Credit members are poor, even extremely poor. […] We don’t have physical 
collateral to be able to borrow from commercial banks. Nor do we know 
how to get access to concessional loans from the Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies, because it is bureaucratic. It is too difficult for the poor to approach 
these money lenders. Yet, we can get easier access to small-scale loans 
provided by CCERD, and they give us a platform to get connected to one 
other and provide mutual support. In particular, now I know more people, I 
can talk and share with other group members about my day-to-day 
problems, as well as sorrows. I don’t feel alone.” (Interview, Truong Son 
commune, 15 December 2014). 
 
‘I don’t feel alone’, the revelation of this poor woman is reminiscent of Devine 
(1999), when he contrasts ‘having no one’ and ‘having nothing’ as two expressions 
of vulnerability and hopelessness, arguing that the former is a far more profound 
and precarious state. Understanding this sense of insecurity and vulnerability 
among the local poor, CCERD adopted development strategies to organise them 
into self-help and self-reliant groups such as farming interest groups and core 
farmer groups within villages, and farmer networks at a wider level, so that they 
could have a common platform from which to act in favour of their own interests. 
When living in poverty and in an isolated region, the need of networking or sharing 
is profound. It should again be noted that Truong Son, the site of land conflict, is a 
mountainous isolated commune and by setting up these groups or bringing people 
together in specific platforms, CCERD successfully addressed one of the underlying 
causes of poverty: remoteness and lack of solidarity.  
 
These groups play an important role in realising the organisation’s community 
development activities. The key members of these groups are trained and 
empowered with technical skills in areas such as farming, forest plantation and 
protection, and legal knowledge. Then, they become nuclear components helping 
the organisation by imparting training for the other members in their groups and for 
the wider communities. During land mobilisation, CCERD used the strength of these 
groups (i.e. informal structures) as active mobilising forces to improve the legal 
awareness of their communities, as well as to recruit wider participation. They 
became an integral part of the mobilising process, and CCERD deployed this social 
capital effectively by bringing the groups to the frontline of mobilisation and asking 
them to take on lead roles such as acting spokespersons of community groups in 





Rural NGO fieldworkers in Vietnam, like elsewhere, are associated with much less 
desirable positions compared to the NGO bureaucrats working in Hanoi. In contrast 
to the government bureaucrats, the NGO workers come in daily contact with the 
villagers, visiting them in their homes in order to build local bonds, as well as to 
understand their needs and to gain local knowledge. Going to the poor in this 
manner, Hashemi (1997) indicates, reduces the threatening distance between the 
urban educated and the rural poor, as it helps mitigate rural stratification. In 
particular, when the NGO’s target groups in this research mostly involved the poor 
ethnic minority people, understanding and upholding their customs and indigenous 
knowledge was a principle avidly pursued. An experienced staff member stated: 
“Van Kieu people are known as reserved and quiet. During the early days, 
when visiting their settlements, it was not easy to approach the females of 
the household, because they were very shy, timid and tended to keep 
themselves distant from visitors […] It is necessary to acknowledge this 
culture while working with them. Patience and persistence is needed. […] 
Besides, they are very honest, veracious, and sensitive …Once you make 
them feel distrusting, there is no way for you to make them count on you 
again… So, we must be very careful […]”.  (Interview, 22 December 2014, 
Quang Binh province) 
So far, I have discussed how CCERD started its life as a development institution, 
building its identity locally as a social organisation, being a ‘benevolent’ partner 
with local communities and grassroots level government, building and enhancing its 
pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy. I will discuss later its relationship with the 
bureaucratic structures of the state and why it had to engage with these available 
power structures in its mobilisation process. Key to this is the proposition that as a 
registered organisation in Vietnam, CCERD needs to carry out campaigns and 




4.1.2. To community mobilisation 
 
Critical to CCERD’s organisational development was the timely calculation of when 
and how it should integrate non-conventional areas in its activities. In 2009, after six 




directly involved in land issues. In particular, it decided to support ethnic minorities 
(its primary clients) to access their land entitlements. Through a non-adversarial 
approach, CCERD identified potential and strategic partners, both locally and 
beyond, including them in its mobilising structure and organising activism 
accordingly.  
 
The shift by the NGO to more political action was based on three interrelated 
factors. Internally, after long-standing engagement in community development, 
CCERD came to realise that the task of addressing poverty could not ignore the 
most important cause: the dearth of accessible arable land. Poverty, especially for 
the upland communities including the Bru-Van Kieu group, is not a technical 
problem but a systematic and structural one that is deeply rooted in unjust land 
distribution and land right deprivation. Given this, CCERD, aware of its social 
mandate (see above) had to engage in the land question both to support its poor 
clients but also to reduce potential social unrest and tension. Importantly, during 
that period its development roots enhanced its positive relationship with local 
government and other key local actors (e.g. village heads, MOs), as well as 
managing to build loyalty among its clients. Land rights advocacy, in general, the 
director revealed, had been initiated by donors in 2003, but CCERD did not think 
then it could engage with such a sensitive topic. This was because the organisation 
was still at the embryonic stage of its development, when loyalty and community 
linkages had yet to be firmly established. Moreover, during this period the term 
‘civil society’ or the whole concept of a civil society organisation working outside 
the state’s auspices was still a highly sensitive concept, let alone the fact that this 
NGO was based in a rural area and working at the sub-national level, where levels of 
antagonism directed to NGOs from local government, tend to be higher.  
 
Externally, CCERD, as well as many of its counterparts had to adjust themselves to 
respond to a new donor emphasis in which funding for direct intervention projects 
became less available, and more emphasis was put on policy mobilisation and 
impact, good governance, and rights-based approaches. This donor shift partly rests 
in the fact that Vietnam had been upgraded to the middle-income country in 2010. 
The changing donor focus opened up a political space that local NGOs could occupy 
based on their proximity to the poor. Yet, this space can be either an opportunity or 
a challenge for NGOs under the existing political constraints of Vietnam, where the 
necessary institutional preconditions for associationalism are still missing and top-




responding to this shift in donor focus when it began to engage with land issues. 
Civil society networks, some established by INGOs such as Oxfam had begun to 
focus on land issues. CCERD was a member of such a network.  
 
The last factor lies in the opening of a political opportunity structure, which 
triggered the NGO action. The stark discrepancy in land ownership between the SFC 
and local Van Kieu is indicative of the contradiction that had endured over time in 
the commune. Villagers repeatedly sent numerous petitions and complaints to the 
local government to alert them to how land shortage was negatively impacting 
upon their livelihoods. The latter’s response however was inconsequential. Local 
people no longer felt the local government could represent their interests.  
 
Villagers’ pressures intensified over time and reached a peak when they refused to 
vote in the election of the commune people’s council in 2010. This surprised local 
officials who always believed the community was too timid and reserved to 
publically resist in that way. This was also a threat to local officials’ reputation. 
Vietnamese people have the right to vote for people’s elected deputies at all levels, 
but this is considered a ‘sham’ democratic practice, because public votes count for 
nothing (Lewis, 2016). People often vote with no idea about who the party-
nominated candidates they are going to vote for are. People are not allowed to 
nominate candidates, and instead they go to vote for very unfamiliar names with 
unfamiliar faces that they have never seen or heard about, because these 
candidates are not local residents but outsiders nominated by the CPV. Who will be 
elected, who will be not, all in all, is calculated in a political game by the factions 
within the party itself.  
 
Voting is not mandatory by law in Vietnam, but local leadership has to prove to 
their superiors that they are committed to the CPV and effective in the job. Post-
election, it is not uncommon to hear phrases such as  ‘in the light of the glorious 
leadership of the communist party, under the excellent propagation and 
mobilisation of local authorities, almost 99% of the population at our locality are 
excited to go voting to exercise their democratic rights’. If a community decides not 
to vote, the reputation of the local leaders is at stake: 80 or even 90% turnout 
signals poor performance and a lack of commitment to the party.  
 
The election boycott by villagers was also a manifestation of their resistance to the 




CCERD. Being better informed and more prepared to act, these clients circulated 
information within their communities and facilitated the process that led to the 
collective boycott. While the NGO was not involved in this process, the impact of its 
initiatives from earlier days (i.e. establishing these small-scale membership groups) 
was important. The momentum behind the resistance was strong and went beyond 
what the commune government had anticipated. They could not let this get to 
higher government levels. Consequently, the authorities sent a senior official who 
had the same ethnic background as the villagers to persuade them to resume their 
participation in the election. In doing this, the local authority had to make 
concessions and promised to make stronger effort to deal with the dearth of land 
facing the villagers. The village leaders were then invited to a meeting led by the 
commune government, at which they reiterated all the urgent needs, concerns, and 
discontent that had been repeatedly ignored. Both the parties co-produced a 
report, which was lodged with the provincial level government and the SFC. 
However as indicated above, the structure of accountability here was weak: the 
authority of the commune government is limited to dispute resolution mechanism 
only and it has no authority to manage the SFC.  
 
The boycott opened up a political opportunity for the NGO to enter the fray 
officially. This is akin to the transformative events observed in the Trees Movement 
which triggered a step-up in terms of activism.  Mr Linh stated as follows: 
 
“This was the right time for us to enter the fray to support the commune 
government and local communities. We participated so as to intensify 
pressures on higher levels of governments and the SFC. Yet, we were not 
agitators, our activism was not violent, in fact villagers did not wage any 
violent acts, all they did was carry out a peaceful boycott.”  
 
In terms of the land mobilisation for the local poor, there are four main outcomes 
that are directly associated with CCERD’s involvement. First, CCERD helped the local 
government and villagers to identify the exact parcels of disputed land based on 
empirical and historical evidence. This was achieved by investigating existing 
records and carrying out empirical research. It found out that there was actually 
more land owned by the SFC than had been originally indicated. It is important to 
notice that measuring forest land is a much more complicated and time-consuming 
process than can be imagined. It requires manpower and financial resources. CCERD 




officials together to perform this collective exercise. The parcels of disputed land 
were recorded officially by local government. This empirical evidence also became 
very important information that CCERD used to draw attention from national media 
and central government structures. These land parcels were eventually returned to 
the commune government for redistribution among local people. Second, CCERD 
was instrumental in identifying forest land that had been used ineffectively, and 
identifying irregular or unfair labour practices. Third, once land was returned to the 
local government, CCERD played an important role in ensuring that its subsequent 
redistribution was implemented in a fair, transparent and participatory way.  
Fourth, it supported villagers to procure official land use rights certificates. In total, 
3,700 hectares of forest land from the SFC were returned to the commune 
government for redistribution among landless villagers. By 2014, 150 local 
households within the commune had received legal certificates.  
 
What is notable regarding these outcomes is that CCERD was not the actor that 
controlled or mediated access to land, nor was it a member of land redistribution 
committee or anything similar. The mobilisation success did not result in growing 
membership for the NGO, nor was there any remarkable shift in the balance of 
power between the local elites and the NGO. Being a client of the NGO was not 
used at all to decide the allocation of land. Rather, this is a case study of 
mobilisation led by a rural-based, medium-sized NGO that successfully built loyalty 
among its clients, placing its clients as well as the grassroots government at the 
centre of its mobilising strategy. It then couched activism within and through 
bureaucratic structures of the state, connecting itself to wider coalitions and taking 
advantage of the available structural links to its allies. The aim of the process was to 
put collective pressures on the higher level government and its affiliates so as to 
make them respond positively.  
 




4.2. CCERD – Local mobilisation 
 
Collective mobilisation remains a risk-laden activity in Vietnam, especially on the 




in land issues. Although it worked in a real hot spot for land disputes, CCERD knew it 
could not stay at the frontline of land claim struggles. Its legal status is guaranteed 
through its formal registration and this imposes legal bounds. As such CCERD has     
constrained autonomy to challenge local political power overtly. Autonomy is 
understood in this thesis as the ability of civil society actors to act and to determine 
their course in accord with their interests or values and desires when negotiating 
with the state. Embedded in the state and adhering to its regulatory requirements 
opens up guarded space for CCERD to act ‘autonomously’. However it has no 
authority to legitimately ‘represent’ local landless farmers to the upper power 
structures. Therefore its aim is to mobilise local actors to act for themselves and to 
integrate them in wider strategic coalitions, through which they could stand up to 
exercise their land claims effectively.  
 
After the boycott, CCERD quickly supported a number of actions.  The first was to 
identify key mobilising actors locally including local communities, local government, 
and mass organisations (MOs) (i.e. Vietnam Fatherland Front, the umbrella 
organisation of all MOs). In the first key meeting that it organised with these actors, 
it signalled that its involvement was not to convince them to stand up to the 
provincial elites, nor to agitate for local people taking to the streets or engage in 
any act of violence. Instead, it explained that it aimed to help create a collective 
leverage and exert influence on the upper political structure so as to secure a 
positive policy response to their demands. The core message from CCERD was that 
the local poor landless would be at the centre of the mobilising strategy and given 
opportunities to exercise their voice and act in favour of their own interests. Yet, in 
order to bring this process to success, local actors would have to act as a collective 
entity and the NGO would play a facilitating role.  
 
 
4.2.1. Generating legitimacy for mobilisation 
 
Reaching consensus on mobilising collectively, the next challenge was to decide 
what to do as a collective entity. CCERD brought to the table all the legal documents 
of the central government regarding forest land reform and enlightened local actors 





Although CCERD enjoyed good relations locally, it still had to ensure that the 
mobilising strategy was seen to be legitimate.  In the first meeting, CCERD stressed 
the legality and rightfulness of the land claim safeguarded by the existing national 
land reform policy that had yet to be enforced effectively at the local level. In so 
doing, it highlighted the legitimacy of the proposed action, and this was meant to 
help participants feel more comfortable to act. By showing that the actions 
conformed with existing laws and regulations, CCERD helped build a consensus 
among the local actors on the legitimacy of the collective action. In other words, 
their actions were lawful, enshrined in law and policy, and were intended to make 
policy delivery better.   
 
CCERD, as a formal structure defined in this thesis, mainly exercised its activism 
through formal structures and channels and in quite overt ways. Its actions were 
embedded in the official legal framework on forest land reform, which was the 
Resolution 28-NQ/TW by the Political Bureau dated 16/06/2003 and the Decree 
No.200/NĐ-CP by the Government dated 03/12/2004. Decree 200 specifically 
stipulates that the disputed land between local people and SFCs would be 
measured and returned to local government and local communities for 
management and production. However, these formal policies are often not 
implemented at local levels. Rules or directives are broken, re-interpreted, or 
ignored. This is the crux of ‘fence breaking practice’, seen throughout Vietnam and 
explained in Chapter 1. By implementing what was set out in Decree 200, CCERD 
could not only say it was acting legally and legitimately, but it was also delivering on 
key government commitments. The Decree was therefore an important bargaining 
tool in discussions at local levels.  
 
In my research area, the central policies on land redistribution were blocked at the 
provincial level by a combination of provincial government and its affiliate, the SFC. 
CCERD’s approach helped it challenge this collusion but also reinforce the status 
quo; it challenged vested interests by appealing to other vested interests. It 
appropriated available formal channels to engage with local actors in an attempt to 
help them think differently and take more pro-active action in the land claiming 
process. Through these channels, CCERD wanted to break the ground of confusion 
and passivity, which had remained for long, whereby no one knew exactly what to 





It focused its efforts on building legal and political capacities, as well as enhancing 
awareness of local communities and local government regarding the legal 
framework. Strengthening their understanding of why these policies failed to be 
enforced at local level and why the SFC was able to circumvent them, was an 
important component in CCERD’s mobilising strategy. Once people were 
appropriately informed, they acted differently and they made informed decisions 
accordingly. I will bring more in-depth insight into the NGO’s strategies of 
legitimation in the chapter that follows.  
 
 
4.2.2. Co-opting local political power structures 
 
To help local communities claim land, cultivating a strong coalition with relevant 
local actors was a priority for the NGO. To make mobilisation a success, CCERD had 
to work within and through the existing bureaucratic structures of the state. Locally 
however officials can be risk averse and are therefore not incentivised to undertake 
innovative ideas. The final objective of CCERD’s mobilisation was to make the 
provincial political power deliver policy outputs effectively. It therefore had to 
engage with the lower political power structures, i.e. district and commune 
governments, along with local poor to make inroads into the provincial 
government. The role of these government structures is distinguishable in two 
senses. First, they are institutions responsible for directly delivering various public 
services to local people. Second, they frequently have to engage with the upper 
levels in time-consuming day-to-day bureaucratic meetings and other forms of 
interactions, which are nevertheless important channels to convey local land issues. 
The involvement of the NGO from a local official’s standpoint, might cause more 
harm than good especially in sensitive cases such as land conflict that call into 
question of sensitive relationships and questions of state legitimacy.   
 
To make local government structures feel more secure, CCERD allied itself with the 
district level mass organisation, namely, the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF). 
Generally speaking, the relationship between NGOs and MOs in Vietnam is quite 
antagonistic. The former often accuses the latter of enjoying multiple benefits but 
being incapable, self-interested and neglectful of the real needs of the poor. The 
latter, a favoured child of the CPV, tends to overlook VNGOs in many respects. MOs 




are passive and ineffective (VEPR, 2015 and confirmed by my interview data). The 
antagonism towards the MOs by some VNGOs, as well as other civic groups 
(dissidents and independent activists) is entrenched because MOs are portrayed as 
defenders of the status quo, rather than agents of change or allies of the poor. 
So why did CCERD have to reach out to the VFF and work through it? The VFF is the 
umbrella organisation of all MOs, such as Women’s Union, Farmers’ Association, 
Workers’ Union, etc., and it is structured and organised throughout four levels of 
government (central, provincial, district and commune). Being a non-membership 
organisation, CCERD co-opted this formal structure in order to take advantage of 
the latter’s large-scale membership and position or status. In doing so, CCERD could 
manipulate the available structural links that the VFF already has with local 
government structures. Mr Linh explained further: 
“The VFF’s involvement will help break down the suspicion towards our 
motive, i.e. we are mobilising for the local poor, and help us exercise our 
mobilisation more explicitly. By partnering VFF, the local government would 
understand more about the legitimate objective of our mobilisation. More 
importantly, through the VFF, grassroots issues like land disputes can be 
transmitted to upper government structures in an official manner.” 
(Interview, 12 February 2015, Quang Binh) 
 
As Mr Linh said, the VFF’s engagement would eliminate the suspicion towards the 
organisation’s activities on sensitive issues such as land use rights or grassroots 
democracy. In practice, the VFF at the local level faces multiple difficulties regarding 
resources and capacities. They themselves are in need of capacity building and 
financial assistance. CCERD co-opted the VFF through an agreement contract that 
focused on policy propagation for local communities. The content of the policy 
information to be disseminated was guided by CCERD, most of which centred on 
land rights for ethnic minorities. A range of activities were conducted aimed at 
enhancing local people’s awareness on their land rights and what benefits they 
could enjoy according to the existing policies.  
 
Working with and through the VFF opened up a guarded space for CCERD to make 
inroads into the government structures in an effective way. CCERD took advantage 
of the structural links of the VFF with the local political power to consolidate the 
local government’s involvement in the mobilisation process. So how did CCERD 





In the aftermath of the villagers’ boycott, the commune officials felt embarrassed 
because they were pressured by both the villagers and the upper government at the 
same time. One commune leader informed me:   
 
“In fact we really wanted to back the local people, but the role of commune 
government is very limited. The only thing we are authorized to do is to 
mediate. Despite the fact that the disputed land lies within the commune 
boundary, there is not much we can do except for mediation. The SFC is 
under the provincial government, so even for the district government, there 
is not much they can do if the provincial government doesn’t want to 
support us”.  
 
The reason why CCERD wanted to co-opt this government level is because it plays a 
key role in local everyday politics of villagers. There exists a strong tie between 
commune officials and villagers for everyday activities. The commune leadership is 
the knot, which implements national policies at the grassroots levels. If the knot is 
weak, this negatively affects the delivery of policy outputs at grassroots levels. Its 
role is, Mr Linh explained, also considered as a village gate keeper, who can help the 
organisation access specific groups within the commune. It is very difficult to 
organise grassroots activities without the support of the commune leaders, because 
their presence encourages local people to participate in the NGO’s mobilising 
activities. Additionally, CCERD appealed to this formal structure to take advantage 
of its position as a conduit to transmit collective messages to the upper level. Due 
to the close relationship between the commune leadership and villagers, CCERD 
sought to enhance the commune authorities’ capacities and to empower the 
grassroots communities at the same time, whereby these two actors would work 
complementarily to build a stronger collective voice. It engaged both actors in a 
series of activities through formal channels such as empirical research of disputed 
land, training activities and site visits.  
 
With the support of the commune leadership and the VFF, the district government 
was tactically integrated into CCERD’s mobilising activities. I was intrigued about the 
value of the site visits. In discussion with staff, I was repeatedly told that the visits 
gave them a broader understanding of land issues and conflict resolution. This 
helped officials realise that land disputes occurred in many other places. Why was 




“The local authorities are very sensitive and proud. If for some reason we do 
something that might shame them, they will retreat. And obviously this is 
not good, because they are our buffer; we need them to be able to 
implement our activities. When visiting other conflict sites they realise that 
land dispute is not only unique to their locality. Learning from experience 
and good practice means pride is maintained and motivation strengthened.” 
(Focus Group Discussion, Quang Binh 01st March 2015)  
 
An information exchange mechanism between the NGO and local authorities was 
established and sustained with strong commitments from both sides. Over time 
CCERD’s credibility increased further, and local officials accepted the NGO as a 
reliable source of information and consultation before their engagement with the 
upper level and the SFC. In addition, they also provided further support for the NGO 
actions. This reflects how CCERD succeeded in working within and manipulating the 
bureaucratic structures of the state, conducive with its organised actions. Under 
CCERD’s coordination, the commune and district leadership, the VFF and local 
landless collectively prepared a detailed dossier of land conflict to be sent to the 
provincial government. This important document included detailed empirical 
evidence on disputed land with specific figures and data, a list of intermediate and 
long-term needs of the local landless, and a set of recommendations and proposed 
solutions.  
 
As part of its strategy, CCERD also engaged when it could with the government 
structures at the provincial level. Specifically, it disaggregated the provincial-level 
state apparatus to look for options to engage with those sections that were 
responsible for dealing with issues concerning ethnic minorities and forestland, i.e. 
the subcommittee of ethnic minority affairs, and the department of natural 
resources and environment. Again, through its links with the district government 
and the VFF, CCERD provided a better understanding of land conflict and the 
consequences of not having access to suitable land.  
 
So far, I have examined how CCERD waged its formal activism through overtly 
working within and through bureaucratic structures of the state.  However CCERD 
also reverted to informal channels to enhance the effectiveness of its formal 
activism. As mentioned previously, it placed local informal self-help groups and core 
farmer networks at the frontline of interactions with the government bodies, the 




institutionalised, unregistered, and work outside of the formally institutionalised 
structures. Their formation was initiated by CCERD but in fact they are quite 
independent from the latter. CCERD focused on enhancing the technical and 
political capacities of these groups and used them as spokespersons voicing the 
concerns of local communities to different stakeholders.  
 
In short, advocating a collaborative approach, CCERD co-opted powerful local 
actors, such as the VFF and other bureaucratic structures of the state to build 
legitimacy and exert influence on related stakeholders. Working within and through 
these structures, CCERD anchored itself to the available structural links that its allies 
already had with the political power structures. All this opened up guarded spaces 
for CCERD to orchestrate further mobilisation. In addition to local mobilisation, 
CCERD had to reach out to actors at higher levels in order to make the mobilisation 
a success. I turn to this in the next section.  
 
 
4.3. CCERD – Beyond local mobilisation 
 
During the mobilisation process, setting up strategic links with different 
stakeholders situated at various levels plays a crucial role towards achieving the 
final objective. Understanding this importance, CCERD extended its efforts to 
establish vertical links with the influential formal structures at the central level 
including the Hanoi-based NGO Towards Sustainable Development, national media, 
and the state agency in charge of land reform known as VINAFOR.  
 
In the first place, it is important to draw attention to the relationship between 
CCERD and the national NGO Towards Sustainable Development (TSD). During the 
course of its organisational development, CCERD partnered with some other NGOs 
based in different provinces in an informal network working on forest land for 
ethnic minorities. Specifically, during the 2009-2012 period, and under the support 
of a Dutch NGO, CCERD networked closely with these NGOs including TSD (based in 
Hanoi) and decided to bring land rights for ethnic minorities to the centre of their 
collective agenda. A number of joint activities were conducted, such as reviewing 
forest land policies (e.g. the said Decree No. 200) and providing suggestions for 
improving the quality of these policies. Given the local contexts and expertise of 




the different organisational needs and capacities. This network gave CCERD the 
political leverage and opportunity to bring national government agencies and media 
to its local operational sites, including those with land conflicts.   
 
TSD had a strong connection with the national media and some contacts within 
national government bodies. Consequently it was tasked with running the media 
campaign and bringing national political actors to the operational sites of its locally-
based counterparts, where land conflicts were prevalent. Meanwhile, other 
organisations provided on-site evidence and data for TSD to organise 
communication activities and draw the attention of the relevant national agencies 
and bodies. Establishing a stronger national link with the TSD opened up links for 
CCERD to reach the national political structures and effectively mobilise greater 
support from higher level political agents.  
 
As a matter of fact, at the local level, CCERD faced a number of challenges to involve 
the national media. This is not only because of the geographical remoteness of its 
operational sites, but also because of its close connections to the state. It is not 
difficult to imagine that the provincial government would respond negatively if it 
came to know that CCERD had invited the national media to shame them. Hence 
CCERD had to work behind the scenes and make sure TSD were taking the lead in 
inviting the national media. In the end when media representatives arrived at the 
conflict site to film evidence, the local authorities and the SFC had accepted it as a 
fait accompli and would not have known the role played by CCERD. Furthermore 
when the media arrived, CCERD again worked mostly through the same informal 
self-help groups it had trained. So the main discussions took place between the 
media and the informal self-help groups. The resulting documentary chronicled very 
well the suffering of the local landless and was broadcast nationwide. The 
documentary was widely regarded as having an impact upon the provincial 
government and the SFC.   
 
As we have already seen, beyond the local level CCERD worked covertly with TSD, 
its counterpart in Hanoi, to generate greater political leverage so that local 
mobilisation could continue and expand. Another example of how this worked was 
a very successful national-scale workshop organised by TSD on land conflicts. The 
conference was held in Hanoi and included the participation of high-profile political 
leaders, government officers and media agencies. Again behind the scenes, CCERD 




level contacts in the self-help groups to act as spokespersons in the conference and 
to present narratives of those most affected by local conflicts.  
 
CCERD sought to take advantage of TSD’s links with important national political 
agents in charge of forest land issues, i.e. the Vietnam Forest Administration of 
Forestry (VINAFOR). This gave CCERD a gateway to the wider policy context of land 
reform. VINAFOR is tasked with reviewing and devising appropriate policy positions 
and presenting them to the national government, providing personnel and 
overseeing the actual implementation of the forest land reform policy (i.e. the 
Decree 200 and Resolution 28 mentioned earlier). By incorporating VINAFOR into 
the mobilising strategy, CCERD hoped to first take advantage of its structural links 
with the national government, which would enhance the legitimacy of its campaigns 
locally, and open up further room for manoeuvre. Also, by incorporating VINAFOR, 
CCERD hoped that government agencies would exert influence swiftly and 
effectively on the provincial government. While CCERD’s mobilisation was on-going, 
VINAFOR was requested by the Political Bureau to review the implementation 
effectiveness of Resolution 28 on forest land reform. To do this, they had to pay 
field visits to several sites where land conflicts were taking place to capture real-life 
evidence. Again CCERD was quick to respond. It collaborated with TSD to make sure 
VINAFOR visited the Truong Son commune and investigated the dynamics of local 
level conflicts. The final investigation report was effective and resulted in pressures 
being exerted on the provincial government to respond positively.  
 
It is important to note that NGOs in Vietnam are involved in the policy process in a 
very ad-hoc manner because there is no official platform or obvious forum where 
public consultation can occur. In practice, NGOs wait and if called to a state-led 
public consultation they will attend. This contrasts with experiences elsewhere 
where NGOs have a more formal space or platform to engage with government (see 
Devine, 2002 for a good example of government–non governmental collaboration 
on land reform). In Vietnam, the party-owned MOs are responsible for engaging 
with the state but ineffective, passive and lack imagination. As a result, VNGOs find 
it difficult to secure room to engage with the state on policy reform and 
implementation. This sheds light on the significance of CCERD’s collaboration with 








CCERD has built a successful mobilisation strategy by responding tactically to 
internal forces and external stimuli, as well as making careful calculations about the 
timing of specific interventions and about when to be visible or invisible in such 
investments. Locally it built overt relations with state representatives and the level 
of cooperation was effective. Nationally it built covert relations working through 
intermediary allies. In both cases the aim was identical: create pressure on the 
provincial government to respond favourably to the landless farmers in a way that is 
consistent with government policy. As an immediate result, 2,123 hectares were 
removed from the SFC and returned to the commune government for redistribution 
to the landless villagers. In subsequent years, the provincial government withdrew a 
further 1,600 hectares from the SFC.  
 
The chapter has examined a particular form of activism led by a local NGO. The 
involvement of CCERD has to a certain degree improved the policy delivery 
mechanism, resulting in direct and intermediate benefits to landless farmers. It has 
also opened up further space for policy reform in the future.    
 
In authoritarian contexts such as Vietnam, NGO-led collective mobilisation faces 
multiple political constraints due to the politically restricted environment. Given 
this, it would be politically naive to conclude that such activism will soon mature 
into a driving force for progressive change. At best NGOs implement a co-opted 
activism that accommodates rather than challenges the status quo. This 
accommodation however can generate change, albeit incremental.  
 
With this case study, I have argued that despite being embedded in the state, NGO-
led activism was able to pressure the government to introduce more positive 
responses to the needs of the local poor. Whilst the Trees Movement offers an 
account of a more autonomous and antagonistic form of activism, CCERD 
represents a more embedded and collaborative form of activism. This collaborative 
form of activism counters much of the literature on civil society that portrays state-
society relations in a more conflictive manner. At the same time, it challenges the 
conventional wisdom of civil society activism in authoritarian contexts that tends to 





Drawing on the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2, I have examined the 
NGO led mobilisation using the three core themes of legitimacy, autonomy and 
(in)formality of activism. These themes will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
6, where I will engage directly in a comparative analysis of the two different forms 



































Chapter 6: Comparative case analysis 




The two preceding empirical chapters have provided an analysis of two case studies 
that represent two different forms of civil society activism in Vietnam. In relation to 
the Trees Movement (TM), I argued that grassroots citizen-led activism, an 
emerging form of civic engagement in Vietnam, is likely to play a critical role in 
(re)structuring state-society relations in the country. This is because it signals to the 
ruling power how civilians can orchestrate rightful civic actions to oppose 
unaccountable government decisions and policies, as well as how they can make 
demands for a more participatory and accountable government through strategic 
non-violent collective resistance.  The TM also signals the rise of critical green 
activism, in which the use of social media and digital tools is important to social and 
political action in Vietnam. Regarding NGO-led activism, I argued that, by taking 
advantage of its embedded relation into the state, working within and through 
bureaucratic structures, manipulating available structural links, as well as 
strategising around both formal and informal channels of activism, VNGOs are 
seeking to carve out more room for themselves to manoeuvre in critical actions. 
This case study also revealed the options that arise from local politics in Vietnam, 
where the state apparatus is not homogeneous, and relations between different 
administrative levels allow for fence-breaking, discretion and ad hoc alliances.  
 
Whilst the TM showcases a transient, time-bound and more antagonistic form of 
activism in which discrete informal civilian groups organised themselves and stood 
up to the state, the NGO-led activism portrays a more sustainable, collaborative and 
embedded form of activism. Nevertheless, it is notable that despite having a higher 
degree of antagonism, the TM still had to couch its activities within the state 
agenda and discourse to orchestrate its mobilisation. The TM managed to get the 
state to reverse or halt its decision after concerted public resistance, i.e. the 
government temporarily stopped cutting trees and sanctioned some of those who 
were guilty, whereas the NGO-led activism successfully pressured the local 




Both forms of activism express different forms of contentious politics in Vietnam, 
ranging from dialogue to advocacy through to contention. 
 
In this chapter, I will apply the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2 in order to 
compare these contrasting forms of civil society activism. The comparative analysis 
is grounded in my empirical data and particularly guided by this framework, 
composed of three themes: legitimacy, autonomy, and formality and informality of 
activism.  
In Chapter 2, I explained that these analytical dimensions were theoretically 
grounded and subsequently validated and triangulated through my empirical work 
on social activism in Vietnam. In particular, combining a relational approach with 
mainstream movement theories (political process and new social movement 
theories) paves the way to the development of these concepts. The former 
advocates looking at civil society in terms of relations and processes of interactions, 
and seeks to understand how civil society actors situate and express themselves in 
the relations that they respond to and become enmeshed within. Meanwhile, the 
PPT and NSM approaches allow for an understanding of why and how the activists 
come together in groups and networks, and which frames and strategies they build 
in order to mobilise (Alonso et al., 2010). The strengths of both approaches also 
help to explain the mechanisms used by civil society groups with particular 
experiences and institutional characteristics to shape social reality of their 
mobilisations into distinctive legitimate frames that fit into the existing official 
discourse and political opportunity structure. In authoritarian regimes, since 
community mobilisations are not institutionally supported, civil society groups have 
to appropriate existing channels or even create new ones to achieve collective 
action (Tilly, 1978).  
A relational approach helps to explore how legitimacy becomes an integral part of 
the processes through which civil society groups express themselves in relation to 
the state as well as political opportunity structure. The ‘framing processes’ of social 
movement theories is the term that particularly resonates with legitimacy, i.e. 
“frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to 
organise experiences and guide action” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p.614). Framing 
processes incorporate a variety of factors namely, collective identities, beliefs, 
meanings, political ideology and discourse, as well as cultural practices, which once 
established allow collective actors to legitimate their activities, to garner 




legitimacy has been defined broadly to cover how an organisation can be socially 
accepted and recognised for acts that are right in reason and in nature, proper, 
admissible and justifiable; and can enjoy the support of an identifiable community 
(see Chapter 2). In this chapter, drawing on Suchman’s (1995) framework on types 
of legitimacy (regulatory, normative, cognitive, and pragmatic) and legitimation 
strategies, I will directly examine how civil society groups generate and maintain 
legitimacy for their organisational structures as well as their collection actions.  
Autonomy continues to be a topical concern of civil society theories (liberal 
tradition) as well as new social movement literature (e.g. Offe, 1985). Whilst the 
former recognises it as being structurally independent from the state, the latter 
advocates a type of collective action autonomous from the existing bureaucratic 
structures. In Chapter 2, I discussed the idea of ‘relational autonomy’ in order to set 
out the conceptual foundation for my own definitional development of ‘autonomy’ 
in this thesis. Under these relational views, autonomy is approached in terms of 
social relations rather than individual traits (Christman, 2008). These views also 
underscore the “social embeddedness of selves” along with the role of contextual 
social dynamics and power structures in the employment and development of 
autonomy (Christman, 2004, p.143). Drawing on the relational perspective, 
autonomy in this thesis is defined as the ability of civil society groups to act and to 
determine their course in accord with their interests or values and desires when 
negotiating especially with the state. Autonomy is analysed here in relation to 
‘embeddedness’ in the state. It is not a collective goal (individual trait) that civil 
society groups seek to claim from the state. In particular, the research examines the 
significance of the varying relations to the state that civil society groups are 
enmeshed within. It examines, based on these varied degrees of embeddedness in 
the state, how civil society groups are able to express, organise and orchestrate 
activism towards achieving collective goals.  
Whilst legitimacy and autonomy draw attention to the institutional characteristics 
of civil society groups, (in)formality sheds light onto the processes of social 
mobilisation, whereby different civil society groups associated with these 
characteristics strategically articulate the interplay of formal and informal processes 
or even create new channels (e.g. surreptitious platforms) to achieve collective 
goals. Again, the relational approach to civil society and social movement theories 
provide a strong base for the formation of this theme. The former considers civil 
society in terms of processes and relations and examines how it is constituted after 




connectedness among members and collective identities (Diani, 1995, cited in 
Alonso et al. 2010). They are collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through 
which people mobilise and engage in collective actions (McAdam et al., 1996). 
Formality and informality of activism are approached in this thesis in terms of 
processes and interactions performed by different structures, either formal or 
informal. Specifically, I define formal activism as a process through which different 
groups overtly engage with and/or perform their acts through formal channels and 
structures. In contrast, informal activism is a process through which different 
groups engage with and/or perform their acts through informal channels and 
structures in either an overt or a covert manner.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that civil society groups in authoritarian contexts such as 
Vietnam have to couch their activities within the state agenda and discourse to 
exercise their activism, irrespective of their organisational structures, positions of 
legitimacy, or degrees of autonomy. Whether they are registered or unregistered, 
they have to navigate both formal and informal channels of activism to orchestrate 
collective action. Importantly, in order to attain success, they have to strategically 
manipulate the state agenda and discourse to legitimise their chosen courses of 
action. This finding suggests that in authoritarian contexts NGO- and citizen-led 
activisms have as many similarities as they have differences.   
In the sections that follow I examine civil society activism in Vietnam through these 
key themes.  
 
 
2. Civil society activism in one-party ruled Vietnam 
 
The table below illustrates the key comparative points of the two forms of activism 








Table 5. Comparison of two case studies 
 Trees Movement NGO-led activism  
 
Legitimacy The TM did not need legitimacy in 
the same way as the NGO, because 
it was transient, time-bound, and 
issue-based. Yet, it had to build 
legitimacy for its action to recruit 
wider public participation and 
minimise state repression. 
 Generated regulatory 
legitimacy (i.e. complying with 
existing law and rules) 
 
 More concerned about 
generating normative 
legitimacy.  
The TM gained normative 
legitimacy through framing its 
mobilisation in line with wider 
societal values. Particularly, it 
developed mobilising strategies 
and a repertoire of actions in order 
to persuade the public of the 
rightfulness, propriety, urgency 







 Legitimation strategies: 
- Through nesting within the state 
agenda and discourse;  
- Through expanding membership 
 
The NGO had to register with state 
bodies to obtain legal status as the 
first step of generating legitimacy. 
CCERD, as a local long-standing 
social organisation, needs to 
maintain this social identity for its 
existing social audiences.  
 Generated regulatory 
legitimacy (i.e. complying with 
existing law and rules) 
 
 More concerned with 
generating pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy 
- Pragmatic legitimacy:  the NGO 
has to live up to socially pre-
established expectations directed 
at it. Its pragmatic legitimacy is 
based on what it accomplishes for 
its audience (i.e. delivery of social 
services).  
- Cognitive legitimacy relates to 
conformity to established 
cognitive structures in society, 
what is often described as having 
‘taken-for-granted’ status. This 
type of legitimacy is anchored in 
assumed NGO general 
characteristics such as: pro-poor, 
efficient, participatory, and 
empowering.  
 
 Legitimation strategies: 
- Through conformity to the state 
agenda and discourse; 
- Through manipulating the state 
agenda and discourse; 




Autonomy - Not confined by registration or 
any tie to the state 
 
- Less embedded relation to the 
state, which resulted in it 
having less protected space to 
wage activism 
  
- Inherently more antagonistic 
and more overt in its challenge 
to the state legitimacy 
 
- Maximised the political 
opportunities by quickly 
converting them into 
immediate strategic actions to 
recruit wider civilian 
participation 
 
- Autonomous form of activism 




- It had stronger resonance for 
the political elites but it is 
time-bound, episodic, and 
issue-based     
 
 
- Confined by the web of 
legalistic requirements and 
bureaucratic practices, but 
this opens a more protected 
space for mobilisation 
 
- Working through and within 
bureaucratic structures of the 
state, it followed a 
collaborative approach and 
exercised self-censored 
mobilisation within the legal 
bounds and limits of 
permissibility 
 
- More embedded within the 
state, so its mobilising strategy 
was to depoliticise its activism. 
It managed to deliver change 
within the existing rules 
 
- Within its existing opportunity 
structure, the NGO 
represented an embedded, 
cooperative, structurally 
linked, and more sustainable 
activism that is aimed to 
delivering change within the 
existing rules 
 
(In)Formality Internet-based, autonomous, 
antagonistic and politicised 
activism: 
- Mainly exercised informal 
activism 
 
- Being at a distance from the 
state, the TM did not work 
within and through 
bureaucratic structures of the 
state, nor did it have structural 
links like CCERD 
 
Still had to couch its activities 
within the state agenda and 
discourse, existing formal 
channels, in order to wage 
mobilisation 
 
- Mainly appealed to informal 
channels such as the virtual 
Self-censored, embedded, 
collaborative and depoliticised 
activism: 
- Mainly exercised formal 
activism 
 
- Embedded within the state: 
CCERD mainly worked within 
and through bureaucratic 
structures of the state for 
mobilisation  
 
- Allied with strategic formal 
structures at different levels 
and took advantage of 
available structural links 
 
- Informal processes and covert 
arrangement were also made 
behind the scenes, when 




networks (i.e. Facebook), 
petition signing, and street 
protests to exercise their 
activism 
 
- The significance of 
surreptitious symbiosis 
between the registered group 
and the unregistered group of 
the TM  
 
Both forms of activism strategically 
articulated the interplay of 
formality and informality of 
activism. 
 
based counterparts and the 
national media to trigger 
mobilisation locally  
 
- Used its established informal 
structures (i.e. its self-help 




Both forms of activism 
strategically articulate the 
interplay of formality and 
informality of activism. 
 
 
2.1. Legitimacy  
 
Under the authoritarian constraints of Vietnam, where state antagonism towards 
associational activities still prevails, legitimacy is a challenge that impinges upon 
organisational survival as well as collective action. A lack of legitimacy means that 
organisations can no longer operate. Although the significance of legitimacy is 
generally acknowledged, the notion has received little academic attention in civil 
society and social movement theories, and in Vietnamese scholarship.  
Many of my interviewees revealed that legitimacy is a long-standing concern among 
CSOs in Vietnam, which particularly relates to how they are recognised as legitimate 
social actors. Generating and maintaining legitimacy, therefore, always remains a 
top priority of their organisational strategies. As previously explained in this thesis, 
in Vietnam, associations such as local NGOs must be registered with the state’s 
governing bodies or state -affiliated institutions in order to obtain legal status. No 
registration means no legal status, and no legal status means organisational 
legitimacy is precarious. However, the registration process in many instances is 
long, complex and outcomes are always uncertain. Potential applicants are easily 





For the Trees Movement and the NGO, legitimacy-building was an important 
building block for mobilisation. Legitimacy is a highly contextual and contested 
phenomenon (Walton, 2013) and building legitimacy is fundamentally a collective 
process of construction amongst a particular group, community or society of actors 
(Johnson et al., 2006). Drawing on Suchman’s (1995) framework and the strategies 
of legitimation staged by CCERD and the TM, I came to realise that both case studies 
sought to generate regulatory legitimacy for their activism by appealing to the 
official state agenda and discourse. The second similarity lies in that they sought to 
broaden their participation base to draw wider public support. This is important 
because wider participation indicates wider social acceptance of an organisation’s 
framework of beliefs, values and actions. As Johnston et al (2006) indicate, 
generally legitimation involves building consensus among actors in the local 
context, whereby most people accept the object or mission of an organisation as 
legitimate. It is worth noting again that legitimacy has a contested nature, so once 
established, it needs to be maintained otherwise it will fade. This draws attention to 
the point that while both the TM and CCERD directed efforts to building and 
maintaining legitimacy, they did it in different ways. The TM did not need the same 
form of legitimacy as CCERD because it was transient, time-bound and issue-based. 
CCERD, on the other hand is an established social organisation that needs to 
maintain its social identity for existing social audiences.  
 
Another critical distinction between the two rests on the fact that whilst CCERD is 
more inclined to pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy, the TM had a greater 
propensity for normative legitimacy. CCERD’s stress on cognitive legitimacy relates 
to the point that it is a local registered NGO, which means it needs to deliver against 
certain mandates and objectives. These objectives reflect state ideology and donor 
requirements. Its pragmatic legitimacy evolves from the task of actually 
implementing social services and other local development efforts that address 
substantive needs of its constituency and wider community. In other words, its 
pragmatic legitimacy is justified on what the NGO accomplishes.  
 
The TM focused on normative legitimacy gained by aligning its mobilisation with 
cultural beliefs and societal values shared by others in a given community or in a 
broader society (Douglas, 1986). Through this process, Johnston et al (2006, p.57) 




implies that what the movement enacted resonated more with what was morally 
desirable rather than what was legally required. In particular, it designed its 
mobilising strategies to secure public acceptance of the rightfulness, propriety, 
urgency and efficacy of the movement. That is:  
“Our much loved old trees are being cut down with no justification, our 
greenery and environment is being damaged, we, citizens of Hanoi, must 
take action to save our trees, save our environment, and save our beloved 
city”  
(Excerpt from fanpage 6700 People for 6700 trees, 19 March 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
In the following sections, I analyse how the TM and the NGO constructed and 
maintained legitimacy for their activism and at the same time I shed more light on 
the similarities, as well as the differences between them.  
 
 
2.1.1. NGO-led activism 
 
Legitimation by conforming to the state agenda and 
discourse 
 
First of all, CCERD sought legitimacy for its organisation and actions by conforming 
to the existing state agenda and discourse to construct its identity as a social 
organisation.  
In the first instance, CCERD used Government Decree No 177 to establish itself 
legally as a ‘fund’ registering with the district-level people’s committee (i.e. district 
government). After registering with the local government, the organisation has had 
to confine itself to and comply with the terms and conditions stated in the 
registration. Once formally registered, CCERD then had to maintain its legitimacy by 
living up to the standards and expectations directed at it. In particular, it had to 




How does the organisation exactly demonstrate such conformity? As part of its 
legitimation process, CCERD adopted a specific discourse in that it presented itself 
as a ‘social’ organisation working alongside the state to address local needs, resolve 
social concerns and tensions, and play a role as a conduit between the authorities 
and grassroots communities. In asserting its nature as a social organisation, it 
aligned itself well with the communist party’s agenda around ‘the socialisation of 
the welfare service’. The unifying discourse is captured in the party’s favoured 
maxim ‘state and people work together’. The NGO director- Mr Linh described it in 
the following way: 
“The term ‘civil society’ has not been officially admitted by the state in any 
legal document. This obviously affects the way we work. So, we have to be 
very flexible and cautious. For example we always seek the proper language, 
tone, and approach to work with the local authorities. For example, in every 
form of communication we emphasise our identity as a social organisation 
rather than a civil society organisation, or we say we are a scientific and 
technological organisation that addresses SOCIAL issues”. (Interview, 22 
December 2014, Quang Binh province, emphasis added) 
By accentuating ‘social’ characteristics, CCERD depoliticises its identity, creates a   
‘guarded’ rhetoric for the organisation that legitimises its actions. The organisation 
upholds a non-adversarial approach and stresses its complementary role to the 
state. This enables it to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the local authorities. As the 
director indicated in the quote above, finding a proper language, tone, and 
approach to work with the local government is of importance especially in a political 
setting such as Vietnam, where the institutional preconditions for NGO legitimacy 
are unsettled, uncertain and precarious.  
 
CCERD is a locally based organisation, with its leader and the majority of staff born 
in the same locality. This helped the organisation to find a pathway to make itself 
appear more proper, authentic and appropriate to its local audiences. The 
grassroots services it rendered were decided upon taking into consideration local 
needs as well as a good understanding of the local culture. CCERD’s target groups 
mostly pertain to the Van Kieu ethnic minority, and the organisation is committed 
to promoting their culture and strengthening their livelihood options.  
In Chapter 5, I provided evidence of how CCERD works within and through 




organisational activities, as well as to mobilise collectively. By working through 
these local power structures, CCERD has been able to enhance its symbiotic 
relationships with them, and also strengthen its legitimacy. As Mr Linh explained: 
“Once legitimacy is established, it places you in an enabling position to act. 
You can imagine … it is like a guarded space that you will work within. 
Confined to district level and based in rural area, we are not as fortunate as, 
for example, our counterparts in Hanoi, who are able to enjoy a more open 
environment. Having said that, this doesn’t mean we don’t have any 
advantages. On the contrary, we have a strong advantage, i.e. we were born 
here, come from here, live with the local communities and understanding 
their local culture, which all in all allows us to gauge their response 
effectively and make our timely adjustments.” 
Mr Linh’s revelation points to the advantage of being a cultural insider. This position 
allows the organisation to find an appropriate locally-tailored approach to meeting 
the pre-established social values and expectations directed at it and hence, making 
it more proper and legitimate to its local audiences. Tactically, CCERD makes itself 
present in local communities’ everyday lives by finding ways to remind people of its 
presence and mission. As a result, people see it as a legitimate actor in the policy 
landscape. 
 
By conforming to the state agenda and discourse, working within and through 
bureaucratic structures of the state, as well as disseminating its identity and 
interests with local communities, CCERD has managed to gain and enhance its 
pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy. It deploys the ‘guarded’ space it is afforded to 
find ways of further enhancing its legitimacy. However, in order to nurture 
collective mobilisations, CCERD needs to do more than just secure local legitimacy. 
Johnston et al. (2006, p.60) argue that once “local validation” is established, the 
next stage is diffuse and validate. In order to accomplish this, Suchman (1995) 
suggests that an organisation must manipulate pre-emptively the existing 
institutional environment to ignite novel explanations of social reality. The 
plausibility of doing so, lies in the capacity of the organisation to reach beyond its 






Legitimation by manipulating the state agenda and discourse  
 
Going beyond the conformist strategies, CCERD also manipulated the existing 
institutional framework at the national level to legitimise and frame its collective 
mobilisation accordingly. With an identity as a social organisation, CCERD had a safe 
and legitimate space to advocate for and support local communities to gain access 
to land. This was a complex process involving collaborations with provincial 
authorities and the institution that owned the land, i.e. the state forest company 
(SFC) under the provincial government. In order to engage with these institutions, 
CCERD needed to protect and further legitimise its actions. 
 
CCERD knew that several forestland policies had already been put in place by the 
national government via a number of decrees, and these were supposed to support 
local communities to access forestland. However the laws were not being enforced 
at the local level.   
 
CCERD took advantage of this and framed its mobilisation efforts as geared to the 
implementation of state policy. By referring to state policy, CCERD could 
legitimately engage with local authorities. Manipulating the existing framework, as 
Suchman (1995) explains, means the organisation had to write new interpretations 
of social reality. Before CCERD began its work, land disputes were deadlocked. Local 
people would in vain submit complaints regarding the lack of arable land to 
different levels of government. The provincial government was unresponsive partly 
because it was closely linked to the SFC. The district government was also 
unresponsive because of pressure coming from the province, and the commune 
government had very limited power and lacked capacity to act. So there was no 
communication between the different administrative levels, and no way of making 
them engage with each other.  
 
CCERD co-opted the VFF and commune government structure to help raise legal 
awareness and increase capacity to engage with land disputes. The fact that they 
could appeal to the state policy was crucial to securing the cooperation of the VFF 




commune more aware of the rights to land protected in the existing policies, 
provoked them into thinking differently about policy implementation, enabled them 
to take pro-active action in the land claiming process, and enlightened about why 
policy intentions failed to be implemented. Reinforcing the idea that the actions 
were in support of state policy was important. As one local villager stated: 
“Without CCERD’s support, we couldn’t have known about such policies, we 
couldn’t have known about the benefits that were reserved for farmers like 
us […] Once we were aware of our rights, we wanted to demand that these 
rights be realised.” (Interview, 23 December 2014, Quang Binh) 
The NGO coordinated local actors to agree on a mobilisation strategy but each actor 
was approached in a different way. Local villagers were integrated into a range of 
advocacy activities as empowered spokespersons able to directly address higher 
level government and SFC officials. The commune and district governments were 
made more aware of the plight of landless farmers and trained to find policy 
solutions.   
 
 
Legitimation by expanding participation  
 
The broadening of the participation base, Johnston et al. (2006) explain, is 
synonymous with increasing legitimacy, as expansion signals the success of an 
organisation in securing support and resources.    
Collective mobilisation is still risk-laden in Vietnam, especially led by VNGOs. As a 
result, VNGOs tend to engage in what I have called co-opted activism that by 
implication accommodates rather than challenges the status quo. To reduce 
potential risk, CCERD deliberately built legitimacy by increasing the number and 
range of collaborating stakeholders at local and national levels.  At the local level, it 
mobilised the participation of key local actors, namely the MOs, the VFF, district 
and commune government, and some parts of provincial government. As Mr Linh 
stated:  
“Obviously when people know little, they will respond little. So, getting them 
informed becomes a key component in our mobilising structure. Also, 
through engaging with them, we have articulated so much on-site 




people’s problems and understand their concerns. They think of us and 
come to us as a reliable channel to reflect their concerns about land issues. 
We carefully recorded all this information, since it would be used as valuable 
inputs for our mobilising strategy and valuable evidence. This also helped us 
leverage support from institutions in Hanoi.” (Interview, 15 February, 2015, 
Quang Binh). 
To mobilise participation and support at the central level, CCERD allied with a range 
of critical institutions.  With its novel empirical knowledge of land conflict, CCERD 
became a strong point of reference for the media, other NGOs and especially for 
the government bodies in charge of reviewing land policies. Its reputation opened 
doors. This is evidenced in the conference, organised by CCERD and co-hosted with 
the national NGO TSD, entitled ‘Research findings of land conflicts in some regions’. 
This became a landmark conference which attracted the attention of media, 
government, donor and civil society representatives. As a result of the conference, 
land issues, especially those faced by ethnic minority groups, were catapulted on to 
the national agenda and were covered in the mainstream media.  
 
Besides engaging with the national media, CCERD also used its expertise to attract 
the collaboration of national political agents responsible for forestland reform 
(VINAFOR). Indeed CCERD managed to get the forestland conflict in Truong Son 
commune incorporated into the review report of VINAFOR. This gave even greater 
national policy exposure to local land conflicts and was instrumental in the 
subsequent decision of the provincial government to withdraw land from SFC and 
return it to the local communities.   
 
 
2.1.2. Grassroots citizen-led activism: The Trees Movement 
 
“You can’t make them (i.e. the city government) stop their wrongdoings if 
what you do is illegitimate. The trees cutting by the government is wrong 
and undemocratic, but we have to legitimate our acts. We have to legitimate 
our resistance. We have to show them that we are law-abiding citizens. Our 




them for their wrongdoings”. (Interview with a dissident, 01 May 2015, 
Hanoi) 
A good point of entry is to clarify a crucial point regarding legitimacy in the TM, i.e. 
to whom were the TM campaigners deemed legitimate?    
 
The TM was a social movement, the impact of which was time-bound and transient. 
Hence, its claims and need for legitimation are different from those of CCERD. 
Notwithstanding this, it still had to secure and maintain its identity as a legitimate 
actor or movement. More explicitly than the NGO, the TM’s legitimacy was 
attached to the number of people it could attract to sign up. Increased participation 
signals wider social acceptance of the validity and propriety of its actions, i.e. the 
two core values of legitimacy. This is in line with Johnston et al.’s (2006) argument 
linking legitimacy to widened participation. 
 
The TM sought to be legitimate to the state and the public. This was because the 
state response remained uncertain and unpredictable, as the quote above implies. 
For the TM, this makes the task of aligning mobilisation actions to the state 
discourse very challenging. Moreover, the government was the target of the TM’s 
mobilisation and activism. So the TM had to ensure it was seen as legitimate by the 
same agent it was trying to mobilise against. It needed to be seen as legitimate by 
the government otherwise it faced oppression and repression. The only way to do 
this is demonstrate growing public support. To draw in more people, the TM 
needed to convince them of its legitimacy by reinforcing its rightfulness, validity, 
urgency and propriety. How did the TM legitimate its activism? In the next section, I 
analyse two overarching strategies undertaken by the green campaigners.  
 
 
Legitimation by nesting within the state agenda and 
discourse 
 
The TM had neither formal registration nor legal status, nor did it have CCERD’s 
pragmatic legitimacy. Its legitimacy was much more precarious than that of CCERD. 




the NGO case study because its activism directly targeted the government. 
Legitimation in the TM, therefore, became more challenging. So far, the existing 
literature on legitimacy has been much focused on NGO legitimacy and far much 
less on social movements. Efforts on how to define legitimacy in the context of a 
social movement are under developed. In this thesis, legitimacy has been construed 
in terms of how to be socially accepted and recognised for those acts that are right 
in reason and in nature, proper, admissible and justifiable and thus,  enjoy the 
support of an identifiable community. This definition has been adopted to provide a 
broad understanding of the term and it encompasses the strategies of legitimation 
by the TM. To secure legitimacy, the TM had to work very hard to convince 
participants and the wider community that their actions were desirable, urgent, 
appropriate and valid by making connections between proposed activities and the 
state agenda, while also provoking people to transform their love for the city into 
direct action.    
Like CCERD, the grassroots activism in the TM also had to connect to the state 
agenda and discourse to work with and legitimate its mobilisation. Faced with 
greater political constraints, the TM mobilisers could not let their activism be 
divorced from the state official discourse and their link was built around 
fundamental citizenship rights as guaranteed in the national constitution and state-
propagandised maxims about democratic rights and norms. The kind of rights 
included freedom of speech, freedom of association and demonstration, and the 
right to take part in social and state management. A senior official of a foreign 
embassy in Hanoi put it as follows: 
“Oh… you know … I am surprised. It seems to me they (i.e. the trees 
campaigners) are more organised and they change the tactics. They express 
themselves in a nice way, I mean in a legitimate way. Especially, they refer to 
the national constitution, human rights council, and the prime minister’s 
speech… You know… it is interesting. They are using exactly the 
government’s own words. They use it as a starting point, as a point of entry 
for their actions. This surprises me and it signals a sign of the development 
in civil society action in Vietnam now, I suppose.” (Interview, 21 April, 2015, 
Hanoi)  
By nesting within the state agenda, the TM campaigners demonstrated that their 
acts were rightful, valid, and safeguarded by the highest level legal document of the 
country, i.e. the Constitution. This gave the TM much needed ‘guarded’ shelter for 




legitimate, since they were in accord with the state agenda and discourse. The 
legitimacy generated helped to draw in wider participation, which as indicated 
above, signalled broader societal acceptance. The TM stated on its Facebook page 
the following:  
“Our constitution allows us to speak out to show our love for our city, to act 
for our city. Tree after tree is being cut down, please join us to exercise our 
constitutional rights to save our trees”.  
(Excerpt from Facebook page of Group Green Hanoi dated 04 April, 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/vimothanoixanh)  
 
In addition to adopting the official state legal documents in its mobilising strategy, 
the TM also appropriated state-propagated maxims on democratic governance, 
such as “People know, people discuss, people do, and people monitor” and 
converted them into glaring slogans written on the banners raised up in the street 
protests. Coe (2015) argues that when civil society networks in an authoritarian 
setting employ state-propagated values to frame mobilisation, they can be 
effective. Articulating the state discourse and agenda rather than opposing it, the 
TM campaigners criticised the city government’s unusual decision to cut down 
healthy trees, whilst at the same time they questioned the state’s adherence to its 
propagandised commitments and agenda. In other words, the state was violating 
the values that it was propagating itself. This framing strategy was successful. The 
government had to listen and make concessions by temporarily halting the project, 
sanctioning key staff and investigating fraud and irregular allegations. This was in 
response to public pressure that was not triggered by aggressive violent actions but 
by the love and responsibilities of the city citizens.  
 
The argument I propose is confirmed further when we look at the way the state 
responded to different groups in the TM. Whilst Group 6700 People (organised 
around registered NGO staff members) was treated with consent, Group Green 
Hanoi (independent activists and dissidents) was met with force. For example, when 
group 6700 People turned up at the government offices to address the citizens’ 
petition, there was no evidence of obvious state aggression. However when Group 
Green Hanoi did the same act, it met with resistance, discrimination and 
intimidation. The difference in state treatment reflects the different levels of 




The above reflection draws attention to the point that ‘who is legitimate in the eyes 
of the state’ really matters. Legitimacy shapes the ability to act and shapes state 
response accordingly. Let us consider Group 6700 People. Its legitimacy allowed it 
to be a pioneering group within the TM, but it also restrained the group from taking 
forward proposals when these were judged to be susceptible to higher levels of 
state surveillance and perhaps intimidation. In contrast, although Group Green 
Hanoi did not enjoy the same legitimacy as Group 6700 People, it allowed the TM to 
advance a form of activism that challenged the status quo and questioned state 
adherence to its committed agenda and propagandised values. It allowed the group 
to overtly demand that the city leadership prosecute those responsible for the tree 
cutting project. While its legitimacy was more precarious than the registered group, 
it enjoyed space to advance a more progressive form of activism. However it was 
careful not to act lawlessly. It could not afford to draw attention to itself on the 
basis of unlawfulness. Its repertoire of mobilising actions involved both 
conventional events such as direct meetings with the government or using legal 
means to question the legitimacy of the government project, and unconventional 
methods such as peaceful demonstrations on five consecutive Sundays in the city 
centre. The surreptitious symbiosis between the registered (Group 6700 People) 
and unregistered group (Group Green Hanoi) was instrumental in maintaining the 
momentum for the movement and refraining early state repression. Taken 
altogether, this created unprecedented civic resistance amid the increasing level of 
state intimidation and coercion. 
 
 
Legitimation by expanding membership 
 
While CCERD mainly played the role of an intermediary between the local 
community and relevant government agents to help its represented groups claim 
land, the TM groups with their cross-cutting membership base, used this as an 
enabling factor for their legitimacy building and became directly involved in 
addressing collective issues. The latter played multiple roles: as an intermediary, a 





The second strategy the TM employed to secure legitimacy was to expand its 
membership base. There are two salient points to be considered here: voluntariness 
and leadership, with the former concerning ordinary people and the latter 
associated with the role of the core teams of the TM groups. In what follows I look 
at both points. 
 
It is important to clarify that the TM membership was not formally established, was 
voluntarily, loosely and horizontally structured, and cut across the social spectrum. 
It was quite different from CCERD which dealt with a target constituency (local 
landless farmers) and engaged in a ‘contractual’ or ‘exchange’ relationship 
implemented in the delivery of social services to clients.  For CCERD, legitimacy 
depends on delivery of services. For the TM, legitimacy depends on moral support 
or voluntariness. The bottom line for the TM groups was to convince people that 
their acts were moral and consistent with certain social norms and beliefs (Zelditch 
and Walker, 2003). What were these norms or beliefs? A conviction that, ‘saving the 
old trees’ meant saving Hanoi and triggered greater accountability.  
 
The leadership of the TM groups played a discernible role in mobilising wider social 
support. Behind the scenes, they made strategic calculations of when to do what 
and how. As trees were being cut down, the leadership had to make quick decisions 
that could be implemented swiftly and which could have impact in a short 
timescale. All of this needed to be achieved without inviting state repression. The 
TM movement brought together an unusual alliance involving Group 6700 People 
(i.e. driven by registered NGO staff members) and Group Green Hanoi (i.e. driven by 
independent activists and dissidents). This phenomenon is path-breaking for civil 
society activism in Vietnam, and acts as an incubator for future organised citizen-led 
activism. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the TM Facebook groups were structured as concentric 
circles, whereby the core position of each group was inhabited by administrators 
and task force teams. The core team of each group was aware that in order to make 
the collective action a success, it was needed to expand the participation base. An 
independent activist, also a frontline member of Group Green Hanoi, explained this 
in the following terms:  
“In any social movement, you don’t win by only having support from your 




simply clicking the ‘Like’ button to taking to the streets there exists a huge 
gap of consciousness and motivation because of fear, lack of information, 
lack of awareness, lack of safety, fear of suppression, etc. All of these 
become an impediment for people to act and we need to reach out to as 
many as possible, including those who are still undecided, so as to get them 
involved and secure wider support”. (Interview, 20 April 2015, Hanoi) 
As this implies, understanding the nature of different levels of participation was 
pivotal. It was important to secure the participation of those still fearful or 
undecided in order to take the activist agenda forward. With a broadened 
membership base, the TM was able to make claims based on its legitimacy, which in 
turn helped it to avoid or at least minimise the coercion risk. In this regard, it is 
worth pointing out that the TM did not claim to stand or act for a certain group. 
Instead, it sought to reach out to the general populace. They targeted every 
Hanoian and then showed to the government that they were acting as Hanoi 
citizens who loved their city, not on behalf of any political group. It is also important 
to note that even though the leading groups in the TM differed in terms of 
backgrounds (independent activists vs. NGO staff, for instance), they quickly united 
behind the scenes to maintain a non-violent and peaceful spirit.   
 
The first strategy the TM utilised to mobilise more participation concentrated on 
rights awareness raising, as well as injecting urgency into their calls for action. The 
government tree-cutting project was a violation of democratic procedures; with the 
authorities having failed to consult with the people, failed to embrace people’s 
opinions and concerns seriously, and failed to be accountable for their acts. The TM 
not only resorted to citizenship rights protected in the Constitution to generate 
legitimacy for its actions, but it also tactfully appealed to other specific national 
state laws and policies to expose the misconduct of the city government. These 
included the law on the capital city and the Government Decree No. 64/2010 on 
urban green trees management. It also appealed to state-propagated democratic 
values.  
Another tactic that the TM campaigners effectively used to help people mitigate 
fear and participate in the movement was to disclose on the mobilising groups’ 
pages or key campaigners’ pages the experiences they encountered with security 
officers. This was to help new participants be well informed and prepared to 




yet to be approved in Vietnam, yet the conversation excerpted below between a 
security officer and a tree protester at the police station illustrates how well the 
green campaigners were equipped with legal information: 
Security: Tell me why you were at the lake (i.e. the rally point) this morning? 
Do you know that rallying in crowds is illegal? 
Protester: (silent) 
Security: Tell me why you were at the lake? 
Protester: It is my personal freedom. I am not obliged to answer your 
question about my personal freedom, nor am I obliged to report to you 
about it. By the way, there is no law saying that being at the lake is illegal.  
Security: Do you know that rallying in crowds is illegal?  
Protester: OK, just to save my time and your time, I have to tell you this: 
demonstration is one of fundamental citizenship rights mentioned in the 
Article 25 of the Constitution. At present, the National Assembly hasn’t 
passed the law on demonstration, this postponement means the 
government has not shown responsibility to the people on this. And there is 
no specific law stipulating that public demonstration is not allowed. So 
people are allowed to do what is not forbidden by law.”   
Security: (silent and moves to the next question)  
(Excerpt from Facebook of an activist, 26 April 2014, Hanoi) 
 
This excerpt is among numerous experiences shared by key green protesters on 
their Facebook pages, aimed at improving the awareness of the green participants, 
especially newcomers, about the citizenship rights that they were entitled to and to 
reiterate the legitimacy of the movement. The consciousness of citizenship rights 
was improved remarkably among the TM participants because of these tactics. 
When people know about their rights, they will feel confident and take action. This 
improvement could be seen clearly in many students who participated in the TM, 
when they refused to be present at the police station when being requested to do 
so. One student expressed this as follows: 
“The public security sent a request to my house in the form of an invite, 
whereby they wanted me to be present at the police station at the time X on 
the date Y. But I refused to do so because I didn’t commit any crimes. 
Citizens cannot be arrested or detained unless they are caught committing 




the right to refuse an invite because this is my right.” (Interview, 30 April 
2015, Hanoi) 
 
The TM campaigners also demonstrated their solidarity to stand side by side with 
the participants who were harassed by public security. For example, Group 6700 
People set up an ‘advisory unit’ with the participation of lawyers to provide legal 
support for those who were harassed or intimidated by public security.  
 
The TM groups successfully tapped into another important trigger for mobilisation: 
people’s emotion. The trees are important for Hanoians because they symbolise the 
city’s beauty, uniqueness, and attractiveness. The image of large healthy century 
old trees was portrayed by the TM as a historic symbol of revolutionary victory 
Hanoi of days gone by. Cutting the trees was like cutting Hanoi’s history and roots.   
 
Vocabulary also played an important role in the TM’s mobilising structures. The 
mobilising messages the TM groups articulated reflected urgency, severity, efficacy 
as well as correctness of participation and taking action. These messages were 
transmitted throughout the movement, not in a hierarchical manner, but horizontal 
one and on the basis of lawfulness, collectivism, and the exclusion of any act or 
intention that might cause violence.  
 
The TM offers an interesting insight into how different mobilising groups sought to 
stand up to the government’s arbitrary decision to cut down thousands of large old 
trees, as well as challenge the hegemonic norms of the ruling power. As has already 
been seen, while both case studies have different organisational structures and 
positions of legitimacy, they both have to operate within the state agenda and 
discourse to seek legitimacy for their activism. Although CCERD has a stronger 
standing in terms of legitimacy, it is still exposed to risk. The TM meanwhile had a 
more precarious level of legitimacy, managed more confrontational forms of 
activism, and yet still had to couch its activities within the state agenda and 






2.2. Autonomy of activism 
 
Autonomy is the second aspect that has strong analytical resonance in civil society 
activism in contemporary Vietnam. I have used autonomy to refer to the ability of 
civil society groups to act and determine their course of actions in accord with their 
interests or values and desires when negotiating especially with the state. CCERD 
was embedded within the state due to its obligation to secure formal recognition. 
This embeddedness opened up avenues for critical activism that targeted local 
power holders’ performance. It gave CCERD guarded or protected room for 
manoeuvre. By comparison the TM was an informal civilian network that had no 
formal connection to the state. It therefore lacked the guarded space enjoyed by 
CCERD. This gave it more freedom to support riskier acts of mobilisation but also 
put it under constant threat of repression.   
The different degrees of embeddedness civil society groups enjoy have opened up 
different types of space that have shaped how they express, organise and 
orchestrate activism. I argue that given the extent of embeddedness that is 
available to them, civil society groups become attuned to their connections to 
political power and decide to act accordingly. They become strategic by 
manipulating their differing levels of embeddedness.  
 
 
2.2.1. NGO-led activism 
 
CCERD is a registered local NGO embedded within the state via a web of legalistic 
requirements and bureaucratic procedures, but it is financially independent from 
the state. This means it has to work within legal bounds and is constrained in terms 
of what it can say about or do with the state. It mostly works through and within 
the bureaucratic structures of the state such as the local government, the VFF, and 
mass organisations and advocates a collaborative co-opted form of activism that 
upholds rather than challenges the status quo. Working through these existing 
formal structures opens up opportunities for the NGO to manipulate the links it has 
with these institutions. For instance, working with the VFF opened up guarded 
space for CCERD (see Chapter 5) to forge productive links with local government. 
This resonates with the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ put forward by Peter 




both autonomous from and embedded in a dense network of social ties that enable 
them to aggregate social inputs, negotiate and provide appropriate incentives for 
social institutions to thrive. While Evans’ account deals with state institutions, it is 
applicable to civil society activism. Being embedded in the state enabled CCERD to 
create productive ties with state institutions, and this created a guarded space for 
CCERD to pursue its agenda.  CCERD managed therefore to convert its 
embeddedness into productive ties.   
 
CCERD took advantage of guarded space to generate autonomy for itself, building 
its legitimacy as a social development organisation and as a friend and ally to 
relevant local actors. As outlined in Chapter 5, CCERD developed its activism over 
time. As it became more confident, it became more political through its 
involvement in community mobilisation and land advocacy. Nevertheless it had to 
work hard to find a proper tone, language, strategy and approach to mobilise 
effectively. For instance, it had to appeal to the official discourse (i.e. the existing 
state policies) to frame its mobilising strategy and sought to depoliticise its 
mobilisation by framing the question of land conflict as one of livelihoods of local 
people. It championed a collaborative approach and exercised self-censored 
mobilisation by following closely the existing formal rules. It also had to establish 
vertical coalitions with formal structures at the national level by negotiating 
relations behind the scenes. It could not be seen to be actively mobilising at this 
level because overt antagonism to the state would threaten its legitimacy and 
existence.  
 
CCERD activism did not breach the limits of institutionalised mobilisation nor did it 
attempt to change the formal rules. It mobilised to ensure existing laws (i.e. the 
existing central state policies) were properly enacted. This change, Leftwich (2008) 
describes, is that which takes place within the existing rules. He explains, while its 
outcome is unlikely to produce radical shifts in the structure and relations of power, 
change within the limit of what is permitted does not mean that it is insignificant.  
The CCERD director accepts this: 
“We have no intention of challenging or changing the existing rules of the 
formal structure. We want to help the government instead of complaining 
about it. Our actions are to help local government to deliver better policy 




Given the embedded nature of the NGO-led activism, it would be naïve to conclude 
that this embedded form will become a driving force for civil society activism that 
promotes radical change in state-society power relations in Vietnam. Nevertheless, 
NGO led change is not inconsequential. Registered NGOs in Vietnam, as observed, 
have been seeking political opportunities to engage further in the policy process, 
either through state-led public consultation or their own initiatives. Their efforts are 
aimed at delivering pro-poor policy outcomes to the marginalised communities. 
Such incremental change has transformative potential. 
 
 
2.2.2. Grassroots citizen-led activism: The Trees Movement 
 
Unlike CCERD, the TM was not embedded in the state and worked outside 
bureaucratic structures of the state, combining online activism and offline activism. 
Since it was not embedded, it could exercise its autonomy on the margins of what is 
acceptable and engaging in more antagonistic activism. This brought significant 
risks.  
 
The TM was in fact more vocal and critical than CCERD. Given that, it did not have 
long-standing engagements with local communities, it had to take advantage 
quickly of opportunities that opened up. In so doing it had to be able to mobilise 
people. The real comparative advantage of the TM was it could react quickly, and 
react with numbers.     
 
The TM had a broad-based focus for its activism, i.e. environmentalism. This helped 
it recruit a wide section of the population and also allowed it to appeal to different 
kind of emotions and motivations. The Group Green Hanoi posted on its group 
page: 
“[…] We need to create a precedent, i.e. the government must be 
accountable for its wrongdoings. […] we, citizens, are entitled to request a 
transparent and accountable government and we can do it. Public protests 
are only one component of our action agenda that step by step aims to 




(Excerpt from the Facebook page of Group Green Hanoi dated 16th April 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/vimothanoixanh)  
 
The TM activism was in principle anchored in self-determined citizenship and self-
organisation, and aimed at demanding a more accountable democratic government. 
It had greater resonance for the political elites, because it involved activated 
citizens who voluntarily took to the streets.  The TM participants understood the 
need to act because they were owners of the city. While the embedded activism 
observed in CCERD represented a long-term, sustainable co-operation and wanted 
to deliver change within the existing rules, the TM was more autonomous and 
focused on a sporadic, time-bound, and issue-based agenda. The TM wanted to 
change the rules of the game (Leftwich, 2008) (i.e. the decision making process 
must be more participatory and accountable otherwise people would resist), which 
differs from CCERD’s seeking change within the existing rules. In sum, while it 
signalled stronger resonance in terms of provoking the ruling power than CCERD, 
the TM’s impact was time-bound and transient. 
 
While the TM overall embodied an autonomous form of activism, its component 
mobilising groups were characterised by different kinds of connection to the state. 
Group 6700 People (registered NGO based) took advantage of its embedded 
connection to the state to become the path-breaking group of the movement. It is 
also because of this relation that made them diminish some of its activism. Being at 
a more distant position from the state, Group Green Hanoi had more freedom to 
advance the movement further and challenge the status quo. The TM also reflected 
upon how the state exercised its selectivity towards different mobilising groups 
with regard to their degree of institutional embeddedness. The state was more 
tolerant towards the groups with closer connection and more coercive to those 
groups dissociated from its auspices.   
 
 
2.3. Formality and Informality of activism 
 
“King’s rule stops at the village bamboo gate” is an ancient Vietnamese proverb and 
captures nicely the tone and pace of Vietnamese politics. Specifically it highlights 




both, CCERD and the TM, the interplay between formality and informality was 
important for the success of their respective mobilisations.    
 
In the thesis, formality of activism has been construed as a process through which 
different civil society groups overtly engage with and or perform their acts through 
formal channels and structures. Informality on the other hand refers to a process 
through which different groups engage with and or perform their acts through 
informal channels and structures in either an overt or covert manner. In this light, 
CCERD can be seen as a more formal organisation and the TM a more informal one. 
If the membership of the former is organised, discrete, and hierarchical, the 
membership of the latter is loose, unstructured, and non-hierarchical.  
 
In terms of the formal-informal continuum, both CCERD and the TM shared certain 
characteristics. Both acted within the law and, even if there were some differences, 
both acted with reference to state priorities or discourse. Second, both made use of 
both formal and informal channels and as such both faced the same challenge of 
how to manage this. In the following sections, I focus on the differences between 
the two organisational forms. 
 
 
2.3.1. NGO-led activism 
 
In the first place, the formality of the CCERD-led activism could be evidenced in its 
strategic use of its available structural linkages to state bodies and agents. 
Structural links, according to Houtzager (2003), bind state and society together, and 
offer opportunities for collective actors representing subordinated social groups to 
develop strategies of action. Houtzager’s structural links in this case study include 
official institutional arrangements such as the Politburo’s Resolution No 28 and the 
Government’s Decree 200 on forest land reform, and formal structures such as 
mass organisation Vietnam Fatherland Front, and the national NGO based network 





The most important formal opportunity for CCERD appropriated was the 
established legal framework on forest land reform. This was the hook that the NGO 
used to legitimise its land mobilisation. Although there was local level resistance, 
this was overcome by reference to a higher level order.  
 
The legal framework was a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful 
mobilisation. The NGO had to incorporate other formal support into its mobilising 
structure, and it had to continually find ways to forge links with the government 
power structures. This is where the collaboration with the party-owned mass 
organisation (MO), the Fatherland Front (VFF) was so important.  
 
In Vietnam, the VFF and other MOs are organised from central to grassroots levels, 
and are are regarded not only as propagation brigades but also as gatekeepers for 
the party state. As a gatekeeper, the VFF could easily have created barriers to 
prevent the NGO from gaining access to the targeted local community groups or to 
divert it to less sensitive areas. This kind of hindrance was seen in the TM when the 
MOs in the neighbourhood clusters, along with the civil defence forces and public 
security officers turned up at the homes of the campaigners and tried to stop them 
from joining the rallies. They were also active in disseminating derogatory 
information about the protesters across the neighbourhoods.  
 
CCERD deliberately targeted the VFF. As discussed in Chapter 5, it signed an 
agreement contract with the VFF to co-implement its activities. In co-opting the 
VFF, CCERD could take advantage its large-scale membership and its established 
structural links with local government structures. CCERD convinced the VFF that it 
could play a key role in delivering benefits to the poor. This was strategically 
important for the VFF. At the same time the VFF would access capacity building 
inputs as well as some funds to complement their meagre allocation of state 
budget. So in effect: a win-win situation. The involvement of the VFF meant that 
doors were opened with local authorities and any potential resistance was 
weakened. Mr Linh clarified further: 
“The FF’s involvement helped undermine the cynicism or sensitivity 
rumoured around land claims for the ethnic minorities and also formalised 




grassroots land claims to the upper levels in a formal way.” (Interview, 20 
February, 2015, Quang Binh) 
In many ways CCERD illustrates a good case of an organisation building success on 
the back of its ability to work effectively behind the scenes in more informal ways. 
Thus its formal presentation depends on the behind the scenes work. A good 
example of the behind scenes work is the relationship CCERD forged with the NGO 
Toward Sustainable Development (TSD). TSD again is a formal, registered NGO with 
national outreach. CCERD was keen to collaborate with TSD because it had good 
connections with political bodies and agents in Hanoi such as VINAFOR, as well as 
with donors and the media. Being a local based NGO, it was difficult for CCERD to 
directly access these resources. Moreover it did not want to overtly provoke 
national government structures, and in many ways TSD managed that relation for 
CCERD. CCERD on the other hand provided much needed grassroots information on 
land conflicts to TSD so that TSD could engage with national government more 
effectively. TSD’s success not only catapulted CCERD’s locality into national 
government’s spotlight but also put pressure on local government to deal with land 
conflicts in CCERD’s operational area.  
 
How did this relation benefit CCERD’s mobilisation strategy? Earlier in the thesis, I 
referred to the escalating land conflict in Quang Binh. VINAFOR was tasked with 
reviewing the implementation of the Politburo’s Resolution No 28, i.e. the party’s 
official document on forest land reform. In order to conduct the review, VINAFOR 
had to collect on-site evidence concerning forestland management across different 
parts of the country.  CCERD came to know about this plan from TSD, and started 
working behind the scenes to have Quang Binh included in the review. It was 
successful and the result of this is that Quang Binh suddenly received national policy 
attention. National media were also invited to the site. Local officials came to know 
about this but when they turned up they had little choice but to commit to the 
agenda set out by CCERD.  The relationship between CCERD and TSD resonates with 
what Mica et al. (2015) refer to as ‘formally embedded informality’, i.e. a 
combination of formal and informal approaches that are carefully managed to 





Informality was also extended to the local authorities with frequent interactions 
such as dinner meetings, casual exchanges and meetings. Nevertheless, Mr Linh 
explained that this type of informal activity was not deployed on a frequent scale:    
“Land mobilisation is not meant to bring benefits to CCERD, but to local 
communities and common interests. So, it is essential that mobilising 
activities be official, open, and transparent. If we make the relationships 
between CCERD and the local authorities personalised and clandestine, we 
will end up with some consequences that we don’t expect. For example, we 
might cause more suspicion. If this happens, collective mobilisation will 
become even harder. At worst, they might think that our mobilisation tactics 
derive from some sort of conspiracy or are set up for personal interest”.  
Also, regarding informality, CCERD appropriated the informal structures that it 
established, i.e. self-help voluntary groups, and placed them at the core of the 
mobilisation process. During mobilisation, CCERD used these members as 
spokespersons for the local communities in interactions with government officials 
of all levels, the media and the SFC.    
 
CCERD mainly appealed to formal channels and structures to orchestrate its 
mobilisation. However that is not to say it bypassed informal activism, for as Scott 
(1998) pointed out, formality always has an informal underpinning. Underpinning 
the NGO’s formal activism lies a productive and informal dynamic.   
 
 
2.3.2. Grassroots citizen-led activism: The Trees Movement 
 
The TM is an informal civilian network and had to appeal to a formal channel at the 
national level, i.e. the Constitution to organise its activism. In particular, it resorted 
to the Article 25 and Article 28 of Chapter II of the Constitution, which stipulate 
clearly the fundamental rights that Vietnamese are entitled to: 
“Article 25: Citizens have the right to freedom of speech, freedom of press, 
freedom of access to information, assembly, association and demonstration. 
The implementation of these rights is stipulated by law. 
Article 28: Citizens have the right to participate in state and social 




recommendations to government agencies on issues at the grassroots, local, 
and nation levels. 
The State shall create conditions for citizens to participate in managing state 
and society; it shall also be public and transparent in receiving as well as 
responding to petitions and complaints of citizens.” 
 
Notably, from the beginnings of the movement and before taking to the streets, the 
TM groups sought opportunities to work through interactive formal channels 
established by the government such as visiting offices open to citizens located in 
almost every government department. This proved unsuccessful because the 
government could easily dismiss the TM as an illegitimate organisation and so 
refused to dialogue with them. When Group 6700 People for example turned up at 
the city government bodies to address the public petition, they were received in a 
very lukewarm way. It was the indifference of state officials that led the 
campaigners to decide upon more street based activism.  
 
Another important formal activity that the TM quickly implemented was to organise 
a national workshop, which aimed to obtain scientific opinions concerning the 
propriety and legal basis of the tree cutting project. The scientific outputs of the 
activity were employed effectively by other mobilising groups in the subsequent 
periods of the movement, especially as useful inputs for their legal struggles.     
 
The rise of the TM reflected the ambivalence of the formal structures, such as the 
party-owned MOs, which failed to play their constitutional role as the conduit 
between the authorities and the local people when social tensions escalated. 
Instead of providing support to the TM, the MOs were among the forces that tried 
to impede the green campaigners from attending the rallies. This underlines the 
fact that being state affiliates, the MOs do not want to move beyond their officially 
sanctioned channels to work with unauthorised groups and hence bring into doubt 
their claim to be ‘representative’ of the people.   
The TM, like CCERD, had to manage its public actions and behind the scenes work. 
While publically therefore the TM seemed to be loosely structured and non-
hierarchical, behind the scenes it was very well-organised, strategic and 
professionally-led. Publically it presented itself as a movement that relied on quite a 




logos on Facebook, tying ribbons around old trees and so forth. However the 
interactions and negotiations behind the scenes were strategic, organised, 
prepared, and professional. A lot of efforts went in for example to deciding how to 
set up direct meetings with the city government, how to generate inspiring 
mobilising messages, how to create impactful banners and placards, how to 
organise rally points and street protests, and so forth. The overriding fear of 
attracting state repression meant that behind the scenes planning had to be 
meticulous and discerned.  
 
The TM showed its strategic guile in the way it took advantage of political 
opportunities. For example it successfully transformed the provocative statements 
by the government officers into triggers for mobilisation. The Tree Hugs Picnic was a 
response to defamatory comments and accusations levelled at TM by a government 
official. The TM responded swiftly: 
 
 “All we want to do is to save the trees and the city but the government 
doesn’t want to communicate with us. There are so many things that we 
have to do, and we have to do without hesitation, because they don’t give 
us even a minute to spare. Tree after tree is being chopped down. We are 
trying as much as we can. It might be not enough, or we may be too late to 
save trees. However, because of this, we have to raise our voice so that 
there will be no more environmental destruction like this in the time to 
come. We are not the ones who try to hinder human progressiveness. What 
we all demand is transparency, consultation and public respect. Nature 
needs also to be respected. Tomorrow we will go for the Trees Hug Picnic to 
show our love to the city, our love to the nature, our love to the 
environment. We can sing, dance, or hug trees…”  
(Quoted from fanpage of Group 6700 People, 18 March 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/manfortree/notes/?ref=page_internal) 
 
To conclude, the mobilisation strategies of CCERD and the TM had similarities and 
differences. While CCERD can be seen as a form of cooperative, embedded, and 
structurally-linked activism; the TM reflects a more autonomous and antagonistic 
form. 







In this chapter, I have compared my two cases by looking specifically at three areas 
underpinning my analytical framework: legitimacy, autonomy, and (in)formality. 
The chapter has argued that civil society groups in authoritarian contexts, such as 
Vietnam, have to couch their activities within the state agenda and discourse to 
exercise their activism, irrespective of their organisational structures, positions of 
legitimacy, as well as degrees of autonomy. On the face of it, NGO-led activism 
appears to be formal and the TM more informal. Nevertheless, behind the scenes 
they both had to manage formal and informal opportunities and relations. This 
finding has led me to question the distinction often made between NGO-led and 
citizen-led activism. It suggests that in authoritarian contexts there are significant 
similarities in the way these different activisms are articulated and operationalised.  
 
Both organisations needed different forms of legitimacy. The TM was transient, 
time-bound and issue-based whereas CCERD was a local long-standing social 
development organisation. What constitutes legitimacy for both organisation, 
differs. The TM needed to convince the public that its struggle was citizen focused 
and democratic. CCERD needed to deliver to landless farmers and therefore had to 
show that its work and mobilisation were contributing to this. It also had to show 
the government that it was operating within its agreed mandate. I highlighted this 
core distinction by associating CCERD with pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy 
needs, and the TM with more normative legitimacy needs. 
 
Both organisations had different levels and kinds of autonomy. CERD was, through 
registration, connected to the state and had to work to an agreed and controlled 
mandate. Its connections to the state restricted some aspects of autonomy but of 
course opened up areas of activity or created room for manoeuvre that enhanced 
autonomy. The TM had no formal connection to the state and was in that respect 
more autonomous. However its lack of connection also meant it had no ‘guarded or 
semi protected’ room for manoeuvre. The risk of state repression was higher. So 
while it was able to support more antagonistic mobilisations, it was very restricted 
in terms of autonomy. The two cases show the significance of connections to the 




possible, and their influence on organisations to mobilise and operate 
autonomously. 
 
Both CCERD and the TM had to manage an interplay of formal and informal 
connections and events in order to orchestrate their activism. However CCERD 
worked mostly through formal structures and channels and had an identifiable 
leadership while the TM deployed far more informal channels and had a far more 
diffusive leadership.  




















The thesis has examined contemporary civil society activism in Vietnam and 
reflected upon the politics of state-society relations in the same country. This has 
been achieved through an analysis of two contrasting forms of activism, NGO-led 
and citizen-led activism with an examination that has located these in a wider 
historical context. The research has sought to understand how civil society groups 
characterised by different organisational structures, degrees of autonomy, and 
positions of legitimacy orchestrated collective action.  
 
 
1. Key research findings 
 
This research has demonstrated that forms of activism are closely associated with 
the degrees of autonomy, positions of legitimacy and organisational structures 
pertaining to specific civil society groups. Hence, understanding these features 
provides important insights into their actions and decisions. By highlighting these 
distinctive features, the thesis challenges those civil society theories that overplay 
the distinctions between citizen-led and NGO-led mobilisations, and those that 
portray an autonomous and conflictual state-society relationship. These are not 
analytically agile enough for authoritarian contexts like Vietnam. In authoritarian 
contexts such as Vietnam, civil society groups, regardless of whether they are 
formal and registered or informal and unregistered, have to couch their activities 
within the state agenda and discourse in order to implement an activist agenda.  
 
Existing scholarship on civil society activism in Vietnam focuses on either state-led 
or society-led change, leading to two different political narratives: a strong state or 
a vibrant civil society. While under the former, the transformative role of the state 
is highlighted, under the latter, it is society that drives change. The thesis has 
contested these polarities with the argument that a strong state does not always 
mean state effectiveness and accountability, and that a vibrant civil society does not 




and so forth. Civil society vibrancy is still largely contingent on the space opened up 
for it.  
 
It is important in concluding this thesis to retrace the process through which I 
addressed these issues. Following the thesis introduction that presented my 
research puzzle, chapter one provided a background understanding of state-society 
relations in Vietnam drawing on relevant existing literature. It examined two key 
perspectives, the strong state and the vibrant civil society, locating both in an 
historical overview of the ever evolving political landscape in Vietnam. It also 
provided a historically-rooted overview of civil society in Vietnam, with a particular 
focus on VNGOs and critical periods of civil society development.  
 
Chapter two critically discussed the theoretical aspects regarding civil society 
activism in authoritarian contexts and particularly presented an analytical 
framework for understanding civil society activism in the Vietnamese context. The 
framework identified three distinctive features of civil society activism: legitimacy, 
autonomy, and formality or informality of activism. These features are anchored in 
the literature but were also subsequently validated and triangulated through my 
data collection and analysis. Whilst applied to the case of Vietnam, I would argue 
they are relevant to authoritarian contexts more generally.   
 
Chapter three detailed the methods and research process I followed by tracing how 
I came up with my in-depth case studies, data collection, research questions as well 
as how I addressed research challenges and ethical issues. 
 
The focus shifted in Chapter four to the start of my empirical analysis. Chapters 4 
and 5 examined how the two in-depth case study participants orchestrated their 
mobilisation. Specifically, Chapter 4 explored a high-profile case of civil society 
action that was performed by different informal civilian groups. It showcased a 
broad-based citizen-led movement established to protest against the arbitrary 
government decision to cut down thousands of large old trees lining the streets of 
Hanoi. I used this case study to argue that citizen-led activism, an emerging form of 
civic engagement, is likely to play a critical role in effecting change and 




political elites that ordinary civilians are able to organise rightful civic actions to 
oppose unpopular or unaccountable government decisions and policies. In 
particular, this form of activism accentuates the ‘contested’ nature of civil society 
activism, which has been long obscured by the rhetoric that civil society under 
authoritarian regimes like Vietnam is either co-opted or suppressed. This case study 
also points to the potential significance of critical green activism. Environmental 
issues have the potential to attract broad participation and can open new avenues 
for civilians in authoritarian contexts like Vietnam to mobilise for their rights and 
demand a more accountable government.  
 
Chapter 5 presented a case study of NGO-led activism. It described how the NGO 
took advantage of its connections to the state, working within and through 
bureaucratic structures and negotiating structural links at different levels. Since it 
was more embedded within the state than the citizen-led movement, it was able to 
pursue a more collaborative approach. This led to a local government response that 
favoured the clients of the NGO.   
 
Chapter 6 engaged directly in comparative analysis of the two contrasting forms of 
activism based on three domains indicated in the analytical framework: legitimacy, 
autonomy, and formality or informality of activism. The chapter identified 
similarities as well as differences between the NGO and the citizen-led movement, 
and analysed the implications of this for successful mobilisation as well as for state-
society relations in Vietnam.  
 
Whilst the TM has portrayed a transient, time-bound and antagonistic form of 
activism, in which discrete informal civilian groups organised themselves and stood 
up to the state, the NGO-led activism showcased a more sustainable, embedded, 
and collaborative form. Despite being an informal structure and exercising 
contestation, the TM still had to couch its activities within the state agenda and 
discourse to orchestrate its collective actions. The unprecedented phenomenon of a 
symbiotic relationship between registered (NGOs) and unregistered (dissidents and 
independent activists) groups in the TM, served as an incubator for more organised 
and antagonistic collective action. My analysis concluded that the embedded NGO-
led activism is unlikely to produce radical shifts in the political structure and power 




studies, with different organisational structures and strategies of legitimation, 
illustrate two contrasting forms of activism as well as different forms of contentious 
politics in Vietnam ranging from dialogue to advocacy through to contention.  
 
By providing in-depth insights into the key themes of legitimacy, autonomy, and 
(in)formality, I have addressed directly both research questions one and two of my 
thesis. With respect to Question 1 “What organisational forms do civil society 
groups adopt and how are these positioned in relation to the state?”, my analysis 
has demonstrated that civil society groups with different organisational structures 
(either formally or informally organised), degrees of autonomy (the ability to act 
given the extent of embeddedness in the state) and positions of legitimacy (either 
given or ungiven), have to build and maintain legitimacy for their actions and 
organisational structures. In authoritarian contexts, such as Vietnam, state 
authority is still dominant and hence, any civil society activism has to operate within 
this dominance. The two cases show that there are quite different ways of 
operating within this dominance, with quite different outcomes.  
 
Question 2 asked: “What strategies of engagement do civil society groups adopt in 
order to achieve their goals”. My analysis suggests that under authoritarian regimes 
such as in Vietnam, all forms of activism are constrained by the state. Unregistered 
and informal groups mostly deploy unconventional methods and informal channels 
such as public demonstrations, civil disobedience, and petition signing while 
registered and formal groups mainly engage with policy makers and working 
through formal channels. However, my analysis also emerges that in order to make 
collective action a success these groups have to exercise activism in line with the 
state agenda and discourse.  
 
The section that follows addresses Question 3 of my research: “How do the 
contrasting forms of civil society activism illuminate the evolving state-society 






2. Reflecting on the politics of state-society relations in 
Vietnam 
 
My research sought to examine contemporary civil society activism and reflect on 
its implications for broader state-society relations in the changing political 
landscape of Vietnam. As I collected data for my research I was struck by the 
perspectives of my interviewees. These can be divided into two broad camps. Those 
who worked with or for the NGO tended to have a more optimistic outlook and 
tended to see a future in which civil society would function effectively in Vietnam. 
In the vast majority of cases, this perspective was held by people who worked with 
the state. On the other hand those who participated in the TM tended largely to be 
more pessimistic and pointed to a future of struggle and antagonism as well as their 
experiences of repression. In the vast majority of cases, this perspective was held by 
people who had openly mobilised against the state.   
Besides this rather general categorisation what other lessons can be drawn from 
the two in-depth case studies?  
 
First, civil society groups in authoritarian contexts like Vietnam, have to orchestrate 
collective action within the state agenda and discourse irrespective of their 
institutional characteristics. As a consequence, being embedded in the authoritarian 
state matters, because it offers a relatively guarded space for civil society groups to 
accomplish collective goals. My research has also shown however that being 
embedded is not necessarily the same as being co-opted. At the same time civil 
society actors work to co-opt government. This was evidenced in the NGO case 
study where CCERD secured the support of national agents in order to pressure 
local government officials and in effect, force their compliance and cooperation.  
 
Varying levels of embeddedness in the state open up different kinds of space and 
opportunities. Thus the NGO managed to trigger change but the change was 
operational in that it ultimately helped the state better implement its policies. This 
had a positive and arguably transformative impact upon landless farmers but did 
not produce radical shifts in the political structure and relations of power. Arguably 




relatively little real tangible change but mounted a vocal and broad based protest 
against the state. This was a more direct challenge to the status quo.  
 
Second, whilst the different civil society groups explored in this thesis are 
embedded in different organisational structures and occupy different kinds of 
space, they nevertheless orchestrate their collective actions through similar 
channels. During the mobilisation process, they both engaged in formal and 
informal activism to different degrees at different times so as to make full use of the 
political opportunity structures and maximise impact. The similarity in approaches 
to successful mobilisation suggests that the distinction made between NGO-led and 
citizen-led mobilisation may not be that strong. This also challenges the new social 
movement perspective that indicates that collective actors must work outside the 
existing bureaucratic structures.  
 
Third, existing scholarship on state-society relations in Vietnam has focused on 
either state-led or society-led change. My analysis shows that the state is strong not 
in the sense that it is able to put in place sound institutional preconditions for the 
rule of law or to facilitate the healthy development of associational life and 
inclusive economic institutions. It is strong because it monopolises power. This gives 
it the upper hand when faced with opposition and criticism. The two previous 
points already unsettle the focus that argues change in Vietnam is society based. 
Civil society activisms can be transformative but only in an incremental way and, 
again, only if aligned to state discourse. It is likely that civil society activism will 
increase in the future and will take on innovative forms and expressions. My 
analysis suggests this growth and expansion will not necessarily result in a gradual 
weakening of the state.  
 
Fourth, environmental issues have opened up a new arena of contestation for civil 
society activism in Vietnam. The severity of ecological damage has helped awaken 
an emerging urban middle class of citizens, who are more educated, innovative and 
increasingly concerned about the impacts of unselective, haphazard economic 
development on the natural habitat and civic life. They have become more vocal 
and willing to take a stand. Expansive use of digital and technological tools, 
including social media, has given an impetus to environmental activism in Vietnam. 




public contestation towards laying down the first bricks for a more democratic and 
rule of law society.   
 
The continued environmental activism, from protecting green trees (2015) to 
protecting coastal and marine life along with other ecological issues (2016 - to 
present) questions the state’s credibility. Following the Trees Movement in Hanoi in 
2015, the green activists continued to take to the streets demanding environmental 
justice when the heavily polluting discharge from the Taiwanese plant flowed 
directly into the sea causing a massive dead fish disaster across the north-central 
Vietnamese coast. This environmental destruction badly damaged the livelihoods of 
millions of fishermen as well as the eco-system. 2016 was a memorable year of 
associationalism in Vietnam, with multiple large-scale public protests focusing on 
environmental protection with thousands of participants across many provinces and 
cities. Taking to the streets is a civic response by activated citizens faced with 
ineffective legislative, executive and judicial processes and procedures.  While 
independent activists, including new and old faces, have continued street and 
online activism, the registered NGOs and local experts have been trying to improve 
public awareness of the idea of ‘environmental justice’ through more formal 
channels such as  mainstream media, communication activities and trainings.  
 
There are two increasing signs regarding environmentalism in Vietnam recently that 
deserve mention. First, environmental activism is no longer urban-based and 
concentrated in major cities, instead it has been expanded to rural areas and across 
many regions. Second, environmentalism is now also moving to the areas 
concentrated by marginalised groups such as Christian communities. The active and 
large-scale participation of Christians in environmentalism sparks other contentions, 
which genuinely embarrasses the ruling communists and provokes more 
sophisticating repressive response. So might the environment open up new activist 
alliances and collaborations in the future? And how will this shape state-society 
relations in Vietnam?  
 
It is however not a surprise to find that as environmental activism gathered pace in 
2016, state repression seemed also to increase. In 2016 there were more arrests 
and force used against human rights bloggers, land rights activists and green 




intimidation, legal harassment and physical assault. Repressive measures were used 
against the peaceful pro-environment marches in two big cities, namely, Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City. Many protesters reported on their Facebook pages that they were 
beaten and detained for hours. What is more worrying for rights activists and 
dissidents is that the state crackdown on them still prevails even when foreign 
diplomats are present. For example, prominent activists could not attend the 
meeting with President Barack Obama when he visited Hanoi in 2016, because they 
were detained or put under house arrest. According to the Human Rights Watch 
Report 2016 for Vietnam (HRW, 2017), at least 19 prominent activists and bloggers 
were sentenced from 20 months to nine years in prison for their blogging or 
peaceful rights campaigning. In addition, eight other bloggers were also arrested for 
allegedly ‘conducting propaganda against the state’, the term frequently used to 
denounce critics.  This response mirrors perfectly well the analysis presented in my 
thesis. 
 
Vietnamese politics in 2016 and the early days of 2017 offer an uncertain terrain for 
dissidents and rights activists. Nevertheless, there are some positive signs arising 
from the activism led by formally organised associations (registered NGOs). In 2017 
two national conferences on ‘Promoting Environmental Justice’ and the second, 
‘Annual Conference on the Role of Civil Society to cultural, socio-economic 
development in Vietnam’ were organised by NGOs. So far, these two events have 
not encountered excessive police intervention. This again mirrors the analysis 
presented in my thesis because it is likely that the lack of repression is because the 
NGOs have a ‘guarded space’ to operate. The fact that they enjoy such guarded 
space is testament to their resilience, their political astuteness and their continued 
legitimacy.   
 
The sense of resilience and legitimacy emerges from the rationale used for the 
second Annual Civil Society Conference, entitled “Philosophy of Development: 
lessons from the past and orientation to the future”. It reads:  
 “[…] After thirty years of renovation, Vietnam has made significant 
achievements in socio-economic development. […] However, accompanying 
this development is the emergence of many challenges and issues. For 
example, the widening economic inequality in Vietnam could result in 




and modernisation’ has been advocated to justify the national resource 
allocation inefficiency, which leads to public debt and bad debt at an 
alarming level. The rapid urbanisation and commercialisation are eliminating 
cultural and natural heritage as well as local ethnic knowledge, which could 
undermine the national competitive advantages of Vietnam in the 
integration process. National success or failure much depends on the 
development philosophy upon which that country embarks. After 30 years 
of renovation, Vietnam has gained enough experience to look back, draw 
lessons and adjust its development philosophy. With the aim of contributing 
to the analysis of successes and failures, challenges and obstacles, and 
lessons learnt for the future development model, the second Annual Civil 
Society Conference will be focused on “Philosophy of Development: lessons 
from the past and orientation for the future for Vietnam”.   
 
From livelihood development efforts in the early days to the philosophy of 
development over twenty years later is illustrative of a long journey, which local 
NGOs have embarked upon. Discussing the philosophy of development is in fact to 
question the way in which the Communist Party is leading the country.     
 
 
3. Towards civil society activism in authoritarian contexts: 
conceptual and empirical contributions 
 
The thesis has provided an in-depth bottom-up account of civil society activism 
under the one-party rule of Vietnam. While the research does not aim to offer a list 
of recommendations for civil society activism in authoritarian contexts, it has 
pointed towards a number of empirical and conceptual contributions given that the 
existing literature on civil society activism in authoritarian contexts remains limited, 
fragmentary and lacks a strong theoretical paradigm.  
 
First, this thesis makes an intellectual contribution by offering a conceptual 
framework that covers different forms of activism, i.e. NGO-led and citizen-led. It 




around legitimacy, autonomy and (in)formality. This has been applied to the context 
of Vietnam but could, I would argue, be applied in other authoritarian contexts. 
Above, I go into more detail about how these analytical concepts have helped shed 
light on my research context.  
 
To date, there has remained an important lacuna in research on understanding 
relations between legitimacy and social movements. My research fills this gap by 
providing analytical insights into how the citizen-led movement has legitimised its 
actions to gain wider civilian participation, thereby making intermediate impact on 
the power holders. Looking at strategies of legitimation associated with a social 
movement rather than searching for an answer to the classic question ‘whether a 
social movement is a legitimate structure’, offers a more nuanced understanding of 
the nexus between legitimacy and social movements.  
 
Second, my analysis has led me to question the distinction often made between 
NGO-led and citizen-led activism. This emerges from an analysis that found 
significant similarities in the way these different activisms are articulated and 
operationalised.  
 
Third, the thesis has rejected the tendency that exists in much of the current 
literature to downplay NGO-led engagement at the expense of more antagonistic 
forms of activism, such as public protests and social movements. The existing 
accounts also tend to treat each form of activism separately, but my study has 
examined both of them with equal focus. The research has argued that a more 
nuanced understanding of evolving state-society relations can emerge from an 
approach that places equal emphasis on these different forms. It has involved 
attempting to problematise and disaggregate civil society activism into specific 
forms characterised by organisational structures, degrees of autonomy and 
strategies of legitimation. Moreover, the extent to which these forms have 
contributed to effecting change and restructuring state-society relations in Vietnam 
have been explored. These forms also reflect different episodes of contentious 
politics ranging from dialogue to advocacy through to contention in Vietnam, and 





Finally, the research has provided the first in-depth analysis of the Trees 
Movement, which is an important empirical contribution. It has also offered a 
timely bottom-up account of online activism, whereby the role of social media in 
social and political actions in authoritarian contexts is significant. There is no doubt 
that the use of social media has opened new arenas where civilians can mobilise 
and act, such that it is changing the way in which social mobilisation takes place in 
authoritarian contexts. With the Trees Movement, my research also provides an 
important empirical contribution to the very thin literature on the surreptitious 
symbiosis that can exist between NGOs and independent activists or dissidents in 























THEMES FOR INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS 
A. The NGO – CCERD 
55 interviews (including repeated ones) and 5 focus groups (with NGO staff and 
community members) 
The NGO leader and staff  The NGO’s emergence and development? 
 What issues does the NGO best resolve? 
 You claim to work for the poor. Why do you think 
poor people are poor? What do you do to address 
the extents of poverty at the locality?  
 What does the term ‘civil society’ and ‘community 
mobilisation’ mean to you? 
 What do you think about  
 Fields of activities: micro finance, land advocacy, 
etc.? 
 Who are the NGO’s target populations? 
 What are the root cause of land conflict in the 
locality? Why did it happen? 
 How do local stakeholders involve? 
 Why did you embark on land mobilisation? 
 What are legal basis you use for mobilisation? 
 What are the strategies of mobilisation? How did 
you do it? 
 What are the difficulties, challenges as well as 
opportunities in land mobilisation? 
 How are the relationships between the NGO and 
mass organisations, local governments, and other 
NGOs at the local and national level? (i.e. coalition 
building at different levels) 
 How and Why did you engage with national 
stakeholders? 
 How did the local government respond to the 
organisation’s involvement?  




to the organisation? How are your relationships 
with them? 
Local communities, local 
officials, other local 
NGOs, mass 
organisations 
 How long have you involved in the NGO’s 
activities? Why involved? 
 What do you think about the NGO’s activities at the 
locality? 
 What are the recognizable benefits that the NGO 
delivers to the local communities? 
 What is the NGO’s relationships with you and other 
local stakeholders? 
 Why did land conflict happen and remain? What is 
the root cause? 
 What have you done regarding this issue? 
Obstacles? Challenges?  
 What is the role the NGO plays in claiming land for 
local communities? 
 How were land issues resolved since the NGO’s 
involvement? 
 For you what other development areas should the 
NGO concentrate on? 
 
 
B. The Trees Movement 
Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, focus group was therefore not 
utilized. 45 formal interviews were conducted with a wide range of actors who were 
closely associated with the movement (e.g. dissidents, independent activists, 
bloggers, rights activists, local NGO leaders, lawyers, writers, artists, housewives, 
journalists). However, besides formal interviews, a notable number of informal ones 
were complementarily conducted to accommodate the specific contexts and to get 
as much insight as possible of the movement. 
Key themes covered in 
the interviews 
 Motivation of participation in the TM? Perceptions 
of participants? Why involved in the TM? Why 
vocal?  
 Methods of activism? 
 Feelings? Beliefs? Targets? Aspirations? Tactics?  




 Fear of state repression? 
 Relationships with other groups in the TM? 
 State response? 
 Why did registered groups and unregistered groups 
have common voice in this movement? 


























APPENDIX TWO – THEMES USED FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
 
CCERD  Emergence and Development 
 Critical phases of organisational development 
 Community engagement 
 Coalition building 
 What are political opportunities? 
 Transformative events 
 Strategies/tactics of mobilisation 
 Participation expansion 
 Structural links 
 Types of legitimacy 




 Types of space 




 Emergence of the movement 
 Emergence of different groups (why and how) 
 Differences between the groups 
 What are political opportunities? 
 Transformative events 
 Strategies/ tactics of mobilisation 
 Participation expansion 
 Types of legitimacy 




 Types of space 
 State response 








APPENDIX THREE – TYPES AND NUMBERS OF 
ORGANISATIONS AND INFORMANTS 
In relation to research ethics, it was compulsory for me to retain anonymity of 
respondents and organisations that I engaged with for empirical data collection. 
Moreover, I conducted a large number of informal exchanges in data collection. The 
table below presents the types and numbers of organisations and people 
interviewed. 
 
The Trees Movement groups: 
(1)  Group 6700 People 
(2) Group 6700 Trees 





(these members come from different 
backgrounds: lawyers, NGOs, dissidents, 
writers, housewives, rights activists, 
students, academics, journalists, etc.) 
State-related agencies: 
(1) Ministry of Home Affairs 
(2) Commune government 
(3) District government 
(4) Provincial government 
(5) District mass organisations  
(6) VUSTA (Vietnam Union of 
Science and technology 
associations) 
(7) Members of Parliament 
   
 
05 senior staff 
02 senior staff 
03 senior staff 
02 senior staff 
02 senior staff 
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